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SDHF Newsletter No.288 Japan’s Master Plan for Victory 6

JAPAN’S MASTER PLAN FOR VICTORY:
WHAT COULD HAVE BEEN
By Moteki Hiromichi
Heart Publishers, Tokyo, 2018
Series No.6, Chapter 5: The Akimaru Unit and the Falsification of History

September 23, 2020

As I described in Chapter 3, had Japan adhered to “the Master Plan,” Japan might have had a good chance of winning the war. Churchill sent a letter addressed to Roosevelt, April 15, 1942, in which he wrote the following:
Until we are able to fight a fleet action there is no reason why the Japanese should not become the dominating factor in the Western Indian Ocean. This would result in the collapse of our whole position in the Middle East, not only because of the interruption to our convoys to the Middle East and India, but also because of the interruptions to the oil supplies from Abadan, without which we cannot maintain our position either at sea or on land in the Indian Ocean Area. Supplies to Russia via the Persian Gulf would also be cut. With so much of the weight of Japan thrown upon us we have more than we can bear.
This clearly demonstrates how much Churchill feared Operation 11 (the Indian Ocean Operation).
In Chapter 4, I explained why this effective operation was not conducted, even though Japan was fully capable of executing this operation.
After the war, the fact that Japan had a Master Plan for Victory has not been openly discussed in Japan, since the dominate view of the war is that militarist set off on a reckless war without even gathering global intelligence.
There is more to this line of thinking. Prof. Arisawa Hiromi, the very person who produced “Survey of US-UK Allied Economic War Potential”, which was the basis of the Master Plan of Victory, wrote a piece of fiction in the monthly magazine Economist in 1956. He said that his Survey was expunged by Sugiyama Hajime, chief of Army General Staff, because the Survey suggested not to start a war, considering the huge power differential between Japan and the US-UK axis. As explained in Chapter 3, this was contradicted to what was proposed in the Survey. However, Arisawa could say this since the Survey reports were supposedly expunged. Former Lieutenant Colonel Akimaru Jiro, chief of the Akimaru Agency, followed suit. They went along with the postwar flow by showing how pacifist they were.
Ariswa died in 1988 and his books and papers were donated to Library of the Tokyo University Department of Economics by his family. The Survey report was found in his papers. It should have been stated that Arisawa’s and Akimaru’s stories were contrary to the facts. But strangely enough, their fake stories were instead amplified by elitist historians.
Hayashi Chikatsu, an independent researcher who published Outbreak of War Between Japan and the US: Japanese Army’s Chances of Success: Akimaru Agency’s Final Report in 2015, thoroughly reviewed the Survey.
My book is very much based on Hayashi’s findings regarding this issue.

URL: http://www.sdh-fact.com/book-article/1590/
PDF: http://www.sdh-fact.com/CL/Greater-East-Asian-War-No.6.pdf

MOTEKI Hiromichi, Acting Chairman
for KASE Hideaki, Chairman
Society for the Dissemination of Historical Fact

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