SDHF Newsletter No.436 The Road to the Greater East Asian War No. 42 Ch.11-1

THE ROAD TO THE GREATER EAST ASIAN WAR
Nakamura Akira, Dokkyo University Professor Emeritus
(English Translation: Society for the Dissemination of Historical Fact)
Part 42, Chapter 11: Japan-China Relations on Northen China -1

September 5, 2025

Manzhouguo was established in March 1932. But in the ensuing years, bandits continued to run rampant in the region – more than 200,000 of them. The Japanese Guandong Army launched punitive expeditions against them, and as a result, by February 1933 most of the bandits had been expelled or eliminated.

Meanwhile Zhang Xueliang, who had been driven out of Manchuria, managed to form a volunteer army of 40,000 men strong. He proceeded to invade Rehe province, where he organized a base of operations for anti-Manzhouguo and anti-Japanese activity. In the beginning of February 1933, Guandong Army launched Operation Rehe, whose objective was to expel Zhang’s forces, which were the main cause of the turmoil in Manzhouguo. The Japanese speedily routed the Chinese, and, by early March, had taken control of the Great Wall’s key passes. But Commander Mutō Nobuyoshi issued the following secret directive on February 19, which strictly forbade his men from venturing south of the Great Wall.

The operation at hand concerns Manzhouguo and only Manzhouguo. Provoking war with China is contrary to national policy. … Hebei province, situated beyond the Great Wall, is Republic of China territory. We may not take operational action in Hebei in the absence of imperial orders.

However, the Nationalist government ordered the 50,000-man Central Army to advance northward. The Guangdong Army was struggling in the face of fierce Chinese Central Army counteroffensives at every major pass along the Great Wall, in part because the Chinese had the advantage of being able to look down the Japanese from the Great Wall. China’s 20-division Central Army, realizing that the Japanese should stop short of the Great Wall, assembled in the Pingjin area and made repeated attempts to recapture the positions they had lost. The Japanese were provoked into expanding their theater to include the interior of the passes. Now the Japanese offensive beyond the Great Wall began in earnest. By May 23, Beiping was within striking distance. At this juncture the Chinese were helpless. On May 25 the Chinese dispatched an emissary with a formal ceasefire proposal. On May 31 the Tanggu Truce was signed. Its essential points were (1) the Chinese army shall immediately withdraw to regions west and south of the line from Yanqing to … Tongzhou … and Lutai; (2) the Japanese army will not cross the said line, nor continue to attack Chinese troops, and shall voluntarily withdraw to the Great Wall; and (3) in the region to the south of the Great Wall and north and east of the line defined in (1), maintenance of peace and order shall be undertaken by the Chinese police force.

The Tanggu Truce clearly delineated the border between Manchuria and China and provided, to some extent, a resolution of the Manchurian Incident. Why, then, did it not put a complete end to disputes between Japan and China?

General Ishihara Kanji replied to this sensitive question: “The Tanggu Truce was a success in that it offered a local resolution to the conflict between Japan and China. However, it should have gone further, including provisions for diplomatic negotiations resulting in a promise (even a tacit one) from Chiang Kai-shek to put a halt to anti-Japanese activity, initiate Japan-China joint efforts to combat communism, and recognize Manzhouguo.

URL: https://www.sdh-fact.com/book-article/2356
PDF: https://www.sdh-fact.com/CL/Road42E.pdf

Moteki Hiromichi, Chairman
Society for the Dissemination of Historical Fact