SDHF Newsletter No.440 The Road to the Greater East Asian War No. 44 Ch.11-3

THE ROAD TO THE GREATER EAST ASIAN WAR
Nakamura Akira, Dokkyo University Professor Emeritus
(English Translation: Society for the Dissemination of Historical Fact)
Part 44, Chapter 11: Japan-China Relations on Northen China -3

September 16, 2025

It seemed that in North China, relations among Japan, Manzhouguo, and China were becoming less fraught after the Tanggu Truce was signed. Unfortunately, the reality was quite different. Though the Chinese were feigning friendliness toward the Japanese, they were secretly engaging in terrorist activity targeting the Japanese and Manzhouguo. At the center of anti-Japanese, anti-Manzhouguo movement were Hebei Governor Yu Xuezhong (a former northeastern warlord), GMD Central Headquarters personnel, the Central Army, and the Blue Shirt Society (the GMD’s secret special operation agency whose chief function was terrorism.) These individuals and organizations had gone underground, capitalizing on the fact that North China had been relatively quiet since the cease fire agreement. Therefore, they largely escaped the notice of the Guandong Army and the Tianjin Garrison. But in 1935, their activity became more blatant.

Japanese Army records show that between January and May of 1935, there were more than 50 instances of major and minor anti-Japanese and anti-Manzhouguo offenses. The most notable cases were the assassinations of Chinese company presidents who were sympathetic to Japan. There were two Chinese language newspapers in Tianjin that had historically been pro-Japanese: National Rights, and the Tientsin Morning Post. Between May 2 and 3, the presidents of both newspaper companies were murdered by assassins armed with pistols. It was revealed that the Beiping branch of the Military Affairs Commission, the Blue Shits Society, and GMD had been involved in the assassination. Yang Hu, head of the Shanghai Defense Commission and the Blue Shirt Society’s Central Executive Committee, orchestrated the plot and then went into hiding in the French Concession in Shanghai.

The Japanese representatives presented the following demands:

(1) Chiang Kai-shek must abandon his hypocritical policy.
(2) Organizations committing acts of terrorism must withdraw from North China.
(3) The 3rd and 25th divisions, which provide support for (2) must withdraw from North China.
(4) Hu Xuezhong, governor of Hebei province must be dismissed.

After a considerable delay, the Nationalists telegraphed the following notification to He Yingqin, head of the Beiping Branch of the Military Affairs Commission:

(1) Nationalist Party bureaus shall withdraw from Hebei province.
(2) Central Army units shall withdraw from Hebei province.
(3) Order prohibiting anti-Japanese activity through China shall be issued.

The above notification became the Umezu-He Agreement. The incident thereby resolved, Chinese anti-Japanese organizations and Central Army units withdrew from Hebei province.
Song Zheyuan, commander of the 29th Army, became increasingly anti-Japanese after the Tanggu Truce was signed. From the last half of 1934 through 1935, Song created problem after problem for the Japanese. The Guandong Army requested the withdrawal of Song’s forces south of the Yellow River. However, central Army authorities disagreed with Guandong Army’s hardline position. On their part, the Chinese, of their own accord, relieved Song Zheyuan of his position as governor of Chahar province and commander of the 29th Army. They also appointed Qin Dechun, then commissioner of civil affairs, as acting provincial governor. The Guandong Army also softened its requirements for resolution, for instance, by cancelling its demand for withdrawal of Song’s army south of the Yellow River. Maj.-Gen. Doihara presented the revised Japanese demands to Song. On June 27, Qin Dechun responded in writing that the Chinese would accept all of Japan’s demands, including removing anti-Japanese organizations and Song’s army from Chahar province. The missive served as the basis for the Doihara-Qin Agreement.

As a result, Song’s 29th army moved out of Chahar, regrouping in the Beiping area. But who could have known that the 29th Army had already been infiltrated by a great many anti-Japanese elements, most of them CCP members, and that two years later it would cause the Lugou Bridge Incident?

URL: https://www.sdh-fact.com/book-article/2369
PDF: https://www.sdh-fact.com/CL/Road44E.pdf

Moteki Hiromichi, Chairman
Society for the Dissemination of Historical Fact