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SDHF Newsletter No.269 Japan’s Master Plan for Victory 4

JAPAN’S MASTER PLAN FOR VICTORY:
WHAT COULD HAVE BEEN
By Moteki Hiromichi
Heart Publishers, Tokyo, 2018
Series No.4, Chapter 3: Simulations Validate Predictions of Victories

March 23, 2020

Two premises of the simulations are assumed.
The first one is that “Japan had superior war potential at the start of conflict.” Many people will laugh at the premise. But as is mentioned in detail in the book, it is an objective fact. America was forced to divide its naval power in the Atlantic Ocean and Pacific Ocean. So the comparison between Japan and America should be with Pacific Ocean Navy of the US and total of Japan. As to battleship nearly equal, and other vessel Japan was superior. Especially Japan was much superior in aircraft carrier with 10 to 3. Total aircraft carriers US held was 7 against Japan 10.
Of course, I don’t argue that this superiority of Japan would have led to Japan’s victory at all. But this fact should be in mind in thinking about that war.
The second premises is the principle of war that “war potential is reversely proportional to the square of distance from base to battle site.” . Designating the waters off the Mariana Islands as the attack zone, the following formula holds true.

War potential Distance from base to war zone Actual war potential
Japan 100 1 100
US 500 3 500/32 = 55

The Master Plan for Victory was structured taking this principle in full account.
The most important strategic pint was in Indian Ocean. Operation 11(Ceylon operation) was about to start in July 1942. Winston Churchill wrote in his letter to Roosevelt on April 15, 1942.

I must revert to the grave situation in the Indian Ocean [mentioned in my number 65], arising from the fact that the Japanese have felt able to detach nearly a third of their battle fleet and half their carriers, which force we are unable to match for several months. The consequences of this may easily be: (A) The loss of Ceylon. (B) Invasion of Eastern India with incalculable internal consequences to our whole war plan and including the loss of Calcutta and of all contact with the Chinese through Burma. But this is only the beginning. Until we are able to fight a fleet action there is no reason why the Japanese should not become the dominating factor in the Western Indian Ocean. This would result in the collapse of our whole position in the Middle East, not only because of the interruption to our convoys to the Middle East and India, but also because of the interruptions to the oil supplies from Abadan, without which we cannot maintain our position either at sea or on land in the Indian Ocean Area. Supplies to Russia via the Persian Gulf would also be cut. With so much of the weight of Japan thrown upon us we have more than we can bear.

URL: http://www.sdh-fact.com/book-article/1493/
PDF: http://www.sdh-fact.com/CL/Greater-East-Asian-War-No.4.pdf

MOTEKI Hiromichi, Acting Chairman
for KASE Hideaki, Chairman
Society for the Dissemination of Historical Fact

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