SDHF Newsletter No.455 The Road to the Greater East Asian War No. 53 Ch.13-4

THE ROAD TO THE GREATER EAST ASIAN WAR
Nakamura Akira, Dokkyo University Professor Emeritus
(English Translation: Society for the Dissemination of Historical Fact)
Part 53, Chapter 13: What Transpired at Lugou Bridge – 4

March 13, 2026

What was Japan’s response to the Lugou Bridge Incident?

On July 8, the day after the incident, central Army authorities and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs decided upon a policy of non-escalation and local resolution. At an extraordinary Cabinet meeting on July 9, Army Minister Sugiyama Hajime pressed for the dispatch of three divisions to China. But Foreign Minister Hirota Koki (and every other Cabinet member, for that matter) opposed his plan on the grounds that doing so might lead to a full-scale war. Also influencing that position was the fact that some Cabinet members had heard that a ceasefire had been negotiated locally. The more intransigent arguments were overruled by a general determination to avoid escalation of the hostilities.

But Chinese troops did not withdraw as promised during the negotiations. Instead, they continued to engage in provocative acts, and rumors began to circulate that the Central Army was advancing northward. On July 10, the Konoe Cabinet made a provisional decision to dispatch two brigades from the Guandong Army, one division from Korea, and three divisions from Japan proper to the Beiping area. On the following day, July 11, the Cabinet decided to dispatch three divisions from Japan as an immediate measure. That decision was made public.

However, when a ceasefire agreement was reached locally at 8:00 p.m. on July 11, the Japanese government postponed the mobilization of divisions from Japan. It also dispatched Shibayama Kenshirō, head of the Army Ministry’s Military Affairs Section, and Nakajima Tetsuzō, head of
the Army General Staff’s General Affairs Bureau, to China to re-emphasize the government’s non-escalation policy.

The local ceasefire agreement on July 11 read as follows:

1. The representatives of the 29th Army hereby express their regret to the Japanese military, and vow that they shall punish those responsible and ensure that incident of this sort do not recur.
2. (Omitted)
3. As this incident was for the most part engineered by the Blue Shirts Society, the Communist Party, and other anti-Japanese groups, exhaustive preventive measures shall be taken in future.

Informed that a supplementary agreement detailing the implementation of Article 3 (concerning the elimination of anti-Japanese activity) had been signed, and that the Hebei-Chahar Political Council would remove 37th Division troops from Beiping, the 29th Army intended to observe the ceasefire agreement. But pro-Communist groups had infiltrated that army, and as early as July 13, acts violating the agreement had commenced. On July 20, Chinese troops at Wanping Fortress, who were scheduled to withdraw and be replaced by security forces, suddenly attacked Japanese troops with a volley of artillery fire. In response to the illegal Chinese attack, the Japanese government approved the deployment of three divisions from Japan. But on July 21, Shibayama Kenshirō, head of the Military Affairs Section, who had been dispatched to the area, returned to Tokyo. There he reported that the Tianjin Garrison could operate effectively with reinforcements from Manchuria and Korea, and that there was no need to mobilize any divisions from Japan. The Tianjin Garrison’s Chief of Staff also stated that the 37th Division in Beiping had begun to withdraw to Baoding. Consequently, Army authorities decided to postpone deploying divisions from Japan.

However, after the outbreak of the Langfang Incident (July 25) and the Guang’an Gate Incident (July 26), Chief of Operations Ishiwara Kanji, the key supporter of non-escalation efforts, felt compelled to announce, “Delay will lead to utter ruin!” On July 27, central Army authorities issued an order to mobilize three divisions from Japan, for the third time. In the early morning of July 28, the Tianjin Garrison notified the 29th Army of its intention to commence hostilities, and proceeded to launch a full-scale assault.

URL: https://www.sdh-fact.com/book-article/2436/
PDF: https://www.sdh-fact.com/CL/Road53E.pdf

Moteki Hiromichi, Chairman
Society for the Dissemination of Historical Fact