SDHF Newsletter No.444 The Road to the Greater East Asian War No. 46 Ch.11-5

THE ROAD TO THE GREATER EAST ASIAN WAR
Nakamura Akira, Dokkyo University Professor Emeritus
(English Translation: Society for the Dissemination of Historical Fact)
Part 46, Chapter 11: Japan-China Relations on Northen China -5

October 14, 2025

After the Tanggu Truce was concluded, the inhabitants of North China were not altogether satisfied with life under the rule of the Nanjing Nationalist government. Farmers in the Demilitarized Zone harbored a fervent desire for North China autonomy, and hoped an opportunity would arise.

What motivated them was frustration with the Nanjing government’s predatory tax policy vis à vis North China over the preceding decade. Here is one example: In 1935 the government collected 14,000 yuan per annum in central government tax and non-tax revenue, but expended only 8,350 yuan on North China. Exploitative policies like this had been commonly used by Chinese warlords in the past. But as Chiang Kai-shek’s regime gradually retrenched in the face of Manzhouguo’s remarkable progress, it was only natural that a deep-seated longing for autonomy would spring up among the people of North China.

As the notion of political autonomy for North China began to surface, so did unrest among North China’s warlords. They were aware of the need for an alliance with Japan. But they were apprehensive about pressure from Nanjing, and refrained from acting precipitously. The Nanjing government responded to turmoil in North China by using a combination of inflexible and accommodating tactics. In November of 1935 the Nationalist government initiated a currency reform with British backing. If the reform were successful, Nanjing’s control over North China would certainly tighten. Both Song Zheyun and Han Fuju attempted to sabotage it by prohibiting the export of silver from their provinces, and attempted to achieve autonomy for North China.

The North China autonomy movement was in turmoil in November 1935, thanks to the Nanjing government’s attempts to undermine it, and vacillation on the part of the warlords. Then, in Tongzhou on November 25, Yin Rugeng, the commissioner of the Demilitarized Zone, suddenly issued a declaration of autonomy for the zone and announced the establishment of the East Hebei Anti-Communist Autonomous Council. Yin became chairman of the council, which had nine members. The autonomous region comprised 25 counties, seven more than the 18 designated in the Tanggu Truce.

In the meantime, demonstrations in Tianjin and Beiping, which involved both anti- and pro- autonomy groups, created chaos. Finally, the Nanjing government decided that, given the circumstances, it would be preferable to anticipate the Japanese by establishing a political organization suited to North China, one that would allow the central government to salvage its reputation. On December 18 the Hebei-Chahar Political Council was born. The council would have jurisdiction over all government affairs for two provinces (Hebei and Chahar) and two cities (Beiping and Tianjin). When Song was installed as chairman, he said that politics should respect the will of the people and be guided by integrity. While the East Hebei Anti-Communist Autonomy Council stressed independence from the Nanjing government and pro-Japanese, the Hebei-Chahar Political Council was rooted in compromise between Japan and China. Song was hand-picked by the Japanese, but the Hebei-Chahar Council was an organ of the Nationalist government. Their involvement in the organizations notwithstanding, the Japanese were not manipulating them.

URL: 　 https://www.sdh-fact.com/book-article/2385
PDF: 　 https://www.sdh-fact.com/CL/Road46E.pdf

Moteki Hiromichi, Chairman
Society for the Dissemination of Historical Fact