Analyzing the “Photographic Evidence” of the Nanking Massacre

By

Higashinakano Shudo,

Kobayashi Susumu

&

Fukunaga Shinjiro

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Japanese and Chinese personal names have been rendered surname first, in accordance with Japanese and Chinese custom.

The hanyu pinyin Romanization system has been used to translate Chinese personal and place names, with the exception of Wade-Giles translations that are still in common use (e.g., Yangtze River, Chiang Kai-shek).
Table of Contents

List of Abbreviations

Prologue
Search for the Origins of the “Photographic Evidence”

Chapter 1.
Realities of the Battle for Nanking

Chapter 2.
The First “Photographic Evidence”

Chapter 3.
Additional Photographs that are Meticulous Forgeries

Chapter 4.
Misleading use of Photographs of Known Origins

Chapter 5.
Conclusion: No Photographs Can Stand as Viable Historical Evidence
List of Abbreviations

CCP Chinese Communist Party
GMD Guomindang [Chinese Nationalist Party]
ICNSZ International Committee for the Nanking Safety Zone
IMTFE International Military Tribunal for the Far East
NDG Nanking daigyakusatsu no genba e [To the Site of the Rape of Nanking]
POW prisoner of war
QINHUA Qinhua Rijun Nanjing Datusha Zhaopianji [Pictorial Collection of the Invading Japanese Army’s Violence in Nanking]
RBS Rikou Baoxing Shilu [Authentic Record of Japan’s Brutal Acts]
REKISHI Nankin daigyakusatsu: Rekishi no shinjitsu o kataru sokuseki to shōgen [The Rape of Nanking: The Evidence and Eyewitness Accounts that Narrate the Truth of History]
RON-I The Rape of Nanking: The Forgotten Holocaust of World War II
RON-YY The Rape of Nanking: An Undeniable History in Photographs
SEF Shanghai Expeditionary Force
SND Shashinshū: Nanken daigakuatsu [A Pictorial Collection of the Nanking Massacre]
WMRB Wairen muduzhong rijun baoxing [Japanese Violence As Witnessed by Foreigners]
ZKH Zhongguo Kangzhan Huashi [Pictorial History of China’s Resistance War]
Prologue: Search for the Origin of the “Photographic Evidence”

John H.D. Rabe reported only hearsay

What do people do when they are unable to find a clear answer to a puzzling question? They will either brush it from their mind or keep investigating until they find a satisfactory answer. I have assumed the latter position on the question of the alleged atrocities committed by the Japanese in Nanking.

This topic caught my attention for the first time in the mid-1980s when public interest in this historical event resurfaced. It was about the time when the Nanking Massacre Memorial Hall was inaugurated in China, with the phrase “300,000 victims” engraved at its entrance.

The alleged incident was characterized as large-scale violence, including mass murder, robbery and arson, committed by the Japanese troops for six weeks following their occupation of the city in December 1937. Today, in Western society, the event is known as the “Rape of Nanking” and is often publicized with its alleged death toll ranging from 200,000 to 300,000.

A number of Japanese publications have advanced a variety of theses on this topic. Honda Katsuichi, who interviewed some Chinese nationals in the 1970s, said in his Chūgoku no tabi [Trip in China], “... what characterized the Nanking massacre... as the witness accounts reveals, was an indiscriminate killing of a large number of Nanking citizens as well as disarmed prisoners of war.” (1972, p. 267) Hora Tomio, in his Nankin daigyakusatsu no shōmei [Proof of Nanking Massacre], said that the city of Nanking “turned into a living hell as it was subjected to the violence of the Japanese troops both inside and outside the city walls.” (1986, p. 1) Hata Ikuhiko noted in his Nankin Jiken [Nanking Incident], “... regardless of the range [in the alleged death toll], that the Japanese troops committed a large-scale massacre and a variety of misconducts in Nanking is an undeniable fact, and as a Japanese national, I would like to express my heart-felt apology to the Chinese people.” (1986, p. 244)

However, Maeda Yūji, a University of Tokyo graduate and Dōmei News correspondent who accompanied the Japanese troops to Nanking, said in his Sensō no nagare no naka ni [In The Current of The War], “A correspondence from a foreign source maintained that a large-scale robbery, violence, and arson was perpetrated within the refugee zone... We were puzzled to read it... None of the cameramen or the film crew, who were frequently moving around the city, was aware of such large-scale brutal acts occurring after the termination of hostilities... If such lawlessness had prevailed, it could not have escaped the attention of the news correspondents, not just of Dōmei News but also of other media companies.” (1982, p. 125)

I was at a loss in the face of such conflicting stories, but Hata’s thesis, which was generally proclaimed to represent the middle position, stood with irresistible persuasiveness as a conclusion that I should accept.

A critical turning point came when I went to the city of Hagi, Yamaguchi Prefecture, during my research trip in the summer of 1992. I had an opportunity to speak to a veteran of the Nanking campaign in Shimonoseki on my way to my final destination. He was Moriō Migaku, who was at the time of the Nanking campaign a Captain in the 3rd Battalion of the 16th Division’s 20th Regiment.

I asked him about the alleged Nanking massacre, as I was naïve about it at that time. I do not remember every detail of his answer, but he did say that he had neither witnessed nor
heard about the Rape of Nanking. I was also able to detect in his demeanor his frustration over the discrepancy between his own experience and the popularly accepted perception of the incident. Yet, I was still confused, being unable to narrow the gap between Moriō’s account and the information available in popular published sources.

One day, when I finished my lecture at the university, a student caught up with me outside the classroom and asked me the following question:

I would like to ask you this question because you are a specialist in East German affairs. The Mainichi Newspaper reported on the discovery in [then] East Germany of official diplomatic files compiled by then German embassy in Nanking at the time of the alleged Nanking massacre. These files reportedly contain a record penned by John H.D. Rabe, head of the Nanking branch of Siemens. According to Rabe’s account, the city of Nanking was littered with tens of thousands of corpses. Are you familiar with these diplomatic files? If you are, what is your opinion about its content?

I was not aware of the existence of such a file then, but I decided to obtain the microfilmed version of these diplomatic files from Berlin.

I did find a passage reading “as many as 30,000 corpses still lie on the Yangzi river shore of Xiakuan even three months after the fall of the city.” But careful reading revealed that Rabe did not identify these corpses as those of the victims of a massacre. Also, it was obvious that he wrote this account based on hearsay and not as an eye-witness.

The battle of Nanking was fought as a wartime military campaign. As a consequence, both the Japanese and Chinese suffered military casualties. This fact compelled me to ponder several questions: were there really such dead bodies; were these corpses really those massacred by the Japanese army; if so, how many of them were there? In order to ascertain these points, I started reading contemporary primary sources written in English and German. At the same time, I decided to interview as many people as I could who left their footprints in Nanking during and after the Nanking campaign.

Why was the passage pertaining to the “killing of 40,000” deleted?

Another critical turning point was when I interviewed another veteran of the Nanking campaign. He was Maruyama Susumu, who had been a member of the Japanese army’s special service in Nanking. Maruyama cast doubt on Rabe’s account by drawing on his own experience. According to him, burial activities in and around Nanking were more or less completed by March 15, 1938. Thus, the 30,000 dead bodies, as recounted by Rabe, were unlikely to be found in the Nanking area at that time. Also, after careful computation, the actual number of corpses disposed of by that time was estimated to be between 14,000 and 15,000—a far cry from oft-mentioned 200,000 or 300,000 victims.

At the same time, careful reading of the oft-quoted Documents of the Nanking Safety Zone edited by Xu Shuxi (a book published in 1939 in Shanghai and mostly based on “Daily Reports of the Serious Injuries to Civilians” compiled by the International Committee for the Nanking Safety Zone (ICNSZ) and filed with the Japanese embassy in Nanking) convinced me that most of the stories listed in that book were hearsays without any source of authentication.

Another source that attracted my attention was What War Means: Japanese Terror in
China by Harold J. Timperly. Timperly, an Australian national, was a correspondent of Britain’s Manchester Guardian in Shanghai. His book, published in London and New York in July 1938, was the first monograph that accused the Japanese of atrocities in Nanking. Although he recounted his stories allegedly as an eyewitness, again, careful reading did not convince me of the authenticity of his stories.

Further investigation of these and other source materials led me to an important discovery. Timperly’s What War Means contains a “Memorandum” by an anonymous writer, whose real identity was Miner S. Bates, then a missionary as well as a University of Nanking professor. This “Memorandum” says that the record of burial activities inside and outside the Nanking walls was a solid proof of the killing of 40,000 unarmed people, of whom non-combatants comprised nearly 30 percent. When this “Memorandum” was reprinted in four English-language sources published in China, however, this passage was not included. The same is true of the Chinese translation of Timperly’s book.

These questions and discoveries prompted me to write ‘Nankin gyakusatsu’ no tettei kenshō [An Exhaustive Study of “Nanking Massacre”] in 1998. It was published, however, merely to refute the contentions of the so-called “great massacre school” in the controversy over the alleged Rape of Nanking, and not to depict the true picture of the entire incident. Neither was its purpose to answer those questions concerning the burial record or missing passage in Bate’s “Memorandum” in the Chinese edition of Timperly’s book as well as in other sources.

Then, new source materials on the alleged Rape of Nanking were unearthed in 2001, and these discoveries led to some new findings.

First, it is revealed that, Timperly, who penned the first monograph accusing the Japanese army of committing atrocities, was an adviser to the Chinese Nationalist Party’s [Guomindang (GMD)] central propaganda bureau. This bureau was in charge of press and speech censorship as well as propaganda. One will note that the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) today has a section that performs the same functions.

Second, Zeng Xubai, then chief of the international propaganda division of the GMD central propaganda bureau, said in his autobiography (vol. I, p. 201) that the central propaganda bureau funded the publication of Timperly’s What War Means and Lewis S. C. Smythe’s War Damages in the Nanking Area.

Third, Bates, who contributed his “Memorandum” to Timperly’s book under anonymity, was an adviser to the GMD government, according to a contemporary newspaper article. Also, the China Monthly revealed that the wife of George A. Fitch, who also wrote a part of Timperly’s What War Means, was a close friend of Chiang Kai-shek’s wife.

Fourth, Bates’s own record says that he handed his “report” to an American correspondent who was on his way to Shanghai from Nanking prior to the latter’s departure.

Fifth, the “report” by Bates had a striking resemblance to the articles published by the Chicago Daily News on December 15 and the New York Times on December 18. (Recent research shows that the contents of Bates’ “report” are far from truthful.)

Sixth, a recently created database of various contemporary sources on the alleged Japanese atrocities substantiated that most cases of murder recorded by these sources were hearsays, and that the only witnessed case of murder was the one that was reported on January 9, 1938, which was actually a case of “lawful execution.” (See pp. 28 - 35, Chapter 1.)

These findings convinced me to speculate that there is the existence of behind-the-scene maneuvering in the creation of the standard story of the Rape of Nanking.
Discovery of a “top secret” GMD document

Then, I unearthed source material which answered all the questions that had puzzled me. It was a document I discovered in 2003 at the GMD archives in Taipei. This document, which outlined the activities of the international division of the party’s central propaganda bureau for the year 1941, elucidated two facts. First, the document clearly stated that Timperly’s book, which has often been cited as proof of the Rape of Nanking, was published under the party’s initiative as a “propaganda tool”. Second, the propaganda bureau did not even take up the Nanking “massacre” as a subject in its propaganda activities. The outline of operations of the counterintelligence division in the top secret document mentioned only “malicious acts such as rape, arson, and robbery” committed in Nanking as a topic of propaganda against the Japanese, and did not speak of “large-scale killing.” The Nanking massacre did not appear as a topic for use as propaganda not only in an outline of operations of the counterintelligence division but also in an outline of activities of other divisions. Thus, one may reasonably conclude that no notion of an unprecedented scale of massacre in Nanking entered the minds of either the Nationalists or even the Communists at the time.

The question now is how the story of the Rape of Nanking as it is known today took shape.

The ICNSZ was comprised of Westerners living in Nanking at the time, who organized a “safety zone” inside the city walls. The Chinese troops, however, positioned German-made anti-aircraft guns, established military facilities, and stationed armed men in that area at the last moment prior to the commencement of the battle, in clear violation of stated purposes of the “safety zone”. In addition, the ICNSZ failed to prevent the entry of Chinese combatants into the “safety zone” after the fall of the city. Consequently, the “safety zone” turned into a “danger zone,” where plain-clothed Chinese soldiers mingled with ordinary civilians. In response, the Japanese army commenced military action in the “safety zone,” in order to separate these plain-clothed soldiers from civilians and to execute some of these soldiers.

The GMD, whose military force had suffered one defeat after another since the outbreak of the Battle of Shanghai in August 1937, decided to initiate a propaganda campaign against the Japanese to counteract their battlefield losses. The party’s international propaganda division started its full-scale activities on December 1—prior to the fall of Nanking. As Guo Moruo, who wrote a foreword to the Chinese edition of Timperly’s book, stated in his memoir, their slogan was “Propaganda campaign supersedes campaign on the field.” (p. 191)

The party’s propaganda bureau decided to publish a book for propaganda purposes, so they did not reveal the book’s true purpose. More specifically, they made one of their “foreign sympathizers” speak for their cause in that publication. That “foreign sympathizer” was Timperly, who was ostensibly a correspondent of a British newspaper but in reality was an “adviser” to the party’s propaganda bureau. In accordance with their plan, they had Timperly’s *What War Means* published, and at the same time they planned to make a Chinese publication of the same available—ostensibly as a Chinese translation of Timperly’s work.

Thereafter, Timperly contacted Bates, who was in Nanking. Bates as well as Fitch contributed to Timperly’s book, but as anonymous writers. As already noted, the “Daily Reports of the Serious Injuries to Civilians” did not include any eye-witness accounts of unlawful killing. Most likely, because there were no eye-witnessed cases of murder, Bates
and Fitch in Timperly’s book described the Japanese army’s mopping-up operations following the fall of the city as well as the separation of plain-clothed soldiers from civilians in the “safety zone”— military actions that entailed lawful execution of combatants or ex-combatants— as cases of Japanese troops indulging in “repeated murder.” Those accounts that appeared as eyewitness accounts of Westerners in Nanking obviously served the stated purpose of the GMD propaganda bureau, that is, to denounce the “cruel nature of the enemy’s military clique” and to “promote the anti-war feeling in the international community.”

Yet, there was one serious problem. As already pointed out, Bates concluded that all of the “40,000 dead bodies” as recorded in burial and other records were the results of unlawful killing by the Japanese army, and inserted a short passage referring to this in *What War Means*. As the previously quoted top secret GMD document suggests, however, the party’s propaganda bureau did not recognize as a fact a “massacre” of such scale in Nanking.

Organization Structure of GMZ, GMD, and its Central Propaganda Bureau

Had the propaganda bureau, which professed to “expose the enemy’s atrocities in the capital following its fall,” accepted Bates’s contention as the truth, it would have included, even emphasized, the massacre of 40,000 in its Chinese edition—a contention that was stated in Timperly’s original English edition. The bureau, however, could not because had it been included in the Chinese edition, they knew that knowledgeable sources in China would have soon exposed the fallacy of the “massacre of 40,000 in Nanking”. As a solution, the propaganda bureau on one hand included that passage only in the English version, which was published ostensibly as Timperly’s work and mainly targeted at Western readers who were unfamiliar with the situation in China. The bureau, on the other hand, omitted that portion not
only in the Chinese edition of Timperly’s book but also in four other leaflets that became available in China thereafter.

It is now obvious that the story of the Rape of Nanking was a result of a joint wartime propaganda project between the GMD propaganda bureau and some of the Westerners living in Nanking at the time. At the time, it was not an event recognized as documented fact.

Investigation of 143 “atrocity” photos

It is in the 1970s that the Rape of Nanking, conceived as wartime propaganda in 1938, resurfaced with the veneer of historical fact. Commentators who advanced this thesis have often presented photographic evidence to corroborate their contention. A simple question prompted a research group of the Japan “Nanking Society” to start an investigation of these photos.

Judging from the scenes captured in Photos A and B, it is obvious that the cameraman who took these images pointed his camera straightforward at close range at a man who was either about to behead someone or had just finished doing so. Prior permission was absolutely necessary for that cameraman to take such images. One wonders who issued permission. If those executioners in these photos were genuine Japanese soldiers, the camera crew could not have been either Westerners or Chinese, but must have been Japanese. But these photos were printed in GMD sources—the Chinese edition of Timperly’s book and *Rikou Baoxing Shilu* [Authentic Record of Japan’s Brutal Acts]—which were published as early as July 1938. It would have been impossible for a Japanese camera crew to obtain permission to capture such photographic images for the purpose of serving the GMD’s propaganda needs.

Also, the identities of the four Japanese servicemen in these photos could have been easily verified at the time. In the case of so-called “100-men slashing contest,” Japanese media reported two second lieutenants, Mukai Toshiaki and Noda Tsuyoshi as war heroes for the purpose of wartime propaganda. The Chinese military court in Nanking tried and
convicted these two officers and had them shot to death in 1948. There was, however, no
indication that Chinese authorities tried to obtain the identities of the four men in these two
photographs or even sought their custody after the war. Another dubious point of the photos
is that these servicemen were underdressed for a December in Nanking.

Photo C:
A photo printed on the December 24, 1937, issue of the Tokyo Asahi Newspaper with
the caption “Peace Back in Nanking: Soldiers of the Imperial Army Giving Cookies to Children.”

Photo D:
Photos C and D, which appeared in the December 24, 1937 issue of the *Tokyo Asahi Newspaper* of Japan and the *North China Daily News* of China, respectively, were snapshots of the Nanking safety zone, where virtually all the remaining Nanking citizens were taking refuge. Uniformed Japanese men, who appeared to be either military policemen or members of the army’s special service, are seen giving out cookies to Chinese civilians. One cannot detect any sign of unnatural or dressed-up behavior of the Japanese military personnel or Chinese civilians seen in these photos. Neither can one detect any facial expressions suggestive of fear or a tense atmosphere on the Chinese in the photos, which should have been visible if the city had been subjected to ongoing massacre, rape, robbery, and arson. One may also wonder whether women and children would have ventured out to the street if the Japanese army was actually conducting large-scale killing in the city.

These questions prodded the team to collect and investigate as many photographs as possible that were relevant to the Nanking incident. After reviewing 30,000 pieces of “photographic evidence” on a preliminary basis, some of which were identical to other photographs, the research group took out 143 photos which have been frequently used as evidence of the Nanking massacre and conducted thorough research to determine whether or not each one of them is convincing evidence of the alleged atrocities. Members of the group tried to pinpoint when each photograph was printed, the source and how it was used thereafter, and compiled a table and a flow chart to summarize the findings. In the end, the research, albeit unwittingly, successfully uncovered the whole truth of these atrocity photos.

Outline of the photographic evidence “flow chart”

The following is an overview, in five phases, of the major publications and photographic “evidence” as they have appeared since the fall of Nanking in 1937 through to the present.

(1) 1937-38: Immediately after the fall of Nanking

This period witnessed the publication of Timperly’s *What War Means*, its Chinese edition, and *Rikou Baoxing Shilu* compiled by the political section of the GMD government’s military commission. Timperly’s original English edition did not carry any photos, but the other two were published with quite a few photographs of unknown origin. Those same photos have since been reprinted in publications of the later periods as proof of large-scale massacre and rape in Nanking.

Again, quite a few of these photos are of unknown origin, with a few exceptions, such as the moving images captured by John G. Magee and those printed in the *Life* magazine of the United States.

Japanese magazines like the *Asahi Graph* and *Shina JiHEN GAHO* [Sino-Japanese War Pictorial Report] as well as major newspapers published photographs taken by Japanese war correspondents. They provided the readers with visual images that were useful in understanding aspects of the Japanese troops in China (e.g. uniforms, gear).

In addition, there are some photographs that were not made public at the time, but became available for the first time after World War II. Most of photographs in this category have been verified as to when and where they were taken.
Major publications in this period include Zhongguo Kangzhan Huashi [Pictorial History of China’s Resistance War] by Shu Zongqiao and Cao Juren (1947) and the Japanese translation of Edgar Snow’s *Battle for Asia* (original published in 1941, the Japanese translation in 1957). Many of the photographic images in these works were reprinted from Rikou Baoxing Shilu— a work of the preceding period— although the original English edition of Snow’s *Battle for Asia* was without photos. In Japan, Gahō Kindai Hyakunenshi [Pictorial History of A Century of Modern History] (1952) contains an image of a prisoners-of-war camp in Nanking taken by Fudō Kenji, who was then a war correspondent.

In 1972, a Japanese translation of Timperly’s *What War Means*, which had already been published before World War II, was re-published in Japan. Published in March of the following year was Chūgoku no tabi [Trip in China] by Honda Katsuichi, then a correspondent of the *Asahi Newspaper*, a journal-essay series written for the *Asahi Newspaper* in August-December 1971 and compiled as a book. Then, Chūgoku no nihongun [Japanese Army in China], which was mostly a pictorial account by the same author, came out later in July. It is worth noting that the *Asahi Newspaper* was the only Japanese newspaper company that was allowed to station correspondents in communist China at that time.

