THE ROAD TO THE GREATER EAST ASIAN WAR NAKAMURA AKIRA PART 47 ; CHAPTER 12: CHINESE CIVIL WAR AND THE XI’AN INCIDENT 1. CHIANG KAI-SHEK’S PHILOSOPHY AND POLICIES

CHAPTER 12: CHINESE CIVIL WAR AND THE XI’AN INCIDENT
1. CHIANG KAI-SHEK’S PHILOSOPHY AND POLICIES
GMD-CCP split and the anti-communist campaigns
I shall now backtrack a bit, to the rift between the GMD and the CCP. Even after the First United Front came into being in 1924, friction between the two parties persisted. Finally, in 1927, when the CCP’s plot to foment violent revolution against the GMD came to light during the Northern Expedition, the alliance between the GMD and the CCP was dissolved, and the leaders of the CCP scattered. At that time Mao Zedong was in seclusion at Jinggangshan on the border between Hunan and Jiangxi provinces, where he devoted himself to developing a communist army. Warlord Zhu De eventually joined forces with Mao who, together with Zhu and his army, entered Jianxi province, where they gradually expanded their power base. By the beginning of 1933, the Red Army boasted four corps comprising 200,000 men.

At the end of 1930 Chiang Kai-shek initiated his first and second sweeps (campaigns intended to eradicate communist forces), and launched a third the following year. In September Chiang prepared for a full-scale attack on Ruijin, the CCP’s base of operations, but was temporarily halted by the Manchurian Incident. Mao Zedong seized the opportunity, and set about establishing the provisional government of the Chinese Soviet Republic, in Ruijin.

The fifth anti-communist campaign commenced in October 1933, after the conclusion of the Tanggu Truce, when the situation in North China seemed to have stabilized. During that campaign, three important policies were adopted: (1) the construction of pillboxes in occupied areas, to ensure that the enemy was surrounded; (2) an economic blockade, designed to block the importation of military supplies and food into the soviets (areas controlled by the communists), and (3) the building of motorways in areas recovered from the communists, to expedite military transport.
The New Life Movement
Chiang Kai-shek’s policies during the period between the Manchurian Incident and the outbreak of the 2nd Sino-Japanese War are aptly described by the slogan, “First effect internal pacification, then resist external aggression.” What he meant was stabilize China before attacking the enemy without. Specifically, this meant defeat the communists (the Red Army), and then take on Japan.

Chiang believed that once communism has permeated the minds of the people, the damage cannot be undone. If national strength was bolstered, the Chinese could repel any Japanese invasion. The proper way to do things was to first secure peace in China, and then address external problems. His advocacy of dealing with internal problems first demonstrates the untenable position he found himself in, trapped between Japan and the CCP. It can also be construed as a direct expression of his fears that the CCP was capable of polluting the national spirit.
In keeping with his determination to strengthen national morale, Chiang also advocated and promoted the New Life Movement, a campaign that sought to revive the four cardinal Chinese virtues (propriety, righteousness, integrity, and moral conscience), and apply them to modern times. It was an innovative movement offering spiritual revival to the Chinese people. At its crux was Chiang’s conviction that Chinese apathy was brought on by the absence of standards governing daily life, and that personal transformation should outweigh political transformation.

In February 1934 Chiang launched the movement, delivering a speech entitled “Essentials of the New Life Movement” at temporary headquarters in Nanchang. In it he maintained that other nations looked down on China not because it lacked military strength, but because its people were deficient in knowledge and morality. Germany, with its population of only 60 million and no more than 100,000 soldiers, had been compelled by the terms of the Treaty of Versailles to accept harsh conditions. However, under Hitler’s leadership Germany had made a comeback; it had been granted arms equality and a reduction in reparations. In contrast, China, with its population of 400 million and two million men in its armed forces, had been forced to endure unequal treaties and the burden of reparations for many years. Chiang’s conclusion was that a national rebirth was contingent upon the enhancement of national morality and the acquisition of knowledge. Chiang valued simplicity and cleanliness in daily life, and his objective in establishing the New Life Movement was the complete militarization of the lives of the Chinese people.

