SDHF Newsletter No. 244 Japan’s Master plan for Victory 1
JAPAN’S MASTER PLAN FOR VICTORY:
WHAT COULD HAVE BEEN
By Moteki Hiromichi
Heart Publishers, Tokyo, 2018
Series No.1: FOREWORD & TOC
July 23, 2019
If I were to say that Japan had a formula (and a viable one at that) for victory in World War II, what sort of reaction would I get? Perhaps most people would be dismissive, wondering how I could be suffering from such a delusion at this late date. Certainly most citizens of the Western world would react that way.
James B. Wood of the William College history professor sums up the mentality of Western world regarding this topic in his book Japanese Military Strategy in the Pacific War: Was Defeat Inevitable? As follows.
“Why were the Japanese so crazy as to take on the United States?” or “How could a country with a GNP about that of Italy or Canada, expect to win?” or “Why should we expect anything else from a country with a feudal warrior code and culture, emperor worship, racial supremacy notions, and a total lack of sympathy or respect for her neighbors?” The implication is that those responsible for Japan’s path to war were ignorant or irrational, perhaps a blend of both, as well as basically evil — a perfectly other counterpoise to the victor of modernity in all respect, the United States.
However, I would like to present quite a different view on this topic in this book. On November 15, 1941, three weeks prior to the Pearl Harbor strike, the Japanese government and Imperial General Headquarters held a liaison conference. Those present discussed the Draft Proposal for the Promotion of the End of the War Against the United States, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, and Chiang Kai-shek), and decided to execute it. I consider this the master plan, the plan for victory, and will be analyzing it with the aid of practical simulations throughout this book.
If Japanese military leaders abided by this master plan, the situation will be very likely to become the one, which Winston Churchill feared as expressed in his letter to Franklin D. Roosevelt sent on April 15, 1941.
I must revert to the grave situation in the Indian Ocean … arising from the fact that the Japanese have felt able to detach nearly a third of their battle fleet and half their carriers, which force we are unable to match for several months. The consequences of this may easily be: (A) The loss of Ceylon. (B) Invasion of Eastern India with incalculable internal consequences to our whole war plan and including the loss of Calcutta and of all contact with the Chinese through Burma. But this is only the beginning. Until we are able to fight a fleet action there is no reason why the Japanese should not become the dominating factor in the Western Indian Ocean. This would result in the collapse of our whole position in the Middle East, not only because of the interruption to our convoys to the Middle East and India, but also because of the interruptions to the oil supplies from Abadan, without which we cannot maintain our position either at sea or on land in the Indian Ocean Area. Supplies to Russia via the Persian Gulf would also be cut. With so much of the weight of Japan thrown upon us we have more than we can bear.
I’ll also present analysis why this victorious strategy was not realized in this book.
MOTEKI Hiromichi, Acting Chairman
for KASE Hideaki, Chairman
Society for the Dissemination of Historical Fact