Although Honda used many photographs in his two monographs that originated in the first period, he used captions that were concocted much later, instead of those from the first period. As Honda’s books prompted reactions from conservative commentators such as Yamamoto Shichihēi and Suzuki Akira, Hora Tomio, then professor of Waseda University, had his *Nankin daiyakusatsu: maboroshika kōsaku hihan* [Critique of Rape of Nanking Denial Movement] published in August 1975 to recount the contentions advanced in the accounts by these writers.

The paperback issue of Honda’s *Chūgoku no tabi* came out in 1981. Then, in the following year, the Japanese news media reported on the education ministry’s screening of school history textbooks. In the course of the ministry’s screening process, some textbook writers were reportedly forced to change their wording in the section of the Sino-Japanese War from Japan’s “invasion” of China into Japan’s “advance” to China. Although this report later turned out to be totally groundless and false, the textbook controversy soon developed into a diplomatic issue.

The period following the textbook controversy witnessed successive publication of books by the “great massacre” school. The Japanese version of Timperly’s book was reprinted yet again in November 1982. *Nanking daiyakusatsu no genba e* [To the Site of the Rape of Nanking] was published by the *Asahi Newspaper* in December 1983 under the joint editorship of Honda Katsuichi, Hora Tomio, and Fujiwara Akira. This book contains photos that were reportedly presented as evidence to the military court to try war crimes in connection with the alleged massacre in Nanking. According to the editors of the book, these photos—which are identified here as the “16 photos”—were extra prints that an employee of a film developing shop in Nanking made available from film Japanese officers had brought in—a point of contention that will be subjected to scrutiny in chapter 3.

In August 1984, a Japanese translation of Chinese eye-witness accounts of the
Nanking massacre was published with the so-called “Murase photo.” The photograph, taken by then Private Second Class Murase Moriyasu of the 17th motorized supply company of the Tokyo-based supply regiment, shows numerous dead bodies on the shore of the Yangzi River. The photo was printed in the August 17, 1983, edition of the Mainichi Newspaper as well. It was also included in the Nanking atrocity photo collections published in China in 1985. A detailed investigation of this photograph will be undertaken in Chapter 4.

The year 1985 marked the completion of the Nanking Massacre Memorial Hall in the city. In Japan the same year witnessed the publication of Nicchu senso nanking daugyakusatsu jiken shiryoshu (Source Material Relating to the Nanking Massacre)(Tokyo: Aokishoten, 1986) edited by Hora Tomio. This book contains Timperley’s What War Means. Another primary source collection was published in 1993 by a group of scholars who shared the same view as Hora. As these works were generated by the publishing industry, a perception that the Rape of Nanking was a historical fact gradually took root among the Japanese population.

(5) 1995 to the present

Starting with the 50th anniversary year of the end of World War II, the Chinese Communist Party launched a “patriotic education” campaign which featured a strong anti-Japanese orientation. The same year saw the publication in Japan of a pictorial collection of the Nanking massacre, but the photos in the book mostly overlapped with those printed in the Chinese pictorial book that was published in the preceding period. The year 1997 saw the debut of the Japanese version of a movie that combined John G. Magee’s moving images with other films produced in China. Under the title of “Nanking 1937,” this movie also features the story of the “16 photos.”

In the same year in the United States, two books were published under the same title, The Rape of Nanking, by ethnic Chinese authors. The Rape of Nanking: An Undeniable History in Photographs, edited by Shi Young and James Yin, was a collection of most of the atrocity photos that had been made public in the preceding four periods. The Rape of Nanking: The Forgotten Holocaust of World War II by Iris Chang was a narrative account that represents the standard view of the incident as accepted in China and in the United States.

This overview of how the Nanking atrocity photos came into being and how they have been used led us to the following four tentative conclusions.

First, one can trace the origin of those atrocity photographs that have been regularly used in Nanking-related publications throughout all five periods to the “evidential photos” of the first period, which were made public for the first time in 1938. Second, new photographic images were added to the photos of the first period and these photographs have been used together after the second period. Third, it was in the 1970s, when so-called photographic evidence of the Nanking massacre made its debut in Japan. Spearheading this move was Honda Katsuichi’s Chūgoku no tabi in 1972, which further stimulated the publishing of more books with the same orientation. Upon this trend, Japanese and Chinese history textbooks began to include descriptions of the Nanking massacre in 1979. Then, the year 1985 saw the inauguration of the Nanking Massacre Memorial Hall with its photo section. Finally, the 1990s was characterized by the global proliferation of these atrocity photos thanks to the use of the Internet. This trend was culminated by the publication of two books with the same title, The Rape of Nanking by Shi Young and James Yin and by Iris Chang in the United States.

Beyond this, though, are several unanswered questions. Did those photographs that
surfaced for the first time in 1938 and have since been acclaimed as evidence of the atrocities in Nanking truly capture scenes of Japanese brutality? Do they deserve categorization as solid evidence of the incident known as the Nanking massacre? These questions prompted me and other members of the research group to start investigating each one of these photographs.

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vii Higashinakano Osamichi, “Nanking ‘Daigyakusatsu’ o kutsugaesu ketteiteki shōko o hakkutsu shita” [I unearthed a piece of decisive proof that disproves the Rape of Nanking], *Seiron*, April 2003.

viii Mao Zedong never mentioned a “massacre” either following the Japanese capture of Nanking or after the war. Oddly, it is only recently that the Chinese Communists have used “Nanking” as a propaganda tool. (Mao: The Unknown Story by Chang and Halliday, 2006).
Chapter 1: Realities of the Battle for Nanking

Chinese strategy: Drawing the Japanese troops inland

It has been frequently alleged that the Japanese army slaughtered 200,000 to 300,000 civilians and prisoners of war (POWs), and committed heinous crimes such as torture, rape, and arson extensively for about six weeks following the occupation of Nanking in December 1937. Some commentators of the “great massacre school” have back-dated the massacre to the start of the Battle of Shanghai in August 1937. Appraisal of these contentions absolutely requires the analysis of the Japanese army’s operations that led to the occupation of Nanking.

China in the 1920s and 1930s was not such a unified nation as it is today. Instead, she was under the divided rule of numerous warlords. Many Western nationals and Japanese resided in such a chaotic country either to perform diplomatic duties or to engage in commercial activities. These west and Japan were allowed to station their troops in the Beijing-Tianjin area in accordance with the Boxer Protocol of 1901. The major powers, including Japan, and China signed the Boxer Protocol after the Boxer Rebellion of 1899-1900—a large-scale rebellion in which a chauvinistic organization commonly called the “Boxers” by the Westerners instigated mob violence and caused a substantial number of fatalities among foreigners. The treaty also entitled these legation troops to conduct military drills in the area between Beijing and Shanhaikuan.

It was Chiang Kai-shek’s GMD that eventually had the greatest influence among the various power players in China in the 1920s. Chiang embarked on a military campaign to unify the country in 1927 with his troops. Through this campaign, known as the “Northern Expedition,” Chiang successfully destroyed or subdued the warlords. The GMD then began to tighten its ring around the CCP.
At the time, the Chinese Communists were desperately attempting to turn Chiang Kai-shek’s military might on the Japanese. According to Tokyo Sabin Kyakka Miteisyutu Bengogawa Shiryo [Defense Evidence Rejected by the International Military Tribunal for the Far East (IMTFE)] Vol.5 (p.505) edited by Tokyo Tribunal Source Material Publishing Group, Mao Zedong of the CCP issued the “declaration of war against Japan” several times, beginning in 1932. From 1935 onward, he continued to appeal to the nation for the “expansion” of “anti-Japanese national war” as well as the “initiation of resistance war against Japan.”

Then, one event changed the entire political picture in China. On December 12, 1936, Chiang Kai-shek was visiting the city of Sian to encourage Zhang Xueliang, a son of Zhang Zuolin, to intensify his military offensive against the Communists. Zhang, however, captured Chiang and put him under house arrest. Chiang Kai-shek was later released when he agreed to terminate the GMD’s war against the Communists and give priority to wage war against Japan. On July 7 of the following year, a military clash between the Japanese and the Chinese occurred in the area close to the Marco Polo Bridge in a suburb of Beijing, and from this minor skirmish ultimately developed a full-scale war between the two countries.

On the night of July 7, a Japanese army unit that was conducting a drill in the area, using blanks as usual instead of live ammunition. At 10:40 p.m., the Japanese unit came under fire -- with live bullets. As historian Hata Ikuhiko said in his Rokōkyō Jiken no Kenkyū [Study on Marco Polo Bridge Incident] published in 1998, it was the men of the Chinese 29th Army that fired those shots. Had the Chinese troops opened fire only once, their act could have been excused as an accident. Yet, because they aimed shots at Japanese troops three more times thereafter, the commander of the Japanese troops interpreted it as an act of provocation. Finally on July 8, 5:30 a.m., after the Japanese troops came under fire for the fourth time, they launched a counterattack.

Later in the same month, when a Japanese battalion was about to enter the city of Beijing to reinforce the Japanese garrison there (which was then comprised of only two companies) under an agreement reached with the Chinese authorities in the city, Chinese soldiers closed one of the city walls gates and fired upon them. A Chinese security force stationed in Tongzhou then massacred over 200 Japanese civilians living in the city.

The Japanese government was ready to start negotiations in Shanghai on August 9 with its Chinese counterpart to settle outstanding issues, including these incidents. At this point, the Japanese leadership overall was not at all intent on expanding the military conflict in China.

Then on that very day, the conflict spread to Shanghai when Lieutenant Junior Grade Ōyama Isao and a sailor of the Japanese Imperial Navy’s landing force were killed by the Chinese security force in the city. The resulting battle in Shanghai attracted international attention since the city also contained the international settlements of the Western powers including Britain, the United States, France, and Italy. This was an ideal environment for Chiang Kai-shek to fulfill his intention of promoting and exploiting anti-Japanese feeling among the Westerners, and he was ultimately successful.

Protecting some 30,000 Japanese residents in Shanghai were only 2,500 officers and sailors of the Japanese navy’s landing force. As for Chiang Kai-shek, he had issued a mobilization order earlier on July 12, and had ten divisions of his central army deployed in the Shanghai area even before the start of the Battle of Shanghai on August 9. By
August 12, the Chinese army’s force strength in the area had grown to 50,000. Furthermore, those units dispatched to Shanghai were Chiang’s crack troops, which had been well trained by German military advisers. With the construction of pillboxes underway, they were on a full war footing.

Meanwhile, about 20,000 Japanese residents evacuated Shanghai and left for Japan. Yet, some 10,000 Japanese nationals still remained in the city, and even after the arrival of reinforcements, the navy’s landing force still numbered less than 5,000. The navy’s landing force sustained heavy losses in their clashes with Chinese troops, who made good use of pillboxes and creeks that crisscrossed the city. Finally, the Japanese government decided to form the Shanghai Expeditionary Force (SEF, which was comprised of all of or part of the 3rd, 9th, 13th, and 16th Divisions) and send it to the Shanghai area to strengthen the Japanese defense perimeters there for the protection of the remaining Japanese nationals.

The Japanese landed another corps—the 10th Army (10A), whose main contingents were all of or part of the 5th, 6th, 18th, and 114th Divisions—at Hangzhou Bay to strike at the rear of the Chinese troop positions. After three months of heavy fighting that claimed over 40,000 casualties, the Japanese army finally drove the Chinese force from the Shanghai area by November 12.

The Chinese troops, however, refused to relinquish their fight and withdrew toward the then Nationalist capital city of Nanking. Chiang Kai-shek was intent on drawing the Japanese army deep into China, following the German advisers’ suggestion that distance be utilized as a strength. Chiang planned to fight a protracted war of attrition in which he could not lose—although he might not have been able to win, either—by wearing down the Japanese in the hinterland of China.

Marching routes of the Japanese Army (the 6th, 13th, 16th Divisions).
The Japanese army chased the retreating Chinese troops to settle the score. The 9th and 16th Divisions of the SEF marched westward to the north of Lake Taihu to Nanking while the 6th Division of the 10th Army took a route to the south of the lake to converge with the SEF contingents in Nanking.

The Japanese army’s advance to Nanking can be characterized as a forced march. Almost all units traversed the distance of some 400 kilometers to Nanking in a matter of one month. Assuming that the capture of the adversary’s capital would mark the end of the war, all the units hailing from different regions of Japan were eager to reach Nanking first for the honor.

Collected excerpts from field diaries kept by 423 soldiers of the 6th Division—which was edited by Higashinakano Shūdō and published as *1937 Nankan kōryakusen no shinjitsu* [The Truth of the Nanking Campaign 1937](Tokyo, Shogakukan, 2003)—reveals other intriguing features of this forced march.

“…A scene from the Shanghai front: March on a muddy road—a vehicle immobilized in mud.” Mainichi-ban shina-jihen gahō [Sino-Japanese War Pictorial Report by The Mainichi Newspaper], no. 8, November 1, 1937, p. 28.

First, they often found themselves dragging their feet on muddy roads. There were nine rainy days between November 5—when the 10th Army landed to the south of Shanghai—and November 17. As a result, roads of clay became muddy and slippery. Many soldiers fell a number of times, and some of them even tumbled into creeks. They had a tough time pulling their feet out of the mud and found it extremely difficult to move the artillery and supply wagons forward. The cold November temperature made their predicament even worse.

Second, these men recorded the crossing of creeks as energy-sucking endeavors. Because the creeks in the Yangzi estuary were for ship transportation, they were generally deep even though they were not very wide. The retreating Chinese troops demolished almost all of the bridges to prevent or delay the Japanese army’s advance. Accordingly, the Japanese soldiers had to cross these creeks either by requisitioning boats or building make-shift bridges. It was at such moments that the Chinese army capitalized to attack the Japanese.
Third, the Japanese army units fought a number of military engagements on their way to Nanking. Whether they were ambushed or took the Chinese by surprise, the Japanese were usually heavily outnumbered. In one instance, some 460 Japanese men from two companies were surrounded by about 20,000 Chinese troops. As both the advancing Japanese and retreating Chinese were nearing Nanking, they clashed against each more severely and with greater frequency.

Those of the “great massacre school” of the Nanking massacre controversy often advance the thesis that the Japanese army entered Nanking after a series of operations for the purpose of annihilation—a contention that gives readers the impression that the Japanese slaughtered defenseless and unarmed opponents. The reality was, however, that the retreating armed Chinese attempted to deal a smashing blow to the Japanese.
Two hundred thousand civilians took refuge in the “safety zone”

The following is a chronological summary of the developments in Nanking during the time of the Japanese forced march toward the city.

Thursday, November 11: Chiang Kai-shek decided to fight for the defense of Nanking and appointed Tang Shengzhi as the commander of the Nanking garrison force.

Tuesday, November 16: Chiang secretly decided to abandon Nanking, and ordered the evacuation of the government offices within three days.

Friday, November 19: Fifteen Westerners living in Nanking formed an international committee, with John H.D. Rabe as its chairman, to organize a safety zone modeled on a safety zone undertaken in the French settlement in Shanghai (the Jacquinot Zone).
“Death-defying aerial photograph of the flak-filled sky over Nanking.” Shina-jihen shashinchō [Sino-Japanese War Pictorial Book], p. 37. This aerial photograph of Nanking shows the southern half of the city walls stretching for over 34 kilometers, as well as small canals running parallel with the walls. Smoke is seen rising from the area south of the Tongji and Guanghua Gates, where Chinese army barracks were located.

The 34-kilometer-long Nanking city walls surround the city. (Courtesy of Inagaki Kiyoshi).
Monday, November 22: The international committee announced a plan to create a neutral refugee zone free of a military presence to accommodate civilians. In reality, however, anti-aircraft guns and other Chinese military facilities were left in the safety zone—the area in the map labeled “A”. As the map on p. 21 shows, the southern area in the city should have been designated as a refugee zone because it was the most densely populated area. One may speculate that the Westerners chose the area because that was where their residences were concentrated, and that the designation as a refugee zone served as a convenient ruse to safeguard their own properties.

“Nanking and its vicinity.” Mainichi-ban shina-jihen gahō, no. 13, 21 December 1937, p. 2. (Courtesy of Inagaki Kiyoshi). Letters inserted by the authors.

Tuesday, November 23: Daily press briefings started. It was attended by the Nanking mayor, the garrison force commander, embassy staff members, foreign correspondents, American missionaries, and businessmen. The press conferences continued until the night prior to the fall of Nanking.
Sunday, November 28: Wang Gupan, chief of the police agency, said that the city of Nanking was still inhabited by 200,000 people.

Tuesday, December 7: Chiang Kai-shek escaped from Nanking by plane.

Wednesday, December 8: All of the gates of the city walls were sealed and blocked with sand bags. Garrison force commander Tang ordered the evacuation of all the civilians within the city walls to the “safety zone.” He also issued an order to prohibit the transport of wounded soldiers to the inside of the city walls.

Thursday, December 9: General Matsui Iwane, commander of the Central China Area Army—an umbrella organization that coordinated the operations of the SEF and the 10A—had leaflets scattered over the city by plane that advised the Chinese garrison to surrender.

Friday, December 10: The noon deadline for accepting Matsui’s call for surrender passed without a response from the Chinese.
Subsequently, the Japanese army, which was “unable to recognize any intent of surrender on the opponent,” launched a general offensive against the Nanking city walls at 2 p.m. the same day. The Chinese garrison troops resolutely counterattacked.

Nanking was a traditional Chinese walled city. Inside the city walls, many stores began to close in late August, and a substantial number of the inhabitants started evacuating the city. The pace of the exodus accelerated when it became known that government offices were to relocate to Hankou. The people of Nanking panicked and fled not only because of the anticipated battle but also because they feared jianbi-qingye—a scorched-earth strategy that the Chinese troops were likely to conduct in the Nanking area. Already on July 31, the GMD issued a statement that they were determined to turn every Chinese national and every piece of their soil into ash, rather than turn them over to the opponent. Upon hearing this, the population of Nanking expected that the Chinese troops would burn everything in and around Nanking so as to leave nothing for the Japanese army. Their prediction came true. The Nanking garrison force started setting fire to buildings and houses in the areas close to Xiakuan to the north as well as in the vicinities of the eastern and southern city gates.

In the end, those who remained in Nanking were the “poorest of the poor” (in the words of ICNSZ chairman Rabe), who could not afford the trip to extricate themselves from the city. With the addition of those people who lost their houses due to the scorched-earth strategy and those who fled from the anticipated battle area, as of November 28, the population of Nanking that remained totaled some 200,000.

Other sources corroborate this information. In her diary entry of November 30, Minnie Vautrin of Jinling University quoted Rabe and Fitch as saying that about 200,000 people remained within the city walls. The ICNSZ also noted on the same day that it would be obliged to feed a total of 200,000 people. On December 8, the remaining population entered the safety zone in accordance with the previously mentioned evacuation order. Immediately before the fall of the city on December 12, the ICNSZ referred to “200,000 citizens” in its proposal for a ceasefire. Clearly, there was a commonly accepted notion then that the number of people who stayed within the Nanking city walls totaled about 200,000.

Principal gates of Nanking

Zhongshan Gate seen from above. The upper portion of the photograph is the inside of the city walls. (Property of “Mr. I”)
Zhonghua Gate. View photographed from the canal area outside the West Zhonghua Gate. A postcard from one of the 16-postcard series entitled Genjitsu no Nankin [Nanking As It Is] published in 1938 or 1939.

Guanghua Gate. Chūshi no tenbō [Prospect of Central China], p. 34.

Heping Gate. Nara rentai shashinchō [Nara Regiment Album], p. 80.
“The Nagatsu unit guarding the Tongji Gate. The sight of such a gate with thick walls serves as a reminder of the intense military engagements that imperial forces underwent.” Photographed by correspondent Ōki, 6 February 1938. Asahi-ban shina-jihen gahō [Sino-Japanese War pictorial report by the Asahi Newspaper], no. 13, 20 March 1938, p. 28.

Xingzhong Gate. Rekishi shashin [Historical Photographs], February 1938, p. 10.

Shuixi Gate. A postcard that was on sale in Nanking.

Yijiang Gate. Photographed by then Major of artillery Shirai Gijūrō.
The Japanese army mounted its assault on the Nanking walls from multiple directions. The SEF’s 16th Division attacked three gates on the eastern side, the 6th Division of the 10A launched its offensive on the western walls, and the SEF’s 9th Division advanced into the area in-between.

Japanese operations were hampered for several reasons. First, since the Chinese army had burnt almost everything in the immediate vicinity of the city walls, the Japanese soldiers were exposed in the open fields, thus, were easy targets for Chinese snipers set-up on the walls. Second, small creeks around the walls obstructed the movement of the Japanese army. Every time engineering units constructed bridges or brought boats from elsewhere, Chinese troops sniped at them. Third, the Japanese soldiers had to cut through barbed wires to reach the gates of the walls. Again, those who did this were showered with hand grenades and bullets from the top of the city walls. Fourth, some Chinese units were armed with superior weapons such as heavy machine guns and were protected in well-constructed pillboxes, thanks to the guidance of German military advisers. Fifth, those Japanese soldiers who managed to break through the barbed wires faced well-built gates. For example, the Zhonghua Gate, which the 6th Division attacked, was made up of five gate doors in succession, and measured 25 meters in height and 130 meters both in width and length.