He also referred to the Japanese educational system and the Japanese way of living, arguing that both tangible and intangible aspects of Japanese daily life conformed to the four moral values, i.e., propriety, righteousness, integrity, and modesty. He believed that the resulting attitude toward life was the driving force behind the creation of the wealthy and powerful nation Japan had become. Chiang said, “We Chinese are already losing to the Japanese in everyday life, without even having to compete with them amidst the smoke of cannons and the hail of bullets.”

Chiang even argued that a powerful military force was not necessary to build a new nation. “What really matters is learning to live like the Japanese do. They have simple habits, such as washing their faces with cold water and eating cold rice throughout the year. Practices like those constitute basic military training. We do not require lofty theories to save our nation. Instead we must begin by correcting two serious vices: spitting and urinating in public. This is the starting point for the revival of the nation and of the people.” Some have called Chiang the “Chinese Hitler,” but the New Life Movement embodies noteworthy aspects that reveal his basic ideas about nation building.
“Enemy or Friend?”
In December 1934 the Diplomatic Review, a journal issued under the auspices of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and published in Nanjing, carried an essay entitled “Enemy or Friend?” Legal scholar Xu Daolin was listed as the author, but in actuality Chiang Kai-shek had dictated the contents to Chen Bulei, his head secretary. The essay appeared not only in China, but also in many newspapers and magazines in Japan. It maintains that errors made since the Manchurian Incident — errors affecting the relationship between China and Japan — should be attributed not to one or the other, but to both nations.

Chinese errors included (1) missing opportunities, (2) misjudging Japan, (3) overconfidence in China’s strength, (4) errors in assessing other countries, and (5) internal conflicts. To cite one missed opportunity, “Before 1930 we were too quick to hate Japan and therefore lost the chance to enter into negotiations about the commercial lease problem when the Sino-Japanese Treaty of 1915 was concluded. Since political parties were powerful than the military in Japan at that time, there were ample opportunities to improve relations between China and Japan, and possibly to avoid the Manchurian Incident. But when the Manchurian Incident did erupt, Hu Shi insisted that negotiations on the five demands made by Japan begin immediately. However, Chinese authorities hesitated and refused to negotiate until Japanese troops were withdrawn to the South Manchuria Railway zone. Their stubbornness exacerbated the problem by preventing Japanese moderates from gaining power and, instead, boosting the morale of the military.” China’s obdurate insistence on Japanese troops’ withdrawing to the railway zone clearly complicated the resolution of the incident. Moreover, mention is also made of Chinese responsibility for the Japanese advance into North China: “In the wake of the incident, the Chinese could have attempted to turn the tables on the Japanese before the latter crossed the Great Wall. But they were seduced by the schemes of CCP elements and made a series of errors that resulted in a very difficult situation.”

Chiang’s verdict: “We must forge a lasting plan for our nation and its people by suppressing our emotions and forming an alliance with Japan. Unless the Chinese people discard the perspective created by hatred of Japan, the obstacles separating our two nations shall never be overcome, and we shall both be ruined.”

An enumeration of Japanese errors follows: (1) misunderstanding conditions in China, (2) misunderstanding the GMD, (3) misunderstanding the Chinese mentality, (4) diplomatic blunders, and (5) mistakes of their own creation.

About “misunderstanding the GMD,” the author argues that “Japan’s observation that the GMD is the source of anti-Japanese sentiment, and that the problems between China and Japan cannot be resolved until it is defeated, is a colossal error. Since the GMD clearly abandoned its pro-communist policy after 1927 (referring to the failure of the 1st United Front), Japan should not have had any misgivings about entering into an alliance with the GMD.” Well yes, the GMD abandoned its pro-communist policy, but in name only. By that time the GMD had been communized from top to bottom; Chiang’s argument was overly simplistic.

The conclusion of this essay was that the conflict between China and Japan would be resolved if Japan simply returned Manchuria; thenceforth, China’s and Japan’s hearts would beat as one. The time was now right for the farsighted and wise politicians of both nations to demonstrate great courage and save both countries from the tragic fate of joint collapse. This argument, which foolishly implies that Manchuria could be returned immediately, tells us that Chiang’s perception of Japan was not sufficiently discerning. Nevertheless, “Enemy or Friend?” is a very noteworthy effort, as it expresses Chiang’s sincere opinions about improving Sino-Japanese relations.