The Japanese annexation of Korea was conducted just one hundred years ago with reasons fully in-line with the circumstances at that time. This is clearly vindicated by the fact that there were no countries that criticized the annexation, to say nothing of raising any objections.
However, Koreans are still criticizing Japan for it, claiming that the “36 years of Imperial Japanese rule” brought on the “seven deprivations” (king, sovereignty, human life, land, resources, language and personal name). Mr. Ko Bunyu (Huang Wengxing), a great Taiwan-born writer and historian, refutes this view, rather, based on his comprehensive listing of the historical facts, that Japanese rule brought about the “seven benefits” for the Korean people,. Mr. Ko’s paper will fully convince you of this conclusion.
New!!
The Second Sino Japanese War - How, and with what purpose in mind, Japan fight?-
Moteki Hiromichi’s “China Caused the Second Sino–Japanese War” explains how the Second Sino–Japanese War was a conflict caused by China, and how Japan was dragged into a war she had not sought. http://www.sdh-fact.com/CL02_1/69_S4.pdf
During the war, Japan never made any territorial demands, nor did she make any demands on interests in China. This is made clear from the Funatsu Peace Initiative (Aug. 1937), the Trautmann Peace Initiative (Dec. 1937), etc., wherein no such demands are made.
Well, then — with what goals and with what manner of policies and spirit did the Japanese military fight? There is a suitable document to show this. A booklet dated 29 April, 1940, titled “Orders for Officers and Men of the Expeditionary Force,” issued under the name of Itagaki Seishirô, the China Expeditionary Army’s chief of staff.
The Second Sino–Japanese War Was Caused by China — A Criticism of the “Japan-as-Aggressor” View —
It is generally believed that Japan was an aggressor nation against China for the Second Sino–Japanese War. This is a view not founded on the historical events, however. The Marco Polo Bridge Incident, the opening event of the conflict, was orchestrated by China; and the Shanghai Incident, which was the beginning of the full-scale war, was unilaterally initiated by China. The facts introduced in this article explain how the conflict was initiated and escalated.
Overview of Eight Year’s Scholarly Achievements by the Japan “Nanking” Society
The Japan “Nanking” Society was founded in 2000 to advance research into the “Nanking Incident” of 1937, and the Society actively pursued this research until 2007. The research results were published in the annual report titled “The Frontline of Research on the Nanking Incident” in six volumes book form. Prof. Sugihara summarized the scholarly achievements as presented in those volumes at the Afterword to the final volume. An extensive review of the updated research on the Nanking can be seen there.
Why PRC President Cannot Respond to Open Questions concerning the “Nanking Massacre”
The Nanking massacre controversy has been resolved with the conclusion that a big massacre never happened but in fact it was only a matter of war propaganda. This is now verified with comprehensive historical evidence.
A conclusive fact to prove this will be that P.R.C. President Hu Jintao cannot respond to “Open Questions concerning the Nanking Massacre” submitted by the Japanese investigative group “Committee for the Examination of the Facts about Nanking” (Chairman: Kase Hideaki).
The essay explains why five questions are fundamental and critical points for clarifying the Nanking incident and why the P.R.C. President cannot answer these.
Observation on the Film John Rabe
The German-French-Chinese film John Rabe, directed by Florian Gallenberger, made its debut in Germany on April 2009 and its first showing in China took place on April 28.
However, anyone who perceives John Rabe as a non-fictional film or re-enactment of events that transpired in Nanking in late 1937 is operating under a grave misconception. This is exemplified by subtitles that appear at the end of the film: “300,000 Chinese were massacred. Even today, right–wing elements in Japan refuse to recognize this fact.”
As mentioned in detail in the essay, Rabe does not even mention a single massacre in his diary and the documents of the International Committee for the Nanking Safety Zone, of which chairman was Rabe, recorded population increase of 50,000 in two months after Japanese occupation.
Rabe’s Diary and the Documents of the International Committee completely “refuse” to accept the massacre.
Der Mythos vom Nanking-Massaker
Waehrend des japanisch-chinesischen Krieges wurde die damalige chinesische Hauptstadt Nanking im Dezember 1937 von den japanischen Truppen eingenommen. Nach der Besatzung der Stadt soil das so-genannnte "Nanking-Massaker" von den japanischen Besatzern veruebt warden sein. Die Behauptungen von dem Massaker erschienen erst spaeter nach dem Ende des Krieges. Heute gibt es viele Buecher und Schriften darueber, in denen sehr unterschiedliche Darstellungen und Ansichten vorkommen. Prof. HIGASHINAKANO ist seit 1992 mit der Nanking-Forschung beschaeftigt neben seiner eigentlichen Aufgabe,die Forschung ueber den "Deutschen Sozialismus". Seine langjaehrige Unterauchung hat ihn zum Schiuss gefuehrt, dass das "Nanking-Massaker" im Nachhinein konstruiert warden ist, um das Urteil des Militaertribunals zu rechtfertigen
Using Primary Sources To Clarify the Nanking Incident
Using Primary Sources to Clarify the Nanking Incident
by Tomisawa Shigenobu
The best approach to understanding the Nanking Incident should be via the use of primary source materials.
There are several primary sources that described the “Incident,” which happened in December 1937. The most important one among them is Documents of the Nanking Safety Zone, the activity report of the International Committee for the Safety Zone and published by Kelly & Walsh in Shanghai under the auspices of a Chinese Nationalist government agency. Mr. Tomisawa clarifies the situation in Nanking at that time and describes what really happened there mainly though the use of these documents.
“Last Secrets of the Outbreak of War between Japan and the United States: DevelopingRoosevelt’s Final Telegram to the Emperor of Japan”
The personal telegram from President Roosevelt to Emperor Hirohito, dated December 6, 1941,
has been previously seen as Roosevelt’s final attempt to avoid war between Japan and the United
States. Sugihara argues, however, that this historical document was not the simple message it
appeared to be, and draws parallels with Roosevelt’s me
behind the development of the Roosevelt’s message, and how was the final draft developed? Why
did Roosevelt want this particular version to be sent, what was the significance of its timing, and
what were other alternative policy options available to him?