The Japanese army finally conquered the city of Nanking on December 13 after overcoming all the difficulties. A soldier of the 6th Division noted in his diary that he was unable to explain why he shed tears after the battle—whether it was tears of joy because he played a part in a successful military operation or it was tears of sorrow after he had lost so many of his comrades. ([The Truth of the Nanking Campaign 1937], p. 25)
219) At the same time, many soldiers praised their opponent for their good and brave fight.

“Artillery opening fire at the Zhonghua Gate 50 meters ahead. Behind the artillery pieces are infantry soldiers wearing white sashes, ready for the charge.” Rekishi shashin, February 1938, p. 6.

“Engineering soldiers removing sandbags to open the passage of the Zhongshan Gate.” Manshū Graph, February 1938, p. 12.
However, the Chinese military leadership behaved in such a way unworthy of praise. Although the ICNSZ proposed a three-day truce to the Chinese garrison on December 12, the garrison leader rejected it. Then at 8 p.m. on the same day, that very garrison commander, Tang Shengzhi, escaped from the city through the Yijiang Gate on the northern side of the city walls—the only gate that was available as an escape route then—without officially announcing any intention of surrendering to the Japanese military authorities. Thereafter, many of the remaining Chinese soldiers took off their uniforms and made their way to what was supposed to be the neutral safety zone. Although the Japanese troops captured the gates of the city walls on December 13, quite a few Chinese soldiers kept sniping at Japanese troops inside the city. In addition, the two sides were still severely battling against each other outside the city walls.

Immediately after the battle, the areas around the city gate walls were littered with corpses. It was true of the Zhonghua Gate in the south and of the Zhongshan Gate in the east—both of them were scenes of severe fighting. By far the largest number of dead bodies was found at the Yijiang gate in the north. American news correspondents like F. Tillman Durdin and Archibald Steele noted in their respective articles that the bodies of killed Chinese soldiers formed a small mound six feet high, and that the vehicles of the Japanese army frequently ran over these dead bodies. As these two men recollected after the war, however, the carnage they saw was the result of the actions of a Chinese supervisory unit, which shot their own soldiers to stop them from retreating, in
addition the result of many soldiers being trampled to death when they tried to escape all at once from a narrow gate path. Also, quite a few soldiers were killed when they fell off the city walls during their attempt to descend from the top of the city walls with ropes. The passage in the news article pertaining to Japanese vehicles running over corpses piled up six feet high is an inconceivable scene that defies rational thinking.

**Chinese combatants who chose to condemn themselves to unlawful status**

A military action does not cease until one of the belligerents clearly expresses their intent to surrender. The failure of the Chinese military leadership to formally capitulate left the Chinese garrison soldiers no choice but to choose their own course of action. Some were determined to fight on. Others completely gave up resistance. Yet another substantial group was unable to decide on either of these two options.

The Japanese army could not completely cease hostilities in the face of this reality. As every armed force does against an opponent that has not yet formally surrendered, the Japanese army pursued retreating Chinese units and “mopped up” those who remained within the city, disguising themselves as civilians.

Although those commentators of the “great massacre school” tend to include these military actions in the category of atrocities, the pursuit of defeated opponent is an accepted custom in warfare. As for the “mop up” operation, which was meant to separate combatants from civilians, it was an indispensable measure for guaranteeing the safety of civilians.

Japanese troops marched after the retreating Chinese army units, mainly in the Xiakuan area in the north of the city walls and around the Zijin Mountain in the east. Although the impression might be that it was one-sided slaughter by the Japanese, the remaining Chinese military posed a serious threat to the Japanese. Prince Asaka Yasuhiko, SEF commander, told a war correspondent later that he was in a very perilous position when his headquarters was ambushed by Chinese forces that were in the midst of retreating from Nanking east of the city. On the other side of the city, the 11th Company of the 45th Regiment encountered some 20,000 Chinese military soldiers who were making their way from Xiakuan. Although the 11th Company was thought to have been wiped out, later it became known that they had repelled a sizable number of Chinese soldiers after a four hour engagement, with a loss of more than ten men, including the company commander.

The Japanese army conducted its mop-up operation both inside and outside the safety zone. Since the area outside the safety zone was almost completely evacuated, the effort was concentrated in the safety zone. The safety zone, 3.85 square kilometers wide, was literally packed with the remaining Nanking population. A number of Chinese soldiers in civilian clothes were hiding among them, and the Japanese military leadership estimated their number at about 20,000. It turned out that anti-aircraft artillery positions remained intact within the safety zone, and that numerous plain-clothed soldiers were found concealing their weapons.

If such soldiers had found an opportunity to assault the Japanese, the safety zone would have become a battlefield. In this eventuality, the resulting military action would have endangered the safety of innocent civilians. Accordingly, the Japanese army leadership assigned sections of the safety zone to some units to separate the plain-clothed
soldiers from civilians. Again, this is a universally accepted in military history. Most recently, American troops conducted similar operations during the war in Iraq.

“In Investigation of five to six thousand Chinese regular soldiers who attempted their escape by blending among the refugees inside the city walls.” Mainichi-ban shina jihen gahô, no. 14, 21 December 1937, p. 23.

In the course of the “mop-up” operation, the Japanese screened out a number of Chinese soldiers, whose status as combatants was determined to be illegal. An undeniable fact is that on the Yangzi shore the Japanese military executed several thousand of those who were rebellious. The question is whether or not the execution conducted by the Japanese army was legally justifiable.

Legitimate combatants who have become prisoners of war (POW) are under the protection of international conventions which govern their treatment. They are immune from capital punishment unless they violate laws or regulations. Killing of such POWs without legitimate cause would indeed constitute an unlawful “massacre.”

Those former Chinese soldiers who were arrested in the safety zone, however, were not entitled to the privileges as POWs because they did not meet any of the four qualifications of belligerents as stipulated in the Hague convention of 1907. These four qualifications were:

1. To be commanded by a person responsible for his subordinates;
2. To have a fixed distinctive emblem recognizable at a distance;
3. To carry arms openly; and
4. To conduct their operations in accordance with the laws and customs of war.

Those who did not satisfy these qualifications were deemed to be illegitimate combatants and are not eligible for the protection under the international law. This principle is still upheld in the 1949 Geneva Convention on the treatment of POWs.

It is meaningful here to quote a U.S. government’s statement with respect to its treatment of Al-Qaeda and Taliban warriors who were detained at the U.S. military base in Guantanamo, Cuba. Defense Secretary Ronald H. Rumsfeld said the following in the Defense Department’s news briefing on February 8, 2002 (DoD News);
A central purpose of the Geneva Convention was to protect innocent civilians by distinguishing very clearly between combatants and non-combatants. This is why the convention requires soldiers to wear uniforms that distinguish them from the civilian population. The Taliban did not wear distinctive signs, insignias, symbols or uniforms. To the contrary, far from seeking to distinguish themselves from the civilian population of Afghanistan, they sought to blend in with civilian non-combatants, hiding in mosques and populated areas.

Japanese soldiers giving cigarettes to POWs. “Senki eiga 12: Nankin” [War Documentary Movie no. 12: Nanking].

On their way home with smiling faces. “A scene that should have been shown to Chiang Kai-shek.” Asahi-ban shina-jihen gahō, no. 32, 5 August 1939, p. 34.

War is a life-or-death struggle between two parties. Yet, it must be conducted under certain rules governing the acts of belligerency. Those who abide by these rules will be under protection prescribed by the laws, but those who fail to observe them are sometimes not entitled to such protection.
For example, combatants who are captured in uniforms should be accorded the status of POW. As Rumsfeld said, combatants who satisfy those four qualifications as defined under international law will be guaranteed to live including after they are under the opponent’s custody. But those who discarded their uniforms are regarded as illegitimate combatants and cannot to be classified as POWs and are not entitled to privileges thereof.

Obviously, the Chinese combatants after the fall of Nanking belonged to the latter category. They removed insignias and uniforms that could have distinguished themselves from non-combatants, and made their way to the safety zone where almost all the civilians remaining in Nanking took refuge. They were clearly illegitimate combatants and did not qualify for protection specified in international conventions. Thus, none of the Westerners living in Nanking made a statement that claimed that the Japanese executed “POWs.” Neither was such a contention advanced at the IMTFE.

The Japanese execution of rebellious-looking ex-Chinese combatants was a well-known fact among all the parties involved—the Westerners, the Japanese military, the Chinese soldiers, and the civilian population in the city. Even if they did not personally witness such executions, they surely heard rumors about them. Also, this fact was likely familiar to the peoples of Western countries and of Japan. If such executions in the course of the “mop-up” operation had been deemed illegal, there would have been an immediate international outcry against Japan. But, at the time, no such accusation was leveled against her.

The “Daily Reports of the Serious Injuries to Civilians,” which was later edited, compiled and published as the Documents of the Nanking Safety Zone, contains a case number 185. What is notable about this particular case is its side note, which states, “We have no right to protest about legitimate executions by the Japanese army.” Since “legitimate” means “in accordance with established principles or standards,” one may rephrase this passage as “We have no right to protest about executions by the Japanese army that observed the principles of the conventions governing belligerencies.”

The case 185 was reported on January 9, 1938. Thus, one may conclude that the ICNSZ determined the Japanese executions to be lawful in the light of the international laws on belligerencies as of this date. Notably, no Westerners made their references to the executions in their written records thereafter. As an article in the 2003 edition of Nankin “gyhakusatsu” kenkyū no saizensen [The Front Line of Research on the Nanking “Massacre” 2003](p. 287) noted, the absence of an accusation accrued from universal recognition by the people in Nanking that the Japanese executions were legally justifiable.

Those accustomed to the norms of peace time might have no qualm about granting the status of “ordinary civilian” to military men who stripped themselves of uniforms. But under the laws of belligerencies, combatants remain so until they are formally discharged.

One fact must also be emphasized here: the Japanese army did not execute all the captured Chinese combatants. The Japanese military used many of them as a labor force, and they numbered about 10,000 by the end of February, 1938.([ The Front Line of Research on the Nanking “Massacre” 2004](p. 90) Some of them were registered as civilians.

For example, Major-General Liu Qixiong, who is mentioned in [The Truth of the
Nanking Campaign 1937] (p.173) as a “cooler general,” was arrested at his hideout in the safety zone, and was used as a laborer for a while after his capture. Later, he became a military commander of the government of Wang Zhaoming, which was established on March 30, 1940.

“Liu Qixiong, commander of the Chinese 261st Brigade, of the 87th Division, who became a POW at the battle of Nanking.” Asahi-ban shina-jihen gahô, no. 14, 1 January 1938, p. 23.

There are some source materials that mention how these prisoners were treated at POW camps. Someone took a photograph that showed Chinese POWs playing musical instruments in a mini concert within a camp. Hayashi Fumiko, a Japanese female novelist who visited such a POW camp, drew a scene of an ex-pilot POW reading a book in her Kitagishi Butai [Kitagishi Unit] (p.113). One of the photos printed on Mainichi-ban shina-jihen gahô, no. 59, 20 May 1939, p. 20.
Graph: Nihon no senreki [Mainichi Graph: Japan’s Wars] showed wounded Chinese POWs at a Japanese field hospital. The scene suggested that Japanese medics treated Chinese POWs very well. This photo was reprinted in Shinpen Sankō [Three-All Campaign: Newly edited version], compiled by an association of ex-Japanese soldiers imprisoned at a CCP war criminal camp for “re-education” purposes. A problem of the reprinted photo is that it was modified from the original and a fabricated caption was attached: the sign reading “medical unit” on the building wall, visible on the original photograph was erased, and the new caption read, “Chinese POWs, whose leg was amputated to prevent their escape.”

“Coolies are with imperial troops wherever they may go.” Mainichi-ban shina jihen gahō, no. 15, 11 January 1938, p. 28.

“POWs with missing arms or legs. Their wounds are testimonial to their bravery. No demeanor of begging for sympathy on their faces. A snapshot at a POW camp in Nanking in the spring of 1938.” Mainichi Graph: Nihon no senreki [Mainichi Graph: Battle records of Japan], p. 109.

Timperly’s What War Means contains many passages that give readers the impression that some civilians were misidentified as ex-soldiers and were executed. For example, George A. Fitch, who wrote a part of it under anonymity, said, “[I]t was all too evident that an execution was going on, hundreds of poor disarmed soldiers with many innocent civilians among them—the real reason for his not wanting me to go further.”
This passage, however, only records hearsay and was not a personal eye-witness account. In addition, no source materials recorded any accusation against the Japanese for the execution of civilians who were misidentified as ex-combatants. Fitch himself did not witness any but he wrote thus using his imagination. There is no convincing evidence to prove that such mistaken executions of civilians really happened.

To the contrary, a veteran of the 7th Regiment, which was assigned to sweep the safety zone, recalled that the regimental command had issued a strict order to protect innocent citizens and not to enter refugee camps (Unemoto Masami, Shogen ni yoru Nankin senshi [Eyewitness Account of the Battle of Nanking] p.12). The Japanese army thus appeared to conduct the “mop-up” operation of the safety zone with meticulous care. For example, the photograph printed on this page shows Japanese military policemen separating ex-servicemen from civilians by means of body checks. Also, it appears that the Japanese troops prioritized the search of government facilities such as the justice ministry building, where many plain-clothed soldiers were hiding, and did not enter refugee camps, although one cannot ascertain this fact conclusively due to the scarcity of primary sources.

“About 5,000 Chinese POWs who surrendered to the imperial army.” Mainichi-ban shina jihen gahō, no. 24, 21 December 1937, p. 22. One can see an ideographic symbol indicating “military police” on the armband of a Japanese soldier depicted on the right edge of the photograph.
An important fact is that the Japanese army executed only those combatants who exhibited rebellious behavior on the one hand, and made a point of releasing those judged to be civilians on the other. Therefore, even if some civilians were mistaken as soldiers, they were highly unlikely to be killed as long as they maintained an abiding attitude. If some civilians among refugees were about to be mistakenly arrested, then people around them spoke up for them. Actually, this is what really transpired when the Japanese army conducted another search of ex-combatants within the safety zone starting December 24. Nakasawa Mitsuo, then chief-of-staff of the 16th Division, described the scene of this operation:

As for those whose identity could not be ascertained for sure, we tentatively categorized them as ex-soldiers. If they were not so in reality, not only they themselves denied it emphatically, but some people who knew them spoke for them by giving their identity. (*Nankin senshi* [The Battle of Nanking] p. 387)

One should note that no Nanking citizen, who citied the actual name of the accused, protested against any case of mistaken execution.

"International refugee zone."
Manshū Graph, February 1938, p. 16.
Population did not decrease in the safety zone, which was an “isolated island on land”

A widely accepted thesis of the Nanking massacre contends that slaughter, violence, rape, robbery, and arson raged in the city for six weeks from December 13, 1937, through to the end of January the following year. In July 1946, Miner S. Bates testified at the IMTFE that 12,000 men, women, and children were killed within the Nanking city walls. He also said in February the following year that 90 percent of these killings occurred in the initial 10 days, and most of them in the first three days.

But what was the reality? If, as Bates testified, frequent cases of murder had been committed in the first three days of the Japanese occupation, it would have been impossible to capture the images as printed on pp. 41-51. In addition, the continuation of such a slaughter would have inevitably reduced the size of the population. Here, records pertaining to the population in Nanking are worth investigating.

As noted previously, the Nanking police chief announced on November 28 that some 200,000 people still remained in the city. On December 12, the ICNSZ proposed a truce for the benefit of “200,000 citizens.” An article of the China Bulletin, no. 7, on March 27, 1938, speculated that “80 percent of one million” Nanking population had evacuated the city, leaving “200,000” behind. Plumber Mills, ICNSZ vice chairman and American missionary of the Presbyterian Church, said that the safety zone was packed with refugees, who, by an estimate, numbered about 200,000.

How large was the population of Nanking after its fall? On December 21, a group of foreigners in the city referred to the 200,000 citizens of Nanking in its letter of petition to the Japanese. Fitch entered “the remaining two hundred thousand of Nanking’s population” in his diary entry of December 24. On the same day, the Japanese military authorities started separating remaining ex-combatants from civilians in the safety zone and registered the civilians over the next ten days. Based on the result of this registration, the Westerners in the city concluded that there were a quarter of a million people in Nanking. Obviously, by drawing on this fact, Mills said in his letter dated March 25, 1938, to his family that the population of Nanking totaled 250,000. In an ICNSZ report on April 30, the committee recorded that it had attended to “nearly 250,000 persons in the most critical weeks of December and January.” About half a year later on November 1, the same committee declared that “nearly 250,000” took refuge in the safety zone. Even in a report of the Nanking Relief Committee in 1938, which was renamed from the ICNSZ, its then chairman Bates noted that the safety zone was filled with people, who amounted to close to 250,000.

As these records show, contemporary observers had the universal notion that the population in the city after its fall totaled between 200,000 to 250,000. Some may contend that such figures are unreliable and cannot be verified. But in the face of the allegation that 12,000 were massacred within the city walls, someone could have claimed that this slaughter reduced the population to 190,000. Yet, no such accusation was made.

The Japanese military command severely restricted the entry to and exit from the city of Nanking until February 24. In this “isolated island on land,” the population never decreased, but to the contrary increased according to observations of Westerners. This is a strong case in point to prove that there was no large-scale killing of civilians in
the city.

Given the non-occurrence of large-scale killing of civilians, a puzzling question is why Bates accused the Japanese of such a slaughter. The only killing the Japanese military conducted apart from its formal military operations was the execution of Chinese soldiers who had relinquished their lawful status as combatants. Bates seemingly modified this story to present a case of unjustifiable massacre of civilians.

**Friendly atmosphere grows day by day**

Printed on the following are the photographs that Japanese war correspondents took after the Japanese army’s victory parade on December 17. They will give the readers some aspects of the city of Nanking under the Japanese occupation.

Friday, December 17: The Japanese military command held a victory parade at 1:30 p.m. General Matsui and his staff officers paraded on horses and saluted selected officers and soldiers of the SEF and the 10A who lined up on the both sides of the street that stretched from the Zhongshan gate to the GMD government building. Matsui entered the GMD government building shortly past 2 p.m. Admiral Hasegawa Kiyoshi, who commanded the China Expeditionary Fleet of the Imperial Japanese Navy, joined Matsui there, and they held a joint ceremony to celebrate the capture of the Chinese capital.

![Japanese army leaders entering through the Zhongshan Gate in a victory parade as the press corps records this event. Chūshi o yuku, p. 67.](image-url)
Matsui noted in his field diary on this day that doors of the houses on the streets were closed, and that very few Chinese people were seen there since inhabitants were concentrated in the refugee zone in the northwestern part of the city. Matsui saw very few Chinese nationals because, according to the field diary of then Major-General Iinuma Mamoru, who was the SEF chief of staff, the Japanese military command decided not to give prior notification about the victory parade to the Chinese.

Selected Japanese troops lined up on the northern part of East Zhongshan Street. The building in the background is an old imperial palace.
Asahi-ban shina-jihen gahô, no. 11, 27 January 1938, p. 11.

The Japanese navy’s landing force entering the city through the Yijiang Gate.
Asahi-ban shina-jihen gahô, no. 11, 27 January 1938, p. 10.

The Mainichi Newspaper crew recording the victory parade in Nanking. Mainichi-ban shina jihen gahō, no. 15, 11 January 1938, p. 31.

“Straggling soldiers who hid in the refugee zone. Photographed by correspondent Kawamura, 17 December 1937.” Asahi Graph, no. 24, 5 January 1938, p. 9. Judging from their uniform, however, they appear to be policemen.

Saturday, December 18: The Japanese army and navy held a joint memorial service for the fallen soldiers at an airfield in Nanking amid strong winds blowing at the site. The memorial service ended at 2:45 p.m.

“Commander Matsui (Iwane) presenting tamagushi [Sprig of the sacred tree] to the altar as a token of respect.” Mainichi-ban shina jihen gahō, no. 15, 11 January 1938, p. 29.

Sunday, December 19 – Tuesday, December 21: The following is part of an article dated December 21, 1937, from the Tokyo Asahi Newspaper that describes the condition of Nanking at the time:

Tokyo Asahi Newspaper, 25 December 1937. These photographs appear to depict the scenes described in correspondent Moriyama’s article on the December 21, 1937, issue of the Tokyo Asahi Newspaper. The photographs were credited to correspondent Hayashi. The caption on the lower right reads, “Hymn overheard (at the Ninghai Road in Nanking.”
Nanking, December 19, by correspondent Moriyama,

Peace has returned to Nanking already. I took a walk on the China town streets of Nanking, which the imperial force captured a week ago. It may sound strange that there is a China town within the Chinese city of Nanking. But since the Japanese troops were quartered everywhere within the Nanking walls, the area where Chinese population resided deserves that naming at the present.

