SDHF Newsletter No.420 The Road to the Greater East Asian War No. 34 Ch.9-6

THE ROAD TO THE GREATER EAST ASIAN WAR
Nakamura Akira, Dokkyo University Professor Emeritus
(English Translation: Society for the Dissemination of Historical Fact)
Part 34, Chapter 9: Contending with Attempts to Communize China-VI

January 10, 2025

In 1928 the Tanaka Cabinet joined the other powers in signing an international pact, the General Treaty for Renunciation of War as a National Policy, the intent of which was to demonstrate to the world the desire of signatories to abolish war.

The same treaty was used excessively in the condemnation of Japan at the IMTFE, held after the Greater East Asian War. Proposed by Frank B. Kellogg, US secretary of state, and Aristide Briand, the French foreign minister (and therefore commonly known as the Kellog-Briand Pact, but also referred to as the Pact of Paris), the treaty was concluded in Paris on August 27, 1928. It comprised the following three provisions:

Article I
The High Contracting Parties solemnly declare in the names of their respective people that they condemn recourse to war for the solution of international controversies, and renounce it, as an instrument of national policy in their relations with one another.

Article II
The High Contracting Parties agree that the settlement or solution of all disputes or conflicts of whatever nature or whatever origin they may be, which may arise among them shall never be sought except by pacific means.

(Article III describes ratification and procedural matters.）

However, the idealistic treaty had a major flaw: thanks to assertions on the part of powers like the UK, US, and France, it made exceptions for defensive wars. Furthermore, as the US argued, it allowed the nation or nations involved in the dispute to decide whether the claim of self-defense was legitimate. In his judgement submitted to the IMTFE, held after the Greater East Asian War had ended, Justice Radhabinod Pal refers to a statement made by Secretary Kellog concerning self-defense, in which the US argued that the right of self-defense was not limited to a nation’s own territory.

What was Japan’s reaction to the treaty? Foreign Minister Tanaka prepared a written response describing Japan’s position and stating that he agreed with the American proposal. When he delivered it to US Ambassador Charles MacVeagh, he sought the diplomat’s understanding by further elaborating on Japan’s attitude toward China. About the right of self-defense he said, “Japan’s neighbor, China, is constantly engaged in civil warfare. Although war with China is, of course, not something we wish to engage in, we must always be cognizant of the necessity of taking appropriate defense measures.”

The first violation of the pact soon occurred, the guilty party being the USSR. In 1929 Zhang Xueliang searched the Soviet consulate in Harbin., where he discovered and confiscated evidence of a communist revolutionary plot, which motivated him to seize control of Chinse Eastern Railway. The Soviets retaliated by crossing the border between the USSR and Manchuria with both air and land forces., and invading Manchuria in November. They repelled Zhang’s northeastern army and succeeded in restoring the railway to joint Soviet-Chinese administration, as it had been since the days of imperial Russia. The Sino-Soviet conflict drew the attention of the US, UK, France, and Italy concerning the USSR’s obligation to the Pact of Paris. But the Soviets objected to the interference of third-party nations, insisting that they had acted in self-defense.

When the Manchurian Incident arose, the Japanese advocated for negotiations to be held between Japan and China, arguing that action taken by the Guandong Army had been motivated by self-defense. However, the US castigated Japan over its “violation of the anti-war treaty.” Additionally, the Lytton Report, issued in 1932, rejected Japan’s assertion of self-defense. Nevertheless, when we recall that, two years prior to the Manchurian Incident, the USSR violated the Pact of Paris by invading Manchuria in the name of self-defense, the argument that the Manchurian Incident was an act of Japanese aggression loses all credibility. Moreover, when we consider the fact that at the IMTFE, the very same Soviet Union condemned Japan’s policies subsequent to the Manchurian Incident as acts of aggression, we are overcome by an absolutely unendurable despair.

URL: 　 https://www.sdh-fact.com/book-article/2270/
PDF: https://www.sdh-fact.com/CL/Road34E.pdf

MOTEKI Hiromichi, Chairman
Society for the Dissemination of Historical Fact