Initially, the Chinese residents tended to hide themselves at the sight of the Japanese. But by now, they have become so friendly that they approach Japanese soldiers and propose to help them in some ways or the other. . . .

In the make-shift markets that sprang up in this war time, I could see the vitality of the Chinese population who are able to make adjustment to any environment. Prices were extremely high. A match costs five sen [one-hundredths of one yen], and a handful of salt was ten sen. These prices are ten times as much as the pre-war level.


A man in ragged clothes was selling manjū [Chinese pastry] placed on a cloth spread on the street. Next to him was a man selling gingers, a woman displaying matches and candles for sale, and an old man with salt and teas. At the square in the refugee zone, I smiled to see a Chinese barber shaving a long-grown beard of a Japanese soldier, who looked to be a little sentimental in losing that beard.
Little boys and girls were playing on a broken horse-cart with joyful voices. Some boys were playing a mock battle with a miniature tank—something these poor-looking children could not seemingly afford for—on a pavement. I do not know where these children found that toy.

“On the street of Nanking. Only a few days after the Japanese entry into the city, peace has returned to the former battlefield, and the streets have scenes of children playing with the Japanese soldiers. Both photographed 20 December 1937.” Shina-jihen shashin zenshū, vol. 2: Shanhai jihen [Complete Pictorial Collection of The Sino-Japanese War, vol. 2: Shanghai Incident], p. 151.
I heard a hymn accompanied by an organ play from a church. Reverend John G. Magee was in the midst of a prayer service with the Chinese faithful who looked relieved to see the termination of the battle. Their demeanor was so calm that I realized it was Sunday for the first time at the sight of the service.

A red cross flag was hoisted to show the location of a medical center opened by the Japanese army. Those Chinese persons who were injured on their leg or had cold visited the center for treatment and receive medications with expression of trust and joy on their faces. Such a pleasant scene made me forget that this was the enemy’s capital. The friendly atmosphere grows day by day between the Chinese population who has relinquished their anti-Japanese slogans and the Japanese military men.

The first appearance of this photograph was probably in the December 18, 1937, issue of the North China Daily News. The paper described this scene as Chinese soldiers left behind at a military hospital. This photo was reprinted on Ichikoku-nin no Shōwa-shi: Nihon no senshi 3: Nitchū sensō [The Showa History for 100 million people: Japan’s War Record 3—The Sino-Japanese War], p. 280. Its caption, “Photographed by a foreign correspondent, 29 December 1937” is probably incorrect.

Asahi-ban shina jihen gahō, no. 11, 27 January 1938, p. 15.
Wednesday, December 22: The Japanese military command inaugurated a self-government committee comprised of Chinese nationals on this day to reconstruct the administrative organization for the city. Tao Xishan, the head of the Red Swastika Society, assumed its chairmanship. Almost all the municipal government officials as well as police officers had fled the city while the city had witnessed the extensive destruction of broadcasting, telephone, and telegram stations as well as a substantial part of the social infrastructure. In the face of this reality, Tao hoped for the reconstruction of Nanking at the earliest date, and aimed to arrest “undesirable elements” that had blended in the population.

Women coming out of a public air-raid shelter: These women were in this shelter like moles covering their ears. They came out upon the termination of hostility and the Japanese army’s proclamation on the restoration of peace. Photographed by correspondent Kadono, 14 December 1937. Transmitted via the Fukuoka branch office.” Asahi Newspaper, 16 December 1937.


Friday, December 24 and afterward: The 16th Division started screening Chinese combatants out of the safety zone, under the command of Major-General Sasaki Tōichi, commander of the 30th Brigade. There were two reasons why the Japanese army had to remove combatants again from among the refugees. The first and major reason was that the “mop-up” operation immediately after the fall of the city failed to round up any officers.

Regulations of Hague Convention rigorously request that a POW should answer with his name and rank in full faith (Article 9). According to a battle report filed by the 7th Regiment, which operated in the safety zone, “The interrogation of POWs captured up to this date—December 15—shows that almost all Chinese combatants rounded up are non-commissioned officers and enlisted men, and no officers among them.”(Nankin senshi shiryoshu Vol.1, p.51) Absence of officers among the POWs was extraordinary because escape from inside the city walls was practically impossible then. Inevitably, the Japanese military leadership suspected that a substantial number of officers were still hiding in the safety zone. Again, their concern was that the presence of combatants of unlawful status among civilians might endanger the security of not only the Japanese soldiers but also the Chinese civilians. The Japanese thus resumed the screening process for security and self-defense purposes.

Uchida Yoshinao, who assisted in Major-General Sasaki’s work as a translator that started on this day, said:

Since the Chinese garrison was comprised mainly of men from Guangdong, Guangxi, and Hunan who spoke the southern dialect as the Nanking citizens, dialectical difference did not serve as a good measurement to distinguish former combatants from civilians. Instead, we identified combatants by their physical outlook. We collaborated
with Chinese staff members of the self-government committee in order not to arrest innocent civilians. In many cases, we could identify them easily because ex-combatants were usually wearing civilian clothes only in their upper body, but were still wearing army pants. (*Nankin senshi*, p. 387)

The screening process continued for about 20 days and was more or less completed January 5.

Nevertheless, some Chinese officers were able to evade the watchful eyes of the Japanese military authorities. Sixteenth Division chief-of-staff Nakasawa noted in his report around January 22 that a battalion commander of the Chinese 88th Division had been captured a few days before. He added, “We must be aware that officers of considerably high ranks are hiding in the buildings of diplomatic representatives. According to the confession of that battalion commander, regimental and battalion commanders are still taking refuge within the compounds of the U.S. embassy.”

The *China Press*, published by Americans in Shanghai, reported in its January 25 edition that the Japanese military had rounded up 23 commissioned officers, 54 non-commissioned officers, and 1,498 privates at diplomatic legations and other buildings in Nanking by December 28. That even an anti-Japanese English-language paper published in China reported on this fact, albeit in a small article, attests to the seriousness of this event. A cutout of this article was also attached to a document among the official German diplomatic files compiled by the German embassy.

On the same day, the *China Press* quoted a Japanese military police report, saying that the rounded up officers included a man named Wang Xinlao. The report said that he called himself Chen Mi and was in charge of administrative duties in the safety zone. The report also noted a rumor that among the high-ranked officials still in hiding are Ma Paoxiang, deputy chief of the 88th Division, and Mi Xinxi, ranking official of the Nanking police. Ma was said to be commanding anti-Japanese activities. Lieutenant-Major Huang An and 17 other men were taking shelter inside the safety zone with one machine-gun and 17 rifles, while Wang Xinlao and his three men were engaged in robbery, agitation activities, and rape.

Thus, this military police report makes clear that some Chinese officers were directing sabotage activities against the Japanese from their hide-out within the safety zone. In addition, some Westerners in Nanking were illegally sheltering some of these officers. As Kobayashi Taigen discussed extensively in the March 2004 issue of the Japan “Nanking” Society journal, the *Osaka Asahi Newspaper* also mentioned the “arrest of rogue Chinese who perpetrated robbery and violence disguised as Japanese soldiers” in its February 27, 1938, issue.

Another objective of screening was to compile population statistics. This was an indispensable process to solve the food shortage problem that was afflicting Nanking at the time. The Japanese army released food to the citizens, and no instance of death by starvation was reported in the city. This was one of the forgotten achievements of the Japanese army in Nanking.

Saturday, January 1, 1938: The self-government committee held its inauguration ceremony in the city center. Its inaugural address noted that “the security was restored in the city in a short while after the Japanese army’s arrival.”
Sunday, January 2: Although five Chinese airplanes raided the Daxiao airfield in the Nanking suburb, no damage was reported.

Wednesday, January 5: This day marked the end of the interviewing work for the purpose of the screening out of former combatants. Major-General Sasaki noted in his memoir, “We had rounded up about 2,000 combatants from within the city walls by this date and placed them under our custody at what used to be the foreign ministry building. We had wounded Chinese soldiers transferred from foreign missionaries into our hands.” He added, “Those Chinese combatants who were continuing disruptive activities in the suburban areas outside the walls were captured continuously, and those who were disposed of at Xiakuan numbered several thousands.”

Wednesday, January 26: Ernest Forster, missionary of St. Paul Church in Nanking, said in his letter dated on this day that a woman was hospitalized this morning. The letter quoted a story that she had been abducted by Japanese soldiers to the southern part of the city and was raped there seven to nine times a day. Forster added that she was reportedly released when the Japanese soldiers considered her to be useless, and that she was in the worst stage of three different venereal diseases. Forster, however, refused to accept this allegation and concluded that foreigners in the city were making up such a story to antagonize the Chinese.

A seal impression which then Corporal Kondō Heidayū had produced by a refugee in Nanking on December 20, 1937—one week after the fall of the city. The engraved symbols read, “In commemoration of the victorious entry through the Guanghua Gate.” Photographed by Nomura Toshiyuki. Reprinted from Nankin “gyakusatsu” kenkyū no saizensen [Frontline of Nanking “Massacre” Research], 2004 issue, p. 11.
“One week after the fall of Nanking. Sick Chinese civilians enjoy the charitable and compassionate acts of imperial troops as medics treat them in a hospitable manner. Those who are now free from military fire as well as from illness express their gratitude to imperial forces by closing their palms and tears. Photographed by correspondent Hayashi, 20 December 1937.” Asahi Graph, vol. 30-3, 19 January 1938, p. 6.


Scenes of Nanking after January 1938.

“In prayer for fallen warriors of both Japan and China.” Shashin shūhō [Picture Weekly], no. 26, 10 August 1938, p. 13.
“Peddlers wishing to trade with Japanese soldiers on a Nanking street.”
Mainichi-ban shina jihen gahō, no. 17, 1 February 1938, p. 31.

“Daily Reports” created without verification

During this period, Bates of the ICNSZ filed with the Japanese embassy the “Daily Reports of the Serious Injuries to Civilians.” Commentators have cited these reports, which list a variety of criminal acts, as a proof of the Japanese army’s brutality.

Since Timperly refers to the Document of the Nanking Safety Zone—an edited version of the “Daily Reports”—as a complete collection of such reports in the first two months of the Japanese occupation, one may conclude that this source records all of the reported cases in Nanking. Of these, the cases of murder, rape, robbery, and arson totaled 26, 175, 131, and five, respectively. Of the reports of murder, there was only a single eye-witnessed case, which was actually an instance of lawful execution. Other stories were rumors of unknown origin. The same is true of almost all—about 95 percent—of the reports of rape, robbery, and arson. Such hearsays cannot constitute viable evidence.

It seemed that the staff members of both the Japanese embassy in Nanking and the foreign ministry in Tokyo read a part of these reports. If so, did these reports convince them that a massacre was in progress in Nanking? The answer is “No.”

Tomizawa Shigenobu created a database of the Japanese army’s criminal activities as recorded in not only the Document of the Nanking Safety Zone but also in other primary sources authored by Westerners and Japanese army personnel. According to Tomizawa’s findings, which are summarized in his Nankin jiken no kakushin: Deeta beesu ni yoru jiken no kaimei [Core Truth of the Nanking Incident: Analysis of the Event with the Use of a Database], recorded cases of murder, rape, robbery, and arson/destruction numbered 94, 243, 201, and 34, respectively. Of these, only one case of murder was actually witnessed—which, again, was a case of lawful execution—and actually witnessed were 17 cases of rape, 26 cases of robbery, and one case of arson.

The Japanese army posted sentries at every gate of the Nanking walls, important buildings, and where army units were quartered. Soldiers were to expect severe punishment if they were found to have committed any criminal act. Tsukamoto Kōji, then chief of the SEF’s legal department, testified at the IMTFE that since the legal department sternly prosecuted even minor infractions, rank and file of SEF units sometimes complained about it.

A soldier of the 9th Division that was in charge of sweeping the safety zone recalled that no single soldier was missing in the daily morning and evening roll calls. Matoba Yukio, who participated in the victory parade on December 17 as a warrant officer, said that he was unaware of any instance of Japanese soldiers causing trouble in the safety zone. These recollections do not mean that the Japanese army personnel perpetrated no criminal act. But such misconducts were committed by individuals, and this fact should not be used to criticize the entire Japanese army of conducting systematic violence. It seems that the Japanese army maintained strict discipline in Nanking.

One may advance the counterargument: these cases of “Daily Reports” cannot be dismissed as unreliable evidence solely because they are based on hearsay. Here, to analyze this contentious point, it is worth investigating how these reports were compiled. The following is a recollection by Fukuda Tokuyasu, who was then a staff member of the Japanese embassy in Nanking and became a government minister after the war.
My mission was to visit the office of the refugee zone from time to time and negotiate with the staff there. One day, I saw two or three Americans typing something. When I looked over their shoulders, I saw them typing documents reporting on Japanese soldiers raping women. I told them in an indignant tone, “Who told you of these stories? You should not type up such stories without authentication. You need to verify these facts.” My speculation is that they were providing materials for Timperly’s book. Even after that, I repeatedly cautioned them not to record what the Chinese people said without any supportive evidence. . . . I was in charge of listening to their complaints of various types, which contained both truths and lies. I was fed up with these. . . .

On another occasion, American vice consul visited me. He told me that Japanese soldiers driving trucks were now stealing lumber from a warehouse owned by an American in Xiakuan. Upon hearing this, I called a staff officer of the army and hastened to the scene with the vice consul and that staff officer. It was about 9 a.m. The temperature was freezing, and the snow was falling. We hurried to the scene by car. Upon arrival, however, we saw no one. The warehouse was locked, and there was no sign of foul play. I complained to the vice consul, “Nothing has happened here. I asked even a staff officer to come all the way to this place. From now on, you should call me after you have confirmed the fact. Our army is considerate enough to send a staff officer immediately in response to this kind of minor incident. You should be more careful.” The vice consul appeared to be very embarrassed. Unfortunately, this type of incident happened frequently. . . .

I admit that the Japanese army did perpetrate some criminal acts. But there is absolutely no evidence to corroborate the contention pertinent to the massacre of 200,000 or 300,000—or even thousands. . . . There were watchful eyes of Westerners and Chinese residents. If an atrocity of that scale had happened, it would have become a sensational topic. The story of the great massacre is a fabrication. It was a product of propaganda.

Actually, the “Daily Reports” noted in its report no. 10 that on December 18 the number of complaints filed by the Chinese nationals was too large for the ICNSZ staff to type all of them up. This clearly shows that the international committee compiled the “Daily Reports” just by listening to stories reported by Chinese individuals without making any effort to substantiate them.

In addition, quite a few cases in the “Daily Report” do not identify Japanese soldiers as perpetrators. A possibility is that Chinese civilians or Chinese combatants in hiding committed these crimes. Thus, one may even conclude that the writers of the “Daily Reports” compiled them on the prejudicial assumption that the Japanese committed these heinous acts.

Even some Westerners criticized this tendency. Rabe’s diary quoted Paul Schalfenberg of the German embassy in Nanking as saying that the reports of the Japanese army’s violence were based only on stories provided by the Chinese.

As for the criminal acts committed by the Chinese, Guo Zhi, a Chinese battalion
commander who was hiding in the safety zone, said that the Japanese soldiers “lacked courage to engage in any activities either inside or outside the refugee zone at night . . . . [Chinese] people ransacked large corporations, stores, and residence at their own will.” Guo added that the Japanese soldiers unknowingly bought the stolen goods, which were displayed at markets organized by looters.

Yet another source is worth noting here. It is a hand-written letter which one European woman addressed to the ICNSZ on December 11, and is among the English-language materials accompanying Rabe’s original diary as preserved at Yale University—the materials which the published version of his diary does not include. That woman wrote about some 100 armed soldiers of the Nanking garrison force, who had stayed in the Wutaishan village within the safety zone for two weeks. She asked for the ICNSZ’s protection because on the morning of that day these Chinese soldiers started threatening to destroy properties owned by foreigners and to murder them.

To conclude this chapter, one photograph owned by then Second Lieutenant Akaboshi Takashi, who participated in the Nanking campaign right after his graduation from Waseda University, is worth printing here. According to Akaboshi’s wife, who allowed us to use it in this publication, it was one of his favorite photos. The scene captured in this photo is quite inconsistent with Timperly’s contention that Nanking was subjected to repeated cases of murder as well as planned robbery and rape of a large scale starting on the second day of the occupation.

Starting with the next chapter, readers are encouraged to read the results of our investigation of so-called Nanking massacre “evidential photos” with the reality of the Nanking campaign as described in this chapter in mind.

Second Lieutenant Akaboshi Takashi photographed in the suburb of Nanking immediately following the fall of the city. (Courtesy of Mrs. Akaboshi).
Chapter 2: The First “Photographic Evidence”

Origins of the photographs in two Chinese sources

The investigation by the atrocity photo research group confirmed that the so-called “photographic evidence” of the alleged Rape of Nanking made their debut in two Chinese sources, that is, *Rikou Baoxing Shilu* [Authentic Record of Japan’s Brutal Acts (RBS)] compiled by the political section of the GMD government’s military commission, and *Wairen muduzhong rijun baoxing* [Japanese Violence as Witnessed by Foreigners (WMRB)], the Chinese edition of Timperly’s work published in Hankou. Although Timperly’s book was also published in Hong Kong, the investigation here focuses only on the Hankou edition.

The two sources contained 39 and 31 photos, respectively, and the same seven photos were printed in both. The photos were split into two groups. Forty-one (Group A) of the 63, excluding the overlapping items, were reprinted at least once in other Nanking-related publications in the subsequent periods—the periods previously defined in the prologue—whereas 22 (Group B) have not made any later re-appearance. Although the analysis of only the Group A photos would meet the stated purpose of this book, the research group decided to analyze those of the Group B as well to make the probe comprehensive and complete.

A few words of caution concerning the quality of these photos: (1) the investigation team took close-up shots of those photos in WMRB, which were not of good quality, and reprinted them here; (2) some RBS photos made available here were Xeroxed copies produced some time ago when the project to publish this book had yet to take concrete form.

Group A photographs: Those that have been used in the “second period” and thereafter as well. Seven photographs printed in both RBS and the WMRB Hankou edition
Group A photographs: Those that have been used in the “second period” and thereafter as well.

Ten photographs printed in the WMRB Hankou edition

Twenty-four photographs printed in RBS
Analyses of Group A photographs

1. Scenes of bombing

Aerial bombing constitutes military action. A crucial question is whether or not Japanese armed forces conducted indiscriminate bombing on civilian targets in Nanking, as the American Army Air Corps did against Tokyo. More specifically, did Japanese planes drop bombs in the “safety zone,” where practically all the remaining Chinese civilians made their temporary home and shelter?

The answer is negative. In the very first letter that the ICNSZ addressed to the Japanese embassy on December 13, 1937, the committee thanks the Japanese for having spared the safety zone from artillery barrage. In fact, not only army artillery but also the naval air force did not attack the safety zone. Tomizawa Shigenobu, who reviewed foreign sources that touched on the Japanese bombardment and aerial bombing of the city, concluded in his Nankin jiken no kakushin [Core Truth of the Nanking Incident] that damage caused by such attacks was collateral and sporadic since the Japanese targeted only military facilities. Lillie Abegg, a correspondent of the Frankfurter Zeitung, substantiated this line of reasoning in her Chinas Erneuerung [China’s Innovation] published in 1940. Referring to a photo that seemingly captured a scene of the Japanese bombing of Shanghai in 1937 (Photo A), she said that the Japanese dropped the bombs in an area immediately beyond the line that demarked the international settlement— in the area where the both armies clashed.

Photo A: A scene of aerial bombardment in Shanghai. Lily Abegg, Chinas Erneuerung.
Some photos were, however, misused to trump up charges that the Japanese had murdered innocent civilians by indiscriminate bombing.

(a) Nanking after Japanese bombing?

Photo 1, which is printed in RBS, is captioned as a scene in Nanking, which was allegedly turned into ruins by aerial bombardment. Some sources still use the same photo with the same caption. *Nankin daigyakusatsu: Rekishi no shinjitsu o kataru sokuseki to shōgen* [The Rape of Nanking: The Evidence and Eyewitness Accounts That Narrate the Truth of History (henceforth REKISHI)], which was published in Japan in 2003, cited this photograph as evidence showing the “indiscriminate aerial bombing against the city’s residential area prior to the land campaign,” and added that this bombing “burned numerous houses and killed innocent people.” Likewise, the caption of a WMRB photo, which is an enlarged version of a part of Photo 1, describes the scene as the commercial district of Nanking. ZKH also introduces this image as an “aftermath of the Japanese bombing of Nanking inside its city walls.” So does RON-YY with a caption reading “Downtown Nanking after a Japanese air raid.”

Photo 1: Quite a few sources still uses the RBS caption of this scene which explains this scene as the one from Nanking. This, however, is an image from Guangdong, and appeared in such contemporary Japanese publications as *Rekishi shashin*, October, 1938 and *Shina-jihen seisenshi* [History of Holy War in China], December, 1938.
Contemporary Japanese publications, however, carried this photograph with a totally different caption. The October 1938 issue of *Rekishi shashin* [Historical Photographs] and the December issue of *Shina jihen seienshi* [Holy War History of the Sino-Japanese War] of the same year commented that this photo was a scene of aerial bombing against military facilities in Guangdong. The Japanese army decided on the Guangdong campaign on June 15, 1938, and completed its occupation later on October 21. This caption is more persuasive and plausible because the people seen in the photo were dressed in summer clothes—an unlikely outfit for December in Nanking.

![Image of aerial bombing against military facilities in Guangdong](image)

Photo B: The caption of this photograph in the October 1938 issue of *Rekishi shashin*, p. 19, reads, “A military outpost in Tongshan close to the Tianhe airfield of Guangdong under bombing by the imperial navy’s squadrons.”

One needs to distinguish bombing military facilities from indiscriminate aerial bombardment. A comparison between the former and the latter will become clear when one looks at the aftermath of each case.

(b) The acclaimed image of a baby crying in the ruins after a bombing

Photo A appeared in the media for the first time in the October 4, 1937, issue of the American magazine *Life*. One should first note that this well publicized photo was not taken in Nanking. The scene is of a Chinese supply depot in Shanghai right after a bombardment by the Japanese navy on August 28, 1937. Actually, in a RBS copy which
the investigation team owns, someone—perhaps its previous owner—entered “Shanghai” underneath this photo with a red pencil. Nevertheless, one Internet web site on the alleged Nanking massacre (http://www.cnd.org:8001/ NJMassacre/njm-tran/njm-ch2.htm) used this photo without any caption, implying that it was taken in Nanking.

Photo A: This photo was in the October 4, 1937, issue of *Life* magazine, and was selected as one of the “Best News Stories of 1937 . . . picked by the News readers.”
Of course, the image of a lone infant crying in a bombed out area is truly heart-wrenching. This photo had such high impact that in the January 3, 1938 issue of Life, this photo and its accompanying story was selected by the readers as one of the top ten stories from the previous year. One can easily imagine how anti-Japanese feeling surged among Americans based on this photograph.

It was H.S. Wang, an ethnic Chinese-American and world-renowned photographer, who captured the scene. Known as “Newsreel Wang,” he was also a chief of a Hearst-affiliated news service company.

Now, it is obvious to viewers that Photo 2 captured the same infant at the same location. According to RBS, the individuals in the photo were a father and children who barely survived the Japanese bombing. What is unnatural in this photograph is that a man who appears to be the infant’s father kept himself away from the child, which was supposedly his. Neither did the baby turn around to look at the person who was supposedly the parent.
Actually, one can find similar photos in other sources. Photos B and C are clips from “Battle of China,” an American wartime propaganda film directed by Frank Capra.

Photos B and C: These are still images from the U.S. wartime propaganda film “Battle of China.”
Photos D and E are in a booklet entitled *Japan: The World Enemy* and in the December 21, 1937, issue of the *Look* magazine, respectively.

Photo D: *Japan: The World Enemy* on p. 11 identifies the location as South Station in Shanghai.

Photo E: A photograph in the December 21, 1937, issue of *Life* magazine.
In Photos B and C, another man is seen carrying the infant in the direction of the railway from the right side. The man wearing a hat in Photo B seems to be the same person as the one on Photo 2. However, again, this man who looked like the baby’s father appeared to pay no attention to the other man who was taking his child away. Yet another man, whose identity is unknown, in Photo B is identical to the one captured in Photos C and E. He is seen hoisting the infant in an unnatural manner. In addition, there is a child who has a head injury. Nevertheless, the only captured individual in Photo A was that baby.

Furthermore, a motion picture that contains this same footage includes an intriguing scene. *Gekidō: Nitchū senshi hiroku* [Turbulent Time: Confidential Records of the Sino-Japanese War] shows what appears to be a smoke canister releasing smoke beside the infant. The next segment shows the very moment when the baby turned his head to look at the smoke. One could speculate that someone was making the scene appear as if the location had just been bombed.

Contemporary testimony concerning these photos is worth quoting here. The following is an excerpt from *Senji sendenron* [Discourse on Wartime Propaganda] by Koyama Eizō in 1942. According to the Japan Public Relations Association, Koyama was chief of the research department of the Health and Welfare Ministry’s demographic research institute before the end of the war. As an expert on propaganda warfare, he also lectured on public opinion and propaganda at the University of Tokyo. He became the director of a national opinion poll center after World War II, and became a professor of Rikkyō University.

Correspondents of each country, either wittingly or unwittingly, represent the interests of their home country. At the same time, they tend to look for sensational news stories. Sometimes, they even concoct false stories which even the Chinese dare not to trump up. A case in point is an internationally acclaimed photograph that captured a sensational scene of a baby who was seemingly separated from the parents and was crying alone at a ruin in Shanghai immediately after the Japanese bombing. Fortunately, a correspondent of Chicago Tribune News Service presented other photos and convinced the public that someone brought the baby to the scene and fabricated what appeared to be a dramatic photo scene. This is a masterpiece by “Newsreel Wang,” Chiang Kai-shek’s favorite photo journalist known for his activities since the time of the Manchurian Incident. Along with his reporting on the Panay Incident, this photograph was instrumental in promoting anti-Japanese sentiment among the American public. The Chinese have constantly tried to induce the third party’s intervention against Japan by exaggerating the devastations caused by their own military defeats. That such “fabricated” propaganda photos played important roles during World War I is a well-known fact substantiated in a variety of sources.
It is true that on December 12, 1937, a Japanese navy bomber squadron mistakenly attacked this U.S. gunboat and killed three persons on board. Upon receiving this report, Vice Admiral Hasegawa Kiyoshi, chief of the Japanese navy’s China expeditionary fleet, dispatched the Japanese gunboat Hozu to rescue affected personnel and attend to the wounded. The fact is that the Japanese squadron commander did not know the true identity of the ship at the time of the attack. Nevertheless, Vice Admiral Hasegawa made a “formal apology” to the American commander in Shanghai to avert an international crisis.

It is thus obvious that the Panay Incident is not relevant to the alleged Nanking massacre. Some publications have photos of the Panay, as if to link the incident to the Nanking massacre. In addition, Kasahara Tokushi, a Japanese scholar, made the following remark in his Ajia no naka no Nihon-gun [Japanese Military in Asia]:

Had the Panay not sunk on that day, a foreign news correspondent could have reported all the truths about the Nanking massacre. . . . All his journalist kit and materials went down to the bottom of the Yangzi River with the Panay. . . . [F. Tillman] Durdin started his stay in Nanking as a correspondent three months prior to the Japanese occupation of the city. His trunk that contained his memos, source materials, and photographs was buried under the water. Actually, the Panay was also his office-like location where he wired his news to Shanghai.(pp. 72,73)
This line of thinking is too far-fetched to be believable. If Durdin had really been an eyewitness to the massacre in Nanking, even after the loss of his written and photographed records, he should have been able to pen an article upon his arrival in Shanghai by recalling the dramatic scenes that so tremendously shocked him. The fact is, however, that no foreign correspondent did so because such a massacre did not occur.

The “Panay” as shown in Photo 3 (RBS) and in Photo A (RON-YY) are obviously different from the real Panay as captured in Photos B, C, and D. However, since the Panay Incident was not a part of the Nanking massacre, the research group decided not to conduct further investigation concerning these photos.

Photo A: RON-YY’s caption of this photograph incorrectly identifies this ship as the Panay.

Photo B: A photograph of the Panay in the Japan Advertiser, 14 December 1937.
(d) Humans incinerated with gasoline

The true origin of Photo 4 is obscure. In its first appearance in WMRB, it was captioned “Civilian residence destroyed by an air raid” in Chapter 8, which is entitled “systematic destruction” and has no relevance to the alleged Nanking massacre. But RON-YY describes the photo as “charred remains of two rickshaw coolies,” and REKISHI says that these were rickshaw men incinerated with gasoline by Japanese troops.

Photo 4: WMRB, which printed this photograph for the first time, captioned this as “a civilian residence destroyed by bombing.” No relevant information—who took this image, when it was photographed and at what location—is available.
As for Photo 5, it was originally printed in Chapter 7 of RBS—a chapter entitled “Air raid and deaths”—and its caption identifies this dead body as a victim of an air raid. This captioning remains almost identical in the reprinted version of RBS. Honda Katsuichi, however, stated in his Chūgoku no nihon-gun [Japanese Army in China] that this photo shows a Chinese man that was burnt alive. RON-YY attaches a caption reading “Charred remains of two victims who were doused with gasoline and set on fire” to this photo and introduces it with a quote from a diary of 16th Division veteran Azuma Shirō—material that has been critically disputed. The quoted portion of the diary is about a Japanese army man’s remark that he was intent on slaughtering all villagers in a certain village as he had done previously.

Photo 5: This photograph made its debut in WMRB.

In both cases, the caption was altered without any supportive documentation. Such alteration seems to have occurred because its origin is obscure.

2. Photo Segments of Beheading and Burying Alive

The next group of photographs shows scenes of Japanese soldiers allegedly murdering POWs or civilians by slashing, stabbing, or live burial. Such photos undoubtedly served to implant a stereotyped image of the Japanese army—that they were brutal—in the mind of the viewers.

Commenting on one of such photos, Honda Katsuichi said in his Chūgoku no nihon-gun [Japanese Army in China], “Since officers carried swords, beheading an opponent was their common practice.” Referring to Photo 6, Honda added that the grinning expression that one can observe in the faces of those who were observing the
about-to-take-place beheading was a demeanor typically seen on this kind of occasion.

As for Photo 7, it was in QINHUA, published in China in 1985, with the following caption: “The Japanese troops slashed to death Chinese POWs and civilians. This image captured a brutal scene of the Japanese military killing people for fun. This photo was obtained from a Japanese POW after the war.”
But did the Japanese army really adopt such a “method” of killing as “common practice”?
(a) Four military personnel at the scene of beheading

Since their first appearance on WMRB and RBS, Photos 6 and 7 have been reprinted in a number of books and magazines as shown in the following table.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Photo</th>
<th>Photo 6</th>
<th>Photo 7</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Timperly (1938)</td>
<td>○</td>
<td>○</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ken Magazine (1938)</td>
<td>○</td>
<td>○</td>
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<td>China Weekly Review (1938)</td>
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<td>ZKH (1947)</td>
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<td><em>Ajia no sensō</em> (1956)</td>
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<tr>
<td><em>Chūgoku no tabi</em> (1972)</td>
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<tr>
<td><em>Chūgoku no nihonnguni</em> (1972)</td>
<td>○</td>
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<tr>
<td>QINHUA (1985)</td>
<td>○</td>
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<tr>
<td>SND (1995)</td>
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<td>Nanking 1937 (1997)</td>
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<td>RON-YY (1997)</td>
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<td>RON-I (1997)</td>
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These two photographs seemingly captured the scenes of “before” and “after” of an execution by beheading with a sword because two individuals marked with (a) and (b) in each photo appear on both of them. The objects (e) and (f) look like the torso of the severed head of the executed, respectively.

But one should doubt the authenticity of these photographs based on the following reasons:

1. When beheading someone, the sword-bearer has to step his right foot ahead of the left. But the person on Photo 6 steps forward in his left foot—a posture that may well result in injuring his left foot.
2. The shadows of persons (a) and (c) in Photo 6 fall in different directions while one can see no shadow of the person sitting and waiting for the execution.
3. The left foot shoe of person (a) in Photo 6 looks quite unnatural because it does not point forward.
4. An unidentifiable object that appears to be black clothes covers the about-to-be beheaded person under his chest in Photo 6. Although it looks like Buddhist monk’s robe, one may also suspect that it is a result of retouching, because that part should be sun lighted.
5. Although the executioner in Photo 6 is seen wearing a jacket-like coat, according to Iwata Yoshiyasu, former officer of the Japanese army, no Japanese army man—whether he was an officer, non-commissioned officer, or enlisted man—was dressed like that.
6. As previously noted, one may wonder who captured this image at such close range and with whose permission.
7. Photo 7 appears to show the scene immediately after the beheading. Nevertheless, the shadows of the persons in this photo do not extend in the same direction as seen in Photo 6.
8. Judging from Photo 7, the beheaded man was sitting on the edge of what looks like a huge pit. Thus, one may wonder how the cameraman took Photo 6, which was
obviously taken at a horizontal angle.

9. Persons (c) and (d), who are in Photo 6, are not seen in Photo 7. Why they were not included on Photo 7, which was supposed to be taken immediately after the execution, is a mystery.

All of these considerations lead to one conclusion: these photographs are the product of dramatization and forgery.

There is yet another dubious aspect about Photo 6, one of the first photographs which the GMD’s propaganda bureau printed in its propaganda books almost ten years before the IMTFE. If this photo had genuinely captured a scene of a defenseless man murdered by Japanese military men and had been obtained by Chinese authorities in a way described by them, they should have been aware of its origin. In addition, they should have searched for the culprits as shown in these photos as they did with respect to Mukai Toshiaki and Noda Tsuyoshi—then second lieutenants who were charged after the war with the alleged “killing contest.” (See Chapter 4 for the details of this alleged killing contest.) Strangely, however, there is absolutely no trace of judicial effort on the part of the Chinese authorities to find these four individuals in Photos 6.

One side note to Photo 6 is that Rijun Qinhua Banian Kangzhanshi [History of Eight-Year Resistance War Against the Invading Japanese] by He Yingqin, published in 1983 in Taiwan, contains this photograph with a fabricated caption. The caption said that Noda Tsuyoshi and others killed our innocent nationals with a sword for fun (December 13, 1937).

(* Photos 6 and 7 here are reprints from those on the October 1938 issue of the China Weekly Review [p. 144]. The black spot to the right of the man holding a sword looks like a stain on the page of the magazine which is preserved at the National Diet Library of Japan.)

(b) A man holding up a severed head

Photos 8 and 9 show a person who appears to be a Japanese navy sailor holding a sword in his right hand and a severed head in his left hand. Viewers are likely to have the impression that the sailor had just beheaded someone on the spot, which looks like an entrance to a house. The photos made their debut in WMRB and in RBS, respectively, and the only difference is that Photo 9 is printed with a reduced version of Photo 7 in its upper left corner.

Photo 8 has been reprinted in the following sources: Ken Magazine (1938), China Weekly Review (1939), Chūgoku no tabi (1972), Chūgoku no nihongun (1972), Japanese translation of Timperly’s book (1972), Kōnichi kaihō no Chūgoku [China in Resistance Against Japan and in Liberation] (1986), and RON-YY. As for Photo 9, it appeared in QIHUA (1985) and SND (1995).

What is puzzling are the obscured and dark parts of these photos, especially the background and the area around the severed head. One may be tempted to speculate that this was actually a touched-up photo of a live man with the area around his head blackened sitting next to the sword-holding man. One may point to two facts in this photograph to corroborate this reasoning. First, what appears to be the severed head is so short-haired that the standing “sailor” could not possibly hold it up by grabbing its hair. Second, the severed head faces straight into the camera. His eyes even look like those
of a living person posing for the camera.

Photo 8: An “after-beheading” photograph that made its first appearance in WMRB.
Photo 9: Another version of “after-beheading” photograph which made its media debut in RBS. The smaller photograph on its upper left corner is Photo 7 featured earlier in this chapter.
Apart from this speculation, another part of the photo is questionable enough for one to doubt its authenticity. Judging from his uniform, this “service man” was supposedly a member of the Japanese navy’s landing force, rather than an army soldier. But compared with a real sailor uniform of the Japanese navy as shown on Photo A, the collar of the uniform worn by the man on Photos A and B is obviously different. Whereas the collar of the Japanese sailor has only one white line, the collar of the man’s uniform in these alleged atrocity photos—as seen on Photo B, which is an enlarged version of the part of Photos A and B—is entirely white-colored.

![Photo A: The uniform of the Japanese navy’s landing force. Its collar is marked with a white line. A part of the cover of Asahi-ban shina jihen gahō, no. 16.](image1)

![Photo B: A part of Photo 8 enlarged. The uniform’s collar is all white-colored instead of white-trimmed.](image2)

Although Honda Katsuichi in his Chūgoku no nihongun (p. 117) explained this photo as a scene of a Japanese “soldier” posing for a snapshot after he had beheaded someone, all these considerations make it difficult to identify this man as a Japanese sailor.

(c) Japanese army men allegedly burying Chinese civilians

Photo 10 was originally printed in RBS as evidence of Japanese troops burying Chinese nationals alive. Multiple sources have reprinted this photo and each of those sources have attached to it a slightly different caption. Furthermore, each reprinted version was cropped differently. (The solid line indicates the area reprinted on Honda’s Chūgoku no tabi, short dotted line on Chūgoku no nihongun, and long dotted line on ZKH.)
Again, there are a multitude of questionable points on this photo.

Photo 10: Since its media debut in RBS, this photograph has been frequently reprinted. The white vertical line in the photo is a break between two pages. The person creating the shadow [a] is nowhere to be found. The identity of the object marked [b] is unknown. One side note worth mentioning here is the Chinese army’s leg putties were a little light-colored, whereas the leg putties of the Japanese army is almost of the same color as that of their uniform.

1. Behind a large group of what appears to be Japanese soldiers is a building that might have served as their accommodation. One may wonder if these Japanese conducted this brutal act at such a location.
2. The soldiers are apparently looking in different directions. In particular, three men on the right are facing backwards.
3. There are inexplicable black spots, marked (a) and (b). One may consider them as shadows, but there are no near by objects that would have made these shadows.
4. The cameraman who took this shot supposedly stood in front of these men. One may wonder who issued permission for him to do so.
5. One cannot ascertain the role of the man wearing a towel around his head played in this “live burial” activity.
6. The size of the pit seems to be too small for burying the five men in the photo.
7. The person marked with ① looks smaller than those marked with ⑦ and ⑧, although the person ① was obviously closer to the camera than ⑦ and ⑧.
8. Apparently, no one in uniform has taken any precautionary defensive measures such as pointing a weapon toward those who are about to be “buried alive”. In addition, one can detect no sign of coercion on the part of the “Japanese” men, and an impression is that the five persons are even voluntarily entering the pit.

Based on this analysis, one could conclude that this is a composite picture that combined the photograph of a pit and an earth mound, that of the men marked with ① through ⑥, and that of those who look like Japanese military men in the background. One cannot accept this photograph as authentic evidence of an atrocity in view of these points of skepticism.

Some publications accusatory of a Nanking massacre have used Photo 10 along with Photo 11, which shows some individuals identical with those on Photo 10. Photo 11 is often captioned as a scene of the victims who were allowed to smoke immediately before their live burial.

Photo 11: This photograph also appeared for the first time in RBS. One can see identical individuals, as shown in Photo 10, in this image.
(d) An alleged public execution in Nanking

WMRB introduces Photos 12 and 13 as the scenes of “stabbing to death” and Photos 14 and 15 as those of “beheading.” Photos A and B, which resemble those of Photos 12 and 13, are in ZKH while Photos C and D, which are obviously captured at the same location, are printed in some publications, including *Junia-ban shasin de miru nihon no shinryaku* [Japanese Invasion As Seen In Photographs: Edition for Juniors] (1995). The identical formation of the ground that appears in Photos 12, B, C, and D is convincing proof that these pictures were taken of the same location.

Judging by the presence of so many spectators on the spot, these pictures supposedly captures the scene of a public execution. One cannot clearly determine the nationality of the spectators, but they should have gossiped about the event afterward. But neither the Japanese nor the Westerners in Nanking at the time recorded anything of a public execution taking place in their official or private reports.

According to Rabe’s diary, Reuter correspondent L.C. Smith spoke about the Japanese army’s execution he had happened to witness on his way out from Nanking. Smith said that after he had seen some 100 men killed, a Japanese officer who was in charge there noticed him and ordered him to leave the spot immediately.

It is true that the Japanese army put to death a number of Chinese soldiers on the Yangzi shore in broad day light following its mop-up operation in the safety zone. But
the quote above makes it clear that such executions were not conducted in such a way that ordinary people would be able to observe them.

One may counter this reasoning and say that the spectators were Japanese nationals connected with the military, and that one of them could have taken these photographs. One could, however, rule out this possibility for several reasons.

First, the spectators’ outfits are for the summer and not for the winter, when the Japanese entered Nanking. Since civilians resumed their normal activity within about two months after the fall of the city on December 13, 1937, an execution as shown in these photographs was highly unlikely to take place in Nanking in the summer of 1938. Furthermore, most Japanese troops had already left the city by then to participate in other military campaigns.

RON-YY, on p. 141, identified Photo B as one of the pictures which W. A. Farmer sent to the Look magazine of the United States, and that they were printed for the first time in the November 22, 1938, issue of the Look. Regarding their origin, Look explained that a Japanese military man, who had taken these photos, sent the undeveloped film to a Japanese developer in Shanghai, where a Chinese employee made extra prints.

But Farmer said something more in his letter to Look magazine. Farmer said
that these photographs had been recently taken in Nanking and Suzhou, and added that
the outfits of these men—summer clothing—suggests that they had been taken recently.
Although one cannot ascertain from his remarks about the actual location of where the
photographs were taken, Farmer’s message was at least clear about when they were taken.
Thus, one can conclude that the scenes captured on these photographs have no relevance
to the Nanking campaign, which took place during the winter.

Second, it is obvious that the cameraman took these images from various
angles—something that one could not do without obtaining permission from those who
were conducting the execution. Clearly, someone took Photos 12, 13, A, and B from an
elevated position at a distance and then that same person also captured the images of
Photos 14, 15, C, and D at close range. Such varying camera angles suggest that the
cameraman took these shots openly, instead in secrecy. In other words, the Japanese
military must have permitted these scenes to be photographed.

In total, these points disprove the contention that these photos are proof of
atrocities in Nanking.

Photo 13: “Cilu.” First featured in WMRB. A person lying on the ground, as circled in the image,
appears as if napping in a leisurely manner—a scene that is not consonant with the
tension-packed atmosphere of the entire image.
Photo A: A clip of Photo 13 as printed in ZKH.
Photo 14: “Shatou” [Beheading]. This photograph made its media debut in WMRB.
Photo 15: “Shatou.” The first appearance of this image was in WMRB.

The question remains as to the origin of these photographs. Both RON-YY and Junia-ban shasin de miru nihon no shinryaku described Photos C and D as ones taken by Japanese medic corporal Sakaki Takiji in July 1938. It is almost certain that the same individual photographed these scenes at the same location at the same time since the marked portions of Photos B, C, D, and 12—a peculiar formation on the ground as well as a man in white pants and a distinct group of four standing men—are common in all of the photos. The fact is that the Japanese army at the time was too busy to arrange such a large-scale photo opportunity session. The Japanese military leadership had prioritized the Chuzhou and Hankou campaigns for June and in October, respectively, and thus was highly unlikely to host this type of event.
Photo B: The original of this photograph was in the November 22, 1938, issue of *Look* magazine. The image here was reprinted from “The Rape of Nanking” no kenkyū. The reader should pay close attention to the white pants worn by a man on the right edge of the photograph as well as the formation of the ground under his feet.
Photo C: “Photographed by Sakaki Takiji, who was then a medic corporal at a Nanking hospital.” Junia-ban shashin de miru nihon no shinryaku, p. 59. The ground formation, as circled in this photograph, is identical with the one seen in Photos 12 and B.
Photo D: Junia-ban shashin de miru nihon no shinryaku, p. 59. A man in white pants and the ground formation, circled, are common features as seen in Photos 12 and B.
Four identical individuals are shown in both photographs.

Photo 12: Four persons, as indicated with a square, are identical with those marked with a square in Photo B. One can see the same trees in the background in both pictures as well.
Four identical individuals are shown in both photographs.

Photo B: According to its caption, this photograph made its media debut in the November 22, 1938, issue of *Look* magazine, although it had already appeared in WMRB, which was published in July the same year.
As for Chiang Kai-shek and his GMD, they attempted to cover for their military defeats. Their solution was to conduct a propaganda campaign. As Guo Moruo said in his Kangrizhan Huigulu [Memoir of Resistance War Against Japan], the motto of the GMD’s propaganda bureau was “Propaganda war supersedes the war on the field.” Under their initiative, International News Filming Corporation and Filming Section of the Central News Agency engaged in a “photography campaign.” In view of the close ranges at which these photographs were taken, one may speculate that the GMD’s propaganda bureau orchestrated the scene for propaganda purposes.

A glimpse of Japan’s history reveals that there has never been an instance of public execution in Japan since the Meiji Restoration of 1868. It is highly unlikely that the Japanese nationals, who were not accustomed to public executions, did this in Nanking.

In contrast, the Chinese still publicly executed criminals in the 1930s, and some people recorded such scenes with their camera as shown in Photo F, which is printed from Zusetsu Chūgoku kokukei-shi [Pictorial History of Cruel Punishments in China], published in Japan in 1938. Also, a Japanese navy man wrote an eyewitness account of a public execution in China. In his privately published book entitled Yōsukō monogatari [A Tale of the Yangzi River](1983), Yoshine Hiro’o describes what he saw in February 1930 when he was deputy captain of the gunboat Hira:

Then, a man in a gray military uniform walked up to a group of criminals with a Chinese broadsword in his right hand. He appeared to be drinking something from a small bottle in his left hand. The interpreter told me that he was drinking strong Chinese alcohol liquor because even professional executioners could not behead someone unless they were intoxicated.

The criminals were lined up in the ascending order of the seriousness of their committed crimes.

Now the execution began.

The man with a sword forced the first criminal to sit on the ground, and pushed his shoulder down so that he bent forward. After a short while, the executioner swung his sword down swiftly. The head of the criminal dropped on the ground with blood gushing out from the torso, which fell in the right direction with his hands tied in the back.

At that moment, spectators clapped their hands all at once. I was so accustomed to a peaceful society of Japan and my encounter with this brutal scene today was so nerve-wrecking that I could not sleep at all on that night. After the sleepless night, I took an early morning walk. When I passed through a wharf and was about to come out to a road lined with electric poles, I saw something unbelievable hanging on one of these poles. It was a severed head—the head of the chief of the criminal band who had been executed on the previous day.
3. Still Images of Dead Bodies

If the Japanese army had truly massacred as many as 300,000 people, their dead bodies should have filled the city, and observant people would have photographed them. The first group of the so-called Nanking atrocity photographs printed in publications of the late 1930s, however, did not show scenes that corroborate this allegation. Instead, most of them captured the images of one or two dead bodies, or several dozens at most. Many of the victims in the photos are of women and children. As for those in the WMRB, most of the dead bodies are charred ones. One cannot identify the location of where any one of these pictures was taken.

Here is a mystery relevant to the photographs of the dead bodies. John G. Magee, an American missionary who remained in Nanking throughout the battle and the Japanese occupation, took some still pictures of dead bodies in addition to his well-known motion pictures. Although Timperly, who was reportedly collecting such photographs, was involved in the editing of Magee’s pictures, he did not use any of Magee’s still images in his publication. This point will be subject to detailed scrutiny in Chapter 4. Here, the primary point is to determine whether or not those photographs truly captured scenes of the alleged atrocities in Nanking.

(a) Charred remains of a small child

Photo 16 is included in WMRB. It shows a truly heart-breaking scene that impresses the viewers with the horrors of war. Although it might be morally imprudent to investigate and comment on such a photograph, the research team decided to analyze it as an academic probe to determine whether or not it is truly photographic evidence of the alleged atrocities.

Photo 16: The first appearance of this photograph was in WMRB. Compared with Photo B, the original image was cropped so that the charred body of the infant looked larger.

In *Battle of China*, an American propaganda film from which Photo A was taken,
this charred body was allegedly that of a small child who the Japanese shot to death in the head in what the film described as a historic massacre—a massacre in which the Japanese killed 40,000 men, women, and children. The authors of RON-YY repeated this explanation in the book with a caption “This child was struck in the head by a bullet and died.” The same photograph is, however, printed in Japan: World Enemy, which was published on September 25, 1937—more than two months before the Japanese occupation of Nanking. Its caption reads, “The Japanese aeroplanes killed the innocent during bombardments of the Nantao area in Shanghai.” Even if this caption is true and the Japanese were responsible for this carnage, one must still distinguish between what happened in Shanghai from that which occurred in Nanking.

Photo A:
A still image from the movie “Battle of China.” RON-YY, which reprinted this image, attached a caption reading, “This child was struck in the head by a bullet and died.”

Photo B:
Japan: World Enemy, p. 10. The photographed area is wider compared with Photos 16 and A.
Timperly may well have selected this photo in view of its sensational image because in his private correspondence with Bates prior to the publication of his book, he said that the photographs should be as shocking as possible.

Photos 17, 18, and 19 are those of dead children. In RBS, Photo 17 is captioned as a three-year-old child who was stabbed to death by the Japanese in Nanking. RON-YY explains that this image was one of the images taken by Magee. The RON-YY’s caption states that “thousands of children were killed during the Nanking massacre. These were among a few identified from photographs. The oldest among them was barely three.” Such a photograph was, however, nowhere to be found among Magee’s still or motion pictures.

![Photo 17: RBS](image1)

![Photo 18: RBS](image2)

The caption of Photo 18, which is also among the RBS photo group, identifies the dead bodies as three small children killed by Japanese aerial bombing of Pingshi Street—a main street that connected the Zhonghua Gate and the safety zone—in Nanking. WMRB, which was published almost at the same time, however, stated that they were the victims of atrocities committed by Japanese military men.

![Photo 19](image3)

This image made its media debut in RBS.
As for Photo 19, which is another RBS photo, is an image of a seven-year-old boy whom a Japanese soldier slashed to death in Nanking, according to its caption. Actually, this is a still from Magee’s motion picture with its background erased and blackened.

Regarding these photographs, again, one should wonder who took them. If a Chinese national had truly obtained these photographs in the way usually explained by some Chinese sources, and if he had been sympathetic to the GMD so that they would provide these photos to the editors of RBS and WMRB, he would have certainly gossiped about these atrocities and even reported them to the ICNSZ so that the “Daily Reports” would include them. However, the fact is that no contemporary records, including the “Daily Records” as reprinted on WMRB, contain any of these cases of atrocities.

(b) Corpses on river shore

Photo 20 is a RBS photo of unknown origin. This image has been featured in the following Nanking-related publications:

- ZKH
  - Japanese edition of Timperly’s book
  - *Ketteiban: Nankin daigyakusatsu* [The Authoritative Version of the Great Nanking Massacre]
- QINHUA
- SND
- RON-YY
- RON-I

Grass that appears to be green

Short-sleeves
According to the RBS’s caption, “[The] Japanese troops shot to death those Chinese military men who had ceased their fight in the suburb of Nanking after tying their hands in the back. The Japanese dumped over 300 bodies into this pond.” Many Japanese veterans of the Nanking campaign noted in their records (for example, see 1937 Nankin kōryakusen no shinjitsu) that they had frequently seen dead bodies in creeks or ponds on their way to Nanking. But the question here is whether or not this photo genuinely shows the bodies of “over 300” victims whom the Japanese troops had unlawfully killed and dumped into a pond.

Judging from the condition of these bodies, if the caption had actually told the truth, someone supposedly took this photo shortly after the killing had taken place “in the suburb of Nanking” in December—during the winter. One can see, however, half-naked men and those wearing short-sleeves among these dead bodies. In addition, the grass on the shore of the pond is not withering. Thus, this cannot be a scene which one could photograph in the suburb of Nanking in December.

Furthermore, contrary to the caption’s phrase of “over 300 bodies,” there are only a few bodies shown on the image. Such a large number of human bodies would fill a school gym. If there had indeed been this large number of atrocity victims, the photographer would have captured such a scene.

One must thus conclude that the value of this photo as evidence is far from compelling.

(c) Alleged massacre of innocent civilians

The captions of Photos 21 through 24—all in RBS—identifies these dead bodies as civilians murdered by the Japanese military. Photos 21 and 24 are supposedly images of farmers who were murdered in the suburb of Nanking while Photo 22 is captioned as an old woman who was stabbed to death by the Japanese in Taierjiang and was found with a reed inserted into her sexual organ. It is, however, not clear on what grounds that these images are in fact the scenes of the aftermath of Japanese violence. Names of the “witnesses”, who must have notified the photographer of the carnage are nowhere to be found.

Photos 21-25: These photographs first appeared in RBS, except for Photo 25, the first appearance of which was in WMRB (The original Chinese caption of this image was printed upside down). As Photos 21-25 were reprinted later in other publications, the content of the captions changed in such a way as to emphasize the sensational nature of the perpetrator’s cruelty.
As for Photo 23, RBS attaches a caption which reads, “Twelve adult women and eight girls who were gang-raped by the Japanese army men and were subsequently murdered with the bellies slit at Wuxiang prefecture in the Shanxi Province.” Honda Katsuichi also described this picture as a scene of women gang-raped and murdered en masse in his Chūgoku no tabi, but credited it as the one provided by the city of Nanking. Then, RON-YY, in reference to this image, accused that “[T]housands of women were killed after being raped or gang-raped. Some of them were young children.”

WMRB captions Photo 25 as the scene of carnage after the Japanese army machine-gunned civilians. QINHUA describes the same photograph as an image of Chinese nationals whom the Japanese troops massacred in a group. RON-YY, which credits Marion Fitch as its contributor, only stated, “The Japanese victory claimed hundreds of thousands of lives” in reference to the same photo.

Had the Japanese indeed committed these cases of group massacre, these incidents could not have escaped the attention of the Western journalists in Nanking. Subsequently, there should have sensationalized reporting in the newspapers. However, no contemporary Western media sources covered these stories or printed these photographs.

4. Images of Violence and Rape

One may classify photographic images suggestive of rape or violence in RBS and WMRB into two groups. The first group, Photos 26 through 28, shows patients in a hospital setting while the second group, Photo 29-34, resembles pornography.
According to the caption of Photo 26, the 16-year-old girl was gang-raped by Japanese soldiers in Nanking and infected with a disease. She also appears in Magee’s motion picture. If this story was true, then she should have been hospitalized at the Gulou Hospital—the University of Nanking Hospital—because it was the only hospital in operation at the time. Robert O. Wilson, a medical doctor who worked at this hospital then, however, entered no description about this girl as well as her shocking story in his journal-like correspondence addressed to his family.

Photo 27 is captioned as a scene in which a doctor at the Gulou Hospital was treating a 14-year-old boy who had been shot in the thigh by Japanese troops in Nanking. That patient, however, appears to be around 20 years of age. One may also speculate that he was the very patient whom Wilson recorded as a man who had his foot blown away on December 11. According to his own record, Wilson amputated the lower part of his leg on December 15. Judging from the date of his admission into the hospital—two days before the fall of Nanking—he was very likely to have been wounded in a battle.

The man on Photo 28 is described as an old farmer who had his belly burned in
an action attributable to the Japanese army. It is, however, possible that one of the three was true: (1) he was wounded in a battle, (2) he was genuinely victimized by misbehaving Japanese combatants, or (3) he claimed that his own case was of (2) because such a claim would entitle him to free medical treatment.

The most frequently used “rape photographs” are Photo 29 and 30. In particular, Photo 29 has appeared in the following publications:

ZKH
Japanese edition of Timperly’s book
Chūgoku no tabi
Chūgoku no nihongun
QINHUA
Nankin 1937
SND
RON-YY
RON-I

The following are various examples of the caption to this image:

“A woman who was violated by a beast-like Japanese soldier”
“A woman in Nanking after being raped”
“A shameless Japanese soldier took a souvenir picture after he committed the crime”
“A girl who was stripped naked after she was raped—a photograph confiscated from a Japanese POW”
“A girl who was humiliated even after she was sexually abused”

Hata Ikuhiko, professor of Nihon University, however, found what appears to be the original version of this photograph in a picture book he had obtained in Taiwan. Photograph A, which was originally in *Tiezheng Rushan* [Iron Evidence Accumulates Like Mountain] published in Taiwan, was reprinted in Hata’s *Gendaishi no sōten* [Contentious Points of Modern History].

Photo 29: First printed in RBS with the caption, “A Chinese woman victimized by a rapist.” A blackened part in the background, as seen in Photo A, has been whitened.

Photo A: A photograph included in *Tiezheng Rushan*, which Prof. Hata Ikuhiko discovered in Taiwan. Something on the wall in the background was blackened.
One can easily point out differences between Photo 29 and A. First, a third person, who appears to be a Chinese national, is seen standing close to the right edge of Photo A. Second, there is a blacked-out rectangular portion on the walls in Photo A—a portion of which is whitened out on Photo 29. One may wonder if someone deliberately censored something written on the wall—something perceptive viewers should not see.

Judging from the way they posed for the photograph, one may speculate that the man and woman in the photo were a prostitute and her customer at a brothel. What was blackened on the wall might have been the sign board of the brothel, and the man visible in Photo A was possibly the manager of the prostitution house.

Photos 30-34:
The first publications that carried these images were RBS (Photos 30, 32, and 33) and WMRB (Photos 30, 31, and 34). The women shown in these photographs do not appear to be shivering, which should have been the reaction had they really been outside in winter in the outfits shown in the photographs.
Photo 30 has also been attached with various captions such as “A Chinese woman who wore an expression of agony after she had been gang-raped” (RBS), “A woman who was violated by devil-like Japanese soldiers” (Japanese edition of Timperly’s book), “A rapist took a souvenir shot of his victim” (Chūgoku no nihongun), “Painful look after being raped by a Japanese military man (a photograph confiscated form a Japanese POW)” (QINHUA), and “A sexually abused Nanking woman” (SND, which identifies this picture as courtesy of the Nanking Massacre Memorial Hall). In addition, RON-YY carries this image without any caption.

As for Photo 31, WMRB identified the lady as “a woman violated by beast-like soldiers” while RON-YY credited Marion Fitch as its original owner. When Photo 32 made its debut in RBS, a caption reading “Our nationals were gang-raped by beast-like soldiers” accompanied this image. When it was reprinted in QINHUA, it was captioned as “A woman gang-raped by Japanese military men (a photograph confiscated from a Japanese POW).” SND explained this picture as “Raped women,” and again mentioned the Memorial Hall as its provider. It was reprinted in RON-YY as well.

Photo 33 is another RBS photo which, according to RBS’s caption, depicts a rape scene. It reappeared in RON-YY and in RON-I, and the latter, in reference to this image, states that “[T]he Japanese bound the young woman to a chair for repeated attack.”

Captions of Photo 34 echo those of Photo 31 as QINHUA describes the woman in the picture as “a woman who was gang-raped by the Japanese and was stripped naked” by identifying it as a photograph confiscated from a Japanese POW. Again, SND introduces this as an image of “raped woman” and credited the Memorial Hall as its original source.

In summary, publications in later periods state that four out of these six photographs—Photos 29, 30, 32, and 34—were “rape souvenir” shots that fell into Chinese hands from Japanese POWs—a caption that was not found in the two original sources of the photographs, that is, RBS and WMRB. The fact is, however, that whether the rapist himself or his “army buddy” photographed such an image, one had to wait for several days for film development. Japanese soldiers who were force-marched from one battlefield to another were unlikely to have such leisure time.

One may reasonably ascribe these photographs to be merely pornographic images. Observers at the time noted that a number of such pictures were in circulation in the city of Shanghai. One such observer was Sasaki Motokatsu, who graduated from the University of Tokyo and entered Japan’s Ministry of Communications in 1927. Sasaki was a civilian staff member of the SEF and held the position of field postal service chief, witnessing battles in Shanghai and Nanking. In Yasen yūbinki [Field Postal Flag]—his memoir that recounts his experience in China—he noted the following on November 22, 1937:

We were on our way back on board the truck. Moriyama, who was driving the truck, handed me a brown-colored envelope that contained something without saying anything. That something turned out to be an extremely obscene pornographic photo. The one I had seen in Jiading paled compared with that one. The fact is that dealers who are specialized in such types of photographs sell them underground in
Shanghai. Several photos I saw when we were drinking at a temple in Dachangzhen last night were probably distributed in such a manner. . . . Across the Garden Bridge are foreign settlements. One of the high-rise buildings there is the building of the Yokohama Species Bank. . . . One Chinese man approached the postal service staff in the backyard of that building and showed some items of unknown origins such as golden rings, jades, and pornographic pictures. This Chinese man stalked people like us and tried to sell stolen and contraband items. We were able to purchase a golden watch that would normally cost 10 yen at 3 yen. . . . As for the pornographies, the price of one set was half a yen. Since such peddlers are everywhere around that area, those proficient in Chinese are able to buy a variety of merchandizes. Our guess narrowed the original source of the pornographies to one spot. . . . [In addition to such erotic photographs, they distribute photographs that captured horrible scenes of battles, including those of dead bodies. One of them shows a Chinese woman crying and standing with her lower body naked. We cannot determine whether that image was taken by the Japanese or the Chinese.]

(* The bracketed portion was censored and blacked out when his book was published during the war time.)

Second lieutenant Kajimura Itaru, who was called up from the reserves in August 1937 and participated in the Shanghai and Nanking campaigns, also noted similar obscene goods in his memoir entitled Tairiku o tatakau [Battles on the Continent]. In his journal entry of February 3, 1938, Kajimura quoted part of an article published in the October 29, 1937, issue of the Fukuoka Nichinichi Newspaper:

As I walked through the streets of Dezhou, I saw a red slip of paper that says “This house has been robbed already, and is empty” placed on almost every house. I was told it was a “talisman” to keep away straggling Chinese soldiers from intruding and pillaging the houses. Yet, I could see obvious traces of looting in these houses, which were almost empty. I pitied the people of China. On my way back from the headquarters to the barracks, I came across with three armored vehicles which our troops had captured at Pingyuan from the Chinese. When I looked into the inside of one of them with the permission of Major M, I was surprised to smell perfume on its seat. Furthermore, I saw a handbag, an umbrella, a French perfume bottle, and erotic photographs left there. It seems that on board that armored vehicle were a young officer and a female CCP member.

Judging from this story, pornography was available clandestinely not only among Japanese military men but also among Chinese officers and soldiers.

It seems more reasonable to conclude that someone retouched and re-captioned such obscene pictures to make them look like the scenes of rape committed by the Japanese. It is worth noting here that rape was a severe offense under the Japanese army’s criminal regulation. Under the army’s criminal law enacted in 1908, a Japanese
If the rape resulted in death of the victim, the penalty was either imprisonment for life or a death sentence. As noted previously, discipline was so strictly enforced in Nanking that some soldiers complained about its harshness. Under such circumstances, it was highly unlikely that soldiers took photographs of their rape victims—items that would be incriminating evidence against them if discovered.

If someone indeed used these pictures for propaganda purposes as reasoning thus far has shown, sympathy should go to the women whose naked bodies were caught on film some 70 years ago, which are still publicly shown today only because these photos were reprinted in publications for propaganda purposes.

5. Photographic Images of Alleged Abduction and Robbery

WMRB contains numerous descriptions of abduction and robbery as well as killing. Although there are no photographs of this type in WMRB, four photographs that supposedly show the scenes of these alleged crimes are in RBS. The research team has successfully traced the origin of all these images, that is, Photos 35-37 and 62. (The analysis of Photo 62 will be undertaken in the next section.)

According to the caption of Photo 35 on RBS, “Women in the rural Jingnan area were forcibly taken away in groups to the headquarters of the invading army, and were subsequently abused sexually, raped, and shot to death.” Japanese authors have re-used this photo clip as well as the caption. Honda Katsuichi, for example, had this image reprinted in his Chūgoku no nihongun and attached the following caption: “The Japanese soldiers rounded up women and girls—they raped even little girls of 7 or 8 years of age and old women of over 70 years.” Kasahara Tokushi also referred to this image printed in his Nankin jiken [Nanking Incident] as a scene of “Chinese women being abducted by the Japanese troops in the Jingnan region” and identified its original source as RBS.

Photo 35: RBS caption of this image says, “Women in farm villages in the Jiangnan region were rounded up in groups, and were taken away to the headquarters of the invading troops. Thereafter, they were sexually assaulted, gang-raped, and shot to death.”
In 1998, however, Hata Ikuhiko unearthed the very first source that published this photograph. It was the November 10, 1937, issue of the *Asahi Graph*, and the original still image was Photo A, which appeared in this magazine along with four other pictures—Photos C-E—all taken by a correspondent named Kumazaki. According to the caption for Photo A, the women in the image were escorted by Japanese soldiers to their homes in the Baoshan prefecture in the Yangzi estuary after a day of farming. The whole context of this series of photographs—especially smiling girls in Photo B—is convincing evidence to prove the fact of fabrication by RBS writers.

Photo A: The caption of this photograph as included in the *Asahi Graph*, vol. 29-19, 10 November 1937, p. 12, says, “A group of women and children escorted back to their village—*hinomaru buraku* [sun flag village], a model village under the supervision of the Japanese army— by Japanese soldiers after farming in the field. Photographed by correspondent Kumasáki, 14 October 1937.”

Photo B: Enlarged images of the young girls shown in Photo A. One can see their smiling faces.
Photo C: A photograph on p. 13 of the same issue of the *Asahi Graph* that contained Photo A. “Farmers of the *hinomaru buraku* picking cotton under a warm autumn sunshine. Photographed by correspondent Kumasaki, 14 October 1937.”

Photo D: Another photo on the same page as Photo C. “Faces of happy villagers. Their hard work is appropriately rewarded with higher wages. They are busy selecting out good cotton under the round-the-clock protection of Japanese troops. Photographed by correspondent Kumasaki, 14 October 1937.”
Photo E: *Asahi Graph*, 10 November 1937 (vol. 29-19), p. 13. “This is the very first family that came to the *hinomaru buraku* . . . They now live happily under the imperial army’s protection. Photographed by correspondent Kumasaki, 14 October 1937.”

Photo F: *Shina-jihen shashin zenshū*, vol. 2, p. 147. The soldier and the civilians following him look like the same individuals as some of those depicted in Photo 35.
Our search also revealed that an image almost identical to Photos 35 was printed in *Shinajihen shashin zenshū*, vol. 2: *Shanhai senen* [Pictorial Collection of The Sino-Japanese War, vol. 1: Shanghai Front] published on March 1, 1938. It seems that the image framing of this photo is more similar to that of RBS.

Also printed in this source is Photo F, in which farmers are seen following a Japanese soldier in a peaceful atmosphere. Although whether the persons in this image are the same persons as shown on Photo 35 is not clear, one may speculate that someone took these pictures in sequence.

The RBS caption of Photo 36 reads, “Wherever the invading troops passed, all the chickens and dogs disappeared.” More recently, Saotome Katsumoto in his *Ana kara ana e 13-nen* [From Cave to Cave for 13 years] made a drawing of this pictorial image and attached the following statement: “The Japanese plundering in China was very intense. It was said that the village where the Japanese troops passed could not recover at least for ten years.” The same image is in RON-YY as well.

Our probe, however, revealed—again—that this photograph made its first appearance with a totally different caption. *Asahi-ban shina jihen gahō* [Sino-Japanese War Pictorial Report by The Asahi Newspaper] no. 9 contained this image on the back cover of its December 5, 1937, issue, and its caption read, “A soldier marching forward with chickens that he had purchased from a Chinese residence hanging around his neck—photograph by correspondence Ogawa at Fenglezhen close to the Jinghan railway line.” Thus, this Japanese soldier clearly bought these chickens.

Photo 36: RBS caption of this photograph says, “Wherever the Japanese army marches in, they loot everything including dogs and chickens.”
Photo I: The original of Photo 36 was a back cover image from *Asahi-ban shina-jihen gahō*, no. 9, 5 December 1937. According to its caption, the Japanese army obtained those chickens in exchange for payment.
Likewise, Photo 37, which RBS explained as a scene of a Japanese soldier taking away sheep, turned out to be an image which a Japanese magazine captioned quite differently. Photo J first appeared in Mainichi-ban shina jihen gahō [Sino-Japanese War Pictorial Report by the Mainichi Newspaper] no. 12, which is dated December 11, 1937. Its caption describes the scene of the photo as “two sheep abandoned by their owner (at a village in the vicinity of Waigangzhen).”

Photo 37: RBS caption explains this photograph as a scene of a Japanese soldier taking away sheep belonging to a Chinese farmer.
Photo J: This is the original of Photo 37. It was printed in Mainichi-ban shina jihen gahō, no. 12, 11 December 1937, with a caption, “Two sheep abandoned by their owner (at a village in the vicinity of Waigangzhen).”
Although Honda Katsuichi did not include Photos 36 or 37 in either the hardcover or paperback edition of his *Chūgoku no tabi*, he added them to the photo section of this book when it became a part of *Honda Katsuichi zenshū* [Complete Works of Honda Katsuichi]. He attached a caption that read “All the livestock such as sheep and chickens were looted as booty” and identified the city of Nanking that provide the photos.

As chapter 7 of 1937 *Nankin kōryakusen no shinjitsu* discusses, the Japanese army made payments at the time of requisition. In case of a shortage of currency, they left documentation of proof of requisition. A cameraman was allowed to take Photo 36 because that soldier was conducting a lawful requisition.

Of course, one cannot deny that some soldiers did commit looting. If such an incident became known, however, perpetrators were prosecuted and punished rigorously in accordance with the army’s criminal act. The Japanese army neither overlooked nor ordered robbery.

6. People about to be executed, orphans, parent and children in flight, etc.

RBS caption of Photo 38 alleges that two Japanese soldiers were about to execute the man between them. RON-YY also captioned this image as “Caught between two blades.” Although one can clearly see a man with his legs tied between the two soldiers, one cannot conclude that this image is evidence of an atrocity in view of the absence of supporting information—whether or not the man was about to be executed for a legitimate reason, or merely a prisoner held under guard, and who took this photo, at what location and when.

![Photo 38: An RBS photograph. Reprinted in RON-YY.](image1)

![Photo 39: An RBS photo. Reprinted in *Chūgoku no tabi* and *Chūgoku no Nihon-gun* and credited as “Courtesy of the city of Nanking.”](image2)

Viewers may consider Photos 39-43 as typical war time scenes if they see such images without any explanation. But they may have a quite different impression if they see these photographs with captions as found in some Nanking-related publications. As for Photo 39, RBS simply captioned it as “an orphan girl on the road side.” Honda,
however, stated that the girl in this photograph—which he credited courtesy of the city of Nanking—was packing her belongings after her parents had been murdered and their house had been burnt.” It that seems no other source contains this image.

Photo 40 appeared in RON-YY with a caption “Their loved ones killed and their home destroyed, refugees run for their lives along the Beijing-Shanghai Railroad tracks.” It was also reprinted in John Rabe: Der Gute Deutsche von Nanking edited by Erwin Wickert. The original of Photo 40 is Photo A, which was actually taken on October 14, 1937—two months prior to the fall of Nanking—in Shanghai. Its caption reads “A blind old woman on flight guided by her son.”

Photo A: Haha to ko de miru 20-seiki no sensō: Nitchū-sensō 1 [20-century Warfare for Mothers and Children: Sino-Japanese War 1], p. 130. The photograph is credited as “October 14, 1937 (ACME).” ACME was a news service company in the United States. Photo 40 was a cropped version of this image with the dotted-line area deleted.
Shown in both Photos 41 and 42, which should originally be categorized as Group B photos, are a man and a woman. The captions to these photographs say that the woman in each image was a victim of abuse by the Japanese in Jin province. There is, however, no way to authenticate how these women were abused, or whether the culprit was really a Japanese military man. Neither can one verify who took them and on what date. Although they were supposedly taken in Jin province, RON-YY includes Photo 41 as one that was captured in Nanking.

Analyses of Group B Photographs

Although the photographs in Group B—those that have not been used after their appearance in RBS and WMRB—mostly capture scenes irrelevant to the Nanking campaign, they are worth analyzing here even briefly to appraise the nature of these images. As shown on p.113, most of them are the images of bombing.
Group B photographs: Photographs that were not reprinted in the second period and thereafter

Fourteen photographs in the WMRB Hankou edition

Eight photographs in RBS
Photos 43 and 44, both in RBS, are captioned “Hankou” and the “scene of Shanghai’s Nantao burning as it was set afire by the Japanese,” respectively. As for Photo 44, however, it originally appeared in Mainichi-ban shina jihen gahō, no. 11, dated December 1, 1937. The RBS version was inverted from the original. In addition, the caption attached to the original reads, “Mopping-up operation in Shanghai: A large fire erupts in the Pudong area.”

Photo 43: RBS captions this image only as “Hankou.”

Photo 44: RBS caption of this image reads, “Scene of Shanghai’s Nantao district burning as it was set afire by the Japanese.” This is actually an inverted version of Photo A in Asahi-ban shina-jihen gahō, no. 11, 1 December 1937.
WMRB introduces Photo 45-51 as scenes following a bombing. The caption of Photo 45 says that these girls were looking for their parents in the ruins in the aftermath of the bombing. An enlarged version of this picture is among the materials preserved at the GMD history archives in Taiwan. Other images are captioned as the following:

Photo 46: “Widows and orphans wandering around”
Photos 47-48: “Civilian residences destroyed by the bombing”
Photo 49: “Japanese planes locked on to the targets and bombed them”
Photo 50: “District court in Tianjin”
Photo 51: “Target bombed by enemy planes: shelter of a Christian church in Zhuzhou.”

Since the scenes after the bombing are easily recognizable, they were not captioned as photos shot in Nanking. WMRB includes them in Chapter 5, where the events in Nanking are not the topic.

Photos 45-51: WMRB photographs. As for Photo 45, an identical photograph is among the files of the GMD party archives in Taipei. Photo 47 was printed upside down in WMRB.
According to the caption of Photo 52, the dead body shown in it was a farmer killed by the Japanese military in the Tunliu prefecture in the Shanxi Province. Whatever military operation the Japanese army may have conducted in the region should have been an anti-guerrilla campaign or a counter-insurgency in nature. The military history series compiled by the Japanese Defense Agency’s military history division summarizes the Japanese army’s activities in the area in its 18th volume entitled *Hokushi no chiansen* [Security Warfare in Northern China] (1):

Photo 52: RBS photograph attached with a caption, “A farmer murdered by Japanese troops at Tunliu prefecture in Shanxi Province.”
The headquarters of the Japanese north China area army . . . commanded the first army to strike against the Chinese force on the southern bank of the Yellow River in the upstream of Jinan starting mid-February. As a result of this operation, the Japanese army extended its control over the southern part of the Shanxi province and the left bank area of the Yellow River estuary in the Henan province.

The first army’s occupation was, however, tenuous because a sizable number of Chinese troops fled into the mountain regions in the Shanxi province, joined hands with the Communists who had maintained their bases there, and posed threats to the Japanese occupied areas. Although the first army dealt a substantial degree of blow to these Chinese forces through its counter-insurgency operations from mid-March to late April, it was unable to achieve its initially set objective. In particular, the first army’s campaign stopped short of launching an offensive against the Communists based in the vicinity of Wutaishan and in the north of Luan. As a result, the first army needed to conduct more intensive anti-guerrilla campaigns in order to stabilize the security in these regions.

According to Shina jihen shashin zenshū [Complete Picture Collection of The Sino-Japanese War], no. 3, the Japanese troops occupied Tunliu on February 21, 1938. Yet, the Defense Agency’s military history series clearly states that the Japanese army’s operation “stopped short of launching offensive against . . . the north of Luan,” which includes Tunliu. The premature termination of the Japanese campaign allowed the Communists to operate in these areas quite intensively.
Agnes Smedley describes how the Communists fought against the Japanese about that time in her *China Fights Back*:

We passed whole battalions clothed in Japanese overcoat and some in Japanese uniforms. There must have been two to three thousand men clad like this—and we knew that each coat had meant a dead Japanese. These men carried on their shoulders the certain signs of their victory. . . . the “thousand stitch cloths” made by Japanese women to guard soldiers against bullets, and the Buddhist charms designed for the same purposes . . . . had been useless when the Eighth Route Army met their bearers, whose dead bodies lined the roads for miles on the battlefield.

Such is Smedley’s description of the CCP force on November 5, 1937, when the Japanese army was conducting the Taiyuan operation in northern China. She mentions such locations as Yangquan close to Tunliu prefecture in her account. Her account contradicts the official Japanese history, stating that Japanese “dead bodies lined the roads for miles.” Thus, suffice it to say, one cannot determine whether the dead body in Photo 52 was the one killed by the Japanese or by CCP guerrillas. In addition, one should consider the possibility that this man was killed by CCP guerrillas clad in Japanese military uniforms.

That Photos 53-55 do not portray the scenes in Nanking is obvious even from the captions of RBS. The caption in Photo 53 states that the two dead bodies are a parent and a child killed by enemy planes at Zhabei in Shanghai while the caption attached to Photo 54 says the dead shown on the image were a parent and a child who fell amid the bombing by enemy planes in downtown Chuzhou. As for Photo 55, its caption reads, “Chinese nationals murdered by the enemy force at Liangmazhen in the Shanxi Province.”

Photos 53-55: RBS
Neither do Photos 56-60 show scenes of Nanking. They were printed in Chapter 5 of WMRB—a chapter irrelevant to the events in Nanking. They are captioned as the following:

Photos 56 and 58: “A victim of indiscriminate bombing covered with blood and flesh”
Photo 57: “Women and children victimized by beast-like soldiers”
Photo 59: “Women victimized by bestial soldiers”
Photo 60: “A civilian residence destroyed by bombing attack”

Photos 56-60: WMRB
Photo 58

Photo 59

Photo 60
According to the caption of Photo 61 in RBS, it is a scene of Japanese military men forcing Chinese nationals to construct roads at bayonet point. It, however, turned out to be a reprint of Photo B, which originally appeared on Mainichi-ban shina jihen gahō, no. 23, published on April 1, 1938. The caption to this original photograph reads, “[Japanese troops] use the Chinese labor force to repair roads destroyed by the enemy and advance further.” That the soldier circled on Photo B is seen holding a cigarette in his left hand suggests that the Chinese nationals did not undertake this work under coercion.

Photo 61: RBS

Photo B: The original of Photo 61 in Mainichi-ban shina-jihen gahō, no. 23, 1 April 1938, p. 16. Its caption says, “Local people who reconstruct roads for our troops.”
The RBS caption of Photo 62 says, “Our nationals who did not flee from the Japanese-occupied areas were forced at sword point to work like cattle.” Again, its original was Photo C, which was printed in *Mainichi-ban shina jihen gahō*, no. 11, on December 1, 1937, and was captioned as “Local people who reconstruct roads for our troops.” Thus, one cannot ascertain the existence of coercion or non-existence of payment for labor in the wording of the caption. Furthermore, the demeanor of the people captured on this image, which someone took at Qingpu or Jiashan in the vicinity of Shanghai, gives viewers the impression that these Chinese nationals were even cooperative. Nevertheless, its caption was altered in RBS without any supportive evidence to suggest that these people had been treated inhumanely.

![Photo 62: RBS](image1)

![Photo C: RBS caption of Photo 62 explains that these people are being mobilized for forced labor, like cattle. The original was in *Mainichi-ban shina-jihen gahō*, no. 11, 1 December 1937, p. 17.](image2)
Photos 63 and 64, according to their captions, show “A train carrying refugees from Songjiang,” and “Our nationals who are fleeing in order not to be enslaved,” respectively. Yet, the only sure fact obtainable from these images is that these are the scenes of heavily crowded trains. They may be captioned in a variety of ways to give viewers different impressions. The date and the photographer of these images are unknown.

Photos 63-64: WMRB
Conclusion: Composite, Play-up, Reprint, and Fabricated Caption

One may summarize the characteristics of the 70 photographs that formed the “roots” of the atrocity photos as the following:

1. Most of the images are of unknown origin—one cannot ascertain who took it, at what location and on what date. Photographers were identified only for about ten pictures.
2. As for those photographs whose origins were firmly established, they were either played-up images used for propaganda purposes or reprints from Japanese photo magazines with fabricated captions attached.
3. One can barely determine which photograph was taken in Nanking. In addition, the scenes captured in many of these images were not those of winter—the season in which the Japanese occupied Nanking.
4. No single photo conveys the image of a large-scale massacre allegedly claiming 300,000 lives. One can see about a dozen dead bodies only on two photographs. Almost all other images are of one or two dead bodies. Victims shown in these pictures are women and children in quite a few cases.
5. No image shows the demeanor or facial expression of Nanking citizens who were supposedly under a reign of terror as American newspaper articles and Timperly’s work described.

In the end, all photographs in RBS and WMRB are determined to be of dubious quality as photographic evidence that depicted the reality of Nanking at the time. At the same time, they prove to be propaganda images which the GMD propaganda bureau or even the GMD government itself fabricated to degrade the image of their opponent—Japan. Another fact that gradually took shape in the course of analyzing these photographs is that a number of published books and videos have used them either without authentication, by retouching, or with fabricated captions.

Thus, the conclusion of this chapter is that none of the 70 photographs, from which the “atrocity photographs” as they are known today originated, can be a piece of viable evidence to prove the occurrence of atrocities in Nanking. To accept this conclusion is up to the reader.
Chapter 3: Additional Photographs that are Meticulous Forgeries

The picked-up “16 Photos”

The alleged Rape of Nanking was a topic of judicial deliberation at the IMTFE as well as at the war crimes trials in Nanking. Although the prosecution did not present any photographic evidence to the IMTFE, the Chinese prosecutors reportedly introduced some photographic images to the Nanking court that tried and convicted Second lieutenants Mukai Toshiaki and Noda Tsuyoshi as well as Lieutenant General Tani Hisao. One of these evidential materials was a photo album—as shown in Photos A-1 through A-3—that contained 16 photographs, which are Photos 65-80.


Photo A-2: The cover of the album. Zhu Chengshan, ed., Nanjing datusha yu guoji dajiuyuan tuji [Pictorial Collection of the Rape of Nanking and the International Relief Efforts], 2002, p. 78. The cover design is different from the one shown in Photo A-1.

Photo A-3: A part of the “16 Photographs” in Nanjing datusha yu guoji dajiuyuan tuji, p. 78.
The following sources made references to this album: NDG, “Nanking 1937” (movie), and Zhongguo Kangri Zhanzheng Tuzhi [Pictorial History of China’s Resistance War Against Japan], vol. 2. Based on the stories recounted in these sources, the following is the summary of how the album became available to the public.

Sometime between 1937 and 1939, a Japanese military man asked Mr. A, who was then an employee of Jinling Zhaoxiangguan [Jinling Photo Studio] in Nanking, to develop films and make prints out of them. Mr. A made an extra set of prints totaling 30 for himself, and kept 16 of them in an album. He, however, discarded that album in 1941 because he was afraid that its possession might endanger his life. Another person—Mr. B—picked it up later in the same year and kept it secretly in his possession until the end of the war. When the war crimes court opened in Nanking, Mr. B presented that album to the court as evidence.

One can, however, detect a multitude of inconsistencies and questionable stories with regard to these “16 photos.” This chapter will analyze (1) whether or not the testimonies given by Messrs. A and B are the truth, (2) if the “16 photos” deserve to be classified as viable evidence of the Nanking massacre, and (3) who took these images—did Japanese army personnel really photograph them?

Photo B

Photo B: The “16 Photographs” captured as still images from the movie “Nanking 1937.” The varied sizes of these photographs are obvious.
Testimony of Mr. A

According to Mr. A’s recollection as recounted in “Nanking 1937,” he made prints from two rolls of film, which a Japanese military man had brought to the store, “under the sunlight around January 1938” when electrical power was yet to be restored in Nanking. He then produced another set of prints in the darkroom. Printing in the darkroom was, however, impossible if the power was not restored. As for the printing under the sunlight, it is practically impossible as well. This mode of printing is an atypical one that is not used for producing prints with multiple tones. The final product was of low quality which the customer—a Japanese military man—was unlikely to accept with satisfaction.

Suppose these photographs were the ones Mr. A produced for his own—not for the customer. A glimpse at these 16 photographs—still images captured from “Nanking 1937”—may impress the viewers with their varying sizes. One may consider the possibility that they have been cropped in multiple ways. But except for the lower part of several of them, all the photographs have distinct edges produced by the easel mask, which binds the negative film to the print paper. Even if he had made contact-sheet images or enlarged prints in the darkroom, it would have been highly unlikely for him to use multiple easel masks of varying sizes in order to make prints out of a single negative. He would not have undertaken such complicated processing work unless he purposely intended to make those prints appear to be from multiple types of negative films. But, of course, such an effect would produce a result that would contradict his original story.

There were several types of films in use about the time of the Nanking campaign. Among them were 35-milimeter film with pin-feed holes for Leica cameras, 120 film that is still in use for camera types such as the Zenza Bronica, preferred by professionals, and 127 film, which was widely used then but is rarely used today. Despite the availability of these multiple film types, film-frame size should have been uniform within a single film. For example, suppose someone took photographs with 120 film. Although the print size could vary, such as 6×9, 6×6, or 4.5×6 centimeters, if using a single camera, one had to predetermine the size before loading the film. Specifically, one had to either place a frame inside the camera or close the built-in flap to narrow the screen to produce 4.5×6-centimeter prints. Moreover, choosing another print size would be impossible once the film was loaded in the camera. It was not impossible to have smaller images printed by hiding half of the camera lens. But this method of filming would have made two types of 6×3-centimeter prints available.
Again, the number of rolls of film that the Japanese military man asked Mr. A to develop and make prints from was two. Given the state of photographic technology as described in this section, his photographs should have only been in two different sizes even if that military man had used two different cameras. Nevertheless, examination of the “16 photos” reveals that they were printed in at least five different print sizes. This observation contradicts Mr. A’s testimony.

Testimony of Mr. B, who “picked up” the album

According to Mr. B, he kept the album that contains the “16 Photos” in his possession for years until the end of World War II. NDG contains Mr. B’s following story as recounted to the book’s authors:

He found an album in the grass . . . . According to his recollection, there were 16 photographs in all. . . . For four years from that time until 1945, Mr. B kept the album in his hands. When the GMD initiated a judicial procedure to try Japanese war criminals after Japan’s surrender, he presented the album as evidence to the GMD.
Photo 7
Photos ①-⑦: Photos ①, ②, ③, and ④ are the same as Photos 67, 69, 71, and 72, respectively. Photo ⑤ is not among the “16 Photographs,” but is included in RBS (introduced as Photo 10 in the previous chapter). Photo ⑥ was not one of the “16 Photographs,” either. Instead, it was featured in Life magazine, and it is featured as Photo 95 later in this chapter. Photo ⑦ is not a part of the “16 Photographs,” but is identical to Photo 82—one of the “Courtesy of Marion Fitch” photographs.

Photos ①-⑦ are the images which Mr. B determined to be identical with what he used to possess based on his memory. Although Photos ① through ④ correspond to Photos 67, 69, 71, and 72 of the “16 photos,” Photos ⑤, ⑥, and ⑦ do not match any of the 16. In addition, although these photographs were supposed to have been in Mr. B’s hands and
have not been seen by anyone else until the end of the war, Photo ⁵ is the same as Photo 10 (see p. xx), which made its debut in RBS—a book published seven years prior to the war crimes trials in Nanking. Likewise, Photo ⁶ had already appeared in the January 10, 1938, issue of Life (see p. xx).

If Mr. A had provided these photographs to the GMD or Life before he discarded the album, he should have included that fact in his testimony.

As for Photo ⁷, it is among the photo collection of Marion Fitch—another group of photographs that was supposedly in possession of an individual until the end of World War II.

In view of all these inconsistencies, one may cast strong doubt on the truthfulness of the stories regarding the origin of these photographs as recounted by Messrs. A & B.

Wrong season indicated by the length of shadow

NDG noted that the album which contained the “16 Photos” was adduced to the military court in Nanking and was adopted as evidence to convict Tani Hisao, the commander of the 6th Division at the time of the Nanking campaign. Tani was subsequently shot to death. It is, however, highly questionable that these photographs constitute a piece of viable evidence that substantiate the atrocities allegedly committed by Tani. One may even question whether or not the military court in Nanking subjected the photographs to careful analysis before adopting them as evidence.

Judging from multiple elements observable in the “16 Photos”, they obviously do not depict the scenes of the winter when the city of Nanking fell. According to a publication entitled Nanking, which was published in 1941 in Japan under the editorship of Ichiki Yoshimichi, the temperature in the city averaged five and three degrees Celsius in December and in January, respectively. In summarizing the general climate of the city, the book says, “Compared with locations of the same latitude, the summer in Nanking is hotter and the winter there is colder.”

Some may raise the possibility that the winter in 1937 there was milder than usual. To counter this criticism, it may be useful to analyze the shadows that are observable in these photographs.

The length of shadow constantly changes during the day. It is usually longer in the morning and late afternoon, and is the shortest at the time of the meridian sun (noon). A shadow’s length varies depending on the season as well because the earth’s axis is oblique by 23.5 degrees to its solar orbital path. Chart 1 shows the difference of a shadow’s length in the summer and in the winter. A shadow in Nanking at the time of the Japanese occupation in December was longer than one in the summer.

With these data in mind, note the shadow seen in Photo 66. The ratio the length of the shadow (L) to the length of the subjects’ height (H) is 0.32—a ratio that is most likely to occur in Nanking around late May or early June.

The same ratio will be 1.0, at the longest, between December 13 and the end of
February in Nanking, even at the time of the meridian sun (noon) when the ratio is the smallest (See Chart 2). The ratio is larger at all the other times and can never be larger than 1.0. Thus, the location shown in this photograph cannot be Nanking at the time of the Japanese occupation or immediately thereafter.

Judging from the clothing on the military men standing and the posture of those sitting as shown in Photos 70-75, someone took them at the same location at the identical time. The servicemen’s attire and the background does not suggest that the photos were taken during the winter. Since none of the “16 Photos” in possession of the research team are clear enough for analysis, Photo C, which appears in RON-YY, will be subjected to analysis here. As the next section will discuss, Photo C was obviously taken at the same location as Photo 73 was.

Photo 66

![Photo 66: QINHUA, p. 46](image-url)
Since the Japanese entered Nanking during the winter, the angle, as indicated in this photograph, must be 45 degrees or less. Because the angle as measured in this photograph is 78 degrees, the location cannot be Nanking around December-February. In addition, the boots worn by a person swinging a sword is probably not those of the Japanese army.

Note the shadow of the right foot of the soldier swinging down a sword. The angle created between a line connecting the heel and its corresponding point in the shadow and the ground is large because the sun was high in the sky. The angle, indicated as $\theta$, is about 78 degrees. Computation based on Chart 2 reveals that this angle should be 45 degrees or less in December in Nanking. Again, the shadow in this photo serves as convincing proof that they were not taken in Nanking when the massacre was allegedly in progress.
The same background as the “original photographs”

The “16 Photos” were supposedly taken by a Japanese military man, according to the account of the former album owner. One may, however, detect many dubious points in some of them—Photo 70-75—if one assumes that a Japanese serviceman took these images. First, the photographer took these snapshots, which numbered as many as six, at very close range. Second, there were many spectators, including those who were holding cameras. Given such circumstances, it is natural to assume that the photographer—if he had really been a Japanese military man—would have obtained permission of the Japanese military command to take these images. At the same time, the military command should have recorded his name and his unit, and secured his oath that he would not release these images to the public.

Photo D: The same as Photo 14 as printed in WMRB. It is credited as “Courtesy of Marion Fitch” in RON-YY, p. 127.
Photo E: An image identical to Photo 70, which is one of the “16 Photographs.” It is reprinted in RON-YY, p. 70. The same person is seen, in the portion marked by a square, in both Photos D and E.
Photo D is the same as Photo 14, one of the RBS photographs subjected to analysis in the preceding chapter, and Photo E is identical with Photo 70, which is one of the “16 Photos.” A glimpse at these two images causes one to suspect that they were captured at the same location at the same time. Notably, the person seemingly about to be beheaded appears to be the same individual in both of them.

A close examination of these photographs substantiates this suspicion. The enlarged portion marked with square in both photographs show a man in a white shirt sitting on the ground with his hands on his laps. Also, the man is seen wearing something white around his head in the identical postures in both images.

Photo C is the one printed in RON-YY, and Photo F is Photo 15 (see p. xx), which is one of the WMRB images. Photo G is the same as Photo 73, one of the “16 Photos.” Photos F and G are those of RON-YY, which are clearer. Judging from the portions indicated with numbered arrows in these images, all these photographs were taken from the same location. The shapes of the trees, including their branches, the interval between them and the man in the tree on the extreme right are all common to these snapshots.

With these facts in mind, one should consider the accounts given by the two former owners of the album—Mr. A, who reportedly discarded the album containing prints produced from two rolls of film that a Japanese military man asked him to develop, and Mr. B, who said he had found that album but concealed it until the end of the war to present it to the war crimes court. In summary, these two individuals supposedly kept the album tightly in their possessions such that no one else saw them. The truth is, however, that Photo C, which was most likely taken from the same location at the same time at a different angle, was available for a long time. The same is true of Photo F, which appeared in WMRB, published in 1938.

A question worth investigating here is who took the WMRB photographs. It was not possible for the Japanese military authorities to permit its enemy to photograph such images. Thus, it is possible that a Japanese national, either civilian or military, was granted permission and clandestinely provided the images to the GMD. But such a transaction was almost unthinkable during the war because the Japanese military authorities enforced strict restrictions on the use of photographic images like these.

A more plausible scenario is that the Chinese military either captured these acts undertaken by their own men or photographed staged scenes. A notable fact worth repeating here is that the Japanese did not maintained the custom of public execution after the end of the Tokugawa period.
Photo C: RON-YY, p. 119.
Photo F: The same as a WMRB photo previously shown as Photo 15.
Photo G: An image identical to Photo 73—one of the “16 Photographs.” The soldier shown in this image was not wearing leg putties. In view of the common elements in Photos C, F, and G such as the shapes of trees and a man sitting in a tree, someone most likely took these photographs at the same location on the same date.

As for Photo 76, one can notice an object resembling black smoke on the water near the dead bodies. *Ni Meijianguo de Lishi Zhaopian* [Historical Photographs That Are Overlooked], vol. 2, includes the same photograph with a slight difference, that is, Photo I. Originally, two persons, circled in Photo I, are present. If a Japanese military man had actually taken this photograph, these two individuals should have been either Japanese men or, at least, Chinese nationals who were not hostile to the Japanese because they were attempting neither to move away from the camera nor submerge under the water. Rather, one of them is seen wearing a cap while another appears to be swimming toward the photographer. Had a Japanese military man really been the photographer, this image should have been printed in its original form. RON-YY, however, carries this image with the upper portion deleted (Photo H) with a caption reading "Corpses of massacred citizens,
dumped in a pond.” One wonders why the authors printed a modified image in RON-YY and speculate that the authors considered the inclusion of the two swimming individuals in the photograph to be detrimental to their ulterior motive.

In Photo 68, the breast pocket of the man’s uniform is located lower than that of a real Japanese army uniform. Photo 77, which was reprinted in QINHUA, shows many dead bodies, beyond which are a horse and a soldier. If this image had been used as evidence at the military court in Nanking in 1947, it should have been in wider use since then. In fact, it reappeared in QINHUA for the first time in the mid-1980s.

Photo H

Photo 76

Photo I

Photo 76: One of the “16 Photographs”
Photo H: RON-YY, p. 48
RON-YY includes a total of 21 images with the credit “Courtesy of Marion Fitch.” Marion Fitch was the oldest daughter of George A. Fitch, a missionary who, along with John G. Magee, was in Nanking to witness the Japanese occupation. Of the photographs, however, seven photographs overlap with those already featured in the preceding chapter. The Fitch photos, marked as ①, ②, ③, ④, ⑤, ⑥, and ⑦, correspond to Photos 8, 29, 31, 38, 25, 15, and 14, respectively. If these were genuinely in the possession of Marion Fitch, one may speculate that she provided these overlapping images to the editors of RBS and WMRB.
Marion Fitch photographs which were already in use in the first period

How she supposedly obtained these photographs is worth investigating. The following is an excerpt from *Nankin daigyakusatsu: Nihonjin e no kokuhatsu* [The Rape of Nanking: Accusation Against the Japanese]:

The photographs printed at the infographic topping were made available through the courtesy of the Alliance in Memory of Victims of the Nanjing Massacre. These are a part of 30 photographs owned by Marion Fitch in the United States. . . . Marion Fitch lived in Shanghai in 1937, but returned to the United States to commit herself in a fund-raising campaign for China’s war against Japan for several years thereafter. Frederick J. Tooker, her uncle who was a Christian missionary in China, entrusted with Marion
some 50 photographs which he had taken in China. Of these photographs, about 30 depict inhumane conducts allegedly committed by the Japanese military. Tooker told her that a Japanese soldier had captured these images and asked a Korean film developer for its developing and printing. That Korean photo store owner made extra prints and sent them to an American national.

These photographs have been preserved at the home of Marion Fitch for nearly 50 years. Then, a photograph which an ethnic Chinese group seeking damage compensation for the Nanking massacre victims from Japan posted in its advertisement in the *New York Times* happened to be identical with one of those images. This photograph evoked the memory of the Fitch family members, who subsequently provided their photo collection to the Alliance in Memory of Victims of the Nanjing Massacre.

These images are not the making of a single individual. Who photographed them, on what date, at what location is all unknown. About a half of them have already been available to the public, as they have appeared in Nanking-related publications to serve as evidence of the Japanese atrocities in Nanking.
Fitch Photos 8 - 15

Photo 88  Photo 86  Photo 84  Photo 81

Photo 87  Photo 85

Photo 82  Photo 83

Photo 81 = Fitch Photo 8
Photo 82 = Fitch Photo 9
Photo 83 = Fitch Photo 10
Photo 84 = Fitch Photo 11
Photo 85 = Fitch Photo 12
Photo 86 = Fitch Photo 13
Photo 87 = Fitch Photo 14
Photo 88 = Fitch Photo 15
One obvious contradiction that instantly strikes the reader of this quoted passage. If the Fitch family had really closely preserved these photographs in their possession for half a century, some of the photos could not have been printed in RBS or WMRB, which were published in 1938. There are several other inconsistencies and questionable points in this explanation:

1. Although Tooker himself supposedly took these photographs, he contradicted himself by saying that a Japanese soldier had photographed some of them. Had a Japanese military man truly have been the photographer, one wonders who told Tooker about him, and how he obtained them from the military man, at what location and on what date.
2. What was the name of the Korean film developer? What was the identity of the American to whom that Korean sent the photo prints—Tooker himself or someone else? How did that Korean become acquainted with that American?
3. Although Tooker himself reportedly took some photographs, none were credited to him. Did Tooker not take any images of the Japanese?
4. Where and when did Tooker entrust these photographs to Marion Fitch—in China or in the United States?
5. Did Tooker or Marion Fitch ever tell George A. Fitch about his/her own photo collection?
6. Why did Marion Fitch wait for nearly 60 years after the Nanking campaign to go public as the “provider” of these images?

Even the editors of *Nankin daigyakusatsu: Nihonjin e no kokuhatsu* stated that “who photographed them, on what date and at what location are all unknown,” an implicit admission to the questionable nature of this photo collection.

Again, an intriguing question is why Marin Fitch claimed in 1997 as being the “provider” of these images. One may also wonder why RON-YY specifically captioned these photographs as the “courtesy of Marion Fitch” in 1997.

Readers may also be struck by similar circumstances under which the two photo collections—the “16 Photos” and the Fitch collection—supposedly became publicly available. The following are common in both cases.

1. A Japanese military man asked his film to be developed and printed at a local photo developer.
2. That the developer, either a Chinese or a Korean, secretly produced extra prints for himself.
3. These extra prints were transferred to several individuals to eventually become publicly available.
4. The final owner in each case kept the photographs in their possession for a long period of time.

Again, it is striking that the process that led to the final publication of each set of photographs was very similar in each case.

**Tricks to implicate the Japanese**

Now, let us analyze the “Marion Fitch” photographs. The scenes captured in the images—Photos 81-94—vary as the table on p. xxx shows. The research team scrutinized them to answer three questions.

First, did someone actually take these images in Nanking? A glimpse of them will convince the viewer that most of the scenes are not those of winter, when the Nanking campaign was in progress.

RON-YY captioned Photo 84 as “A massacre at Yuhuatai, south of the city. This photo was taken moments after the massacre.” The truth is, however, that the same image made its debut in the October 22, 1938, issue of the *China Weekly Review*, and the magazine specified its location as “Hsuchow,” which is Chuzhou,(in the pinyin transcription), about 200 kilometers north of Nanking. Also, a closer look reveals that the collar of the uniform worn by a man in the photograph is a turnover collar and not the typical standing collar of the Japanese army uniform at the time of the Nanking campaign.
Photos 84 and A: The caption of Photo 84 as included in RON-YY reads, “A massacre at Yuhuatai, south of the city. This photo was taken moments after the massacre.” The fact is, however, that the China Weekly Review featured Photo A in its October 22, 1938, issue. According to its caption, this image shows a Japanese officer inspecting massacred civilians in Shuchow.

Photo B: An enlargement of a part of Photo A. The uniform’s collar looks like a turned-up collar.

The Japanese army issued its ordinance nos. 392-94 to effectuate this change in uniform style on May 31, 1938. This ordinance was followed by a directive that obliged the army personnel to keep wearing the old uniform as long as they could. As a result, army documents indicate that the transition from the old uniform to the new one was still in progress, for example, at the army’s field artillery school as late as September 1939.

In view of these facts, Photo 84 cannot have been taken in or around Nanking from end-1937 to early 1938, and, thus, cannot constitute a piece of valid evidence to substantiate the Nanking “atrocities”. Nevertheless, the September 11, 2002, issue of Time magazine carried a reprint of this photograph with the caption headline “Nanjing Massacre.”
Japanese army uniforms “before” and “after” the change effectuated by the ordinance of June 1, 1938.

Photo C: Photo 84 still used as a “Nanjing Massacre” photograph in the September 11, 2002, issue of *Time* magazine.

The second question concerning the Marion Fitch photographs is whether or not they genuinely originated from her close kin.

The caption of Photo 88 in RON-YY reads, “The once prosperous commercial street Zhong Shan Road after being stormed and looted by Japanese troops.” However, this image was also printed in a Japanese publication entitled *Ichoku-nin no Shōwa-shi* [History of the Shōwa Era for 100 million People], vol. 10. According to the explanation found in this book, this was a scene of Nanking photographed by a correspondent of the *Mainichi Newspaper* (?) immediately after the Chinese garrison had fled the city. Thus, neither a Japanese military man nor Tooker took this image. This is another case in point to question the truthfulness of the story concerning the origin of the Marion Fitch photos.
Photo 88: An identical photograph was featured also in *Ichoku-nin no Shōwa-shi*, vol. 10, p. 245. According to this source, its photographer was most likely a correspondent of the *Mainichi Newspaper*—then the *Tokyo Nichinichi Newspaper* -- or the *Osaka Mainichi Newspaper*. 
The third question is whether or not the photographer was truly a Japanese military man.

Photo 89’s caption in RON-YY says, “These Japanese soldiers dug out the heart of a Chinese ‘to be an appetizer that goes with wine’. The photo was taken as a souvenir of the occasion. The victim was Wang Jia-rang, a boiler worker at Nanking Yongliya Factory.” If this had been a true story, one would have to conclude that the Japanese committed an egregiously inhumane act. Yet, one would first wonder if the Japanese had such a custom. Furthermore, it would appear to defy conventional wisdom for someone to pose for a picture with what seems to be an ordinary demeanor—as distinctly shown in the image—immediately prior to performing such an unbelievably gruesome act. In addition, the cameraman would have also hesitated to record such a scene.

Since a woven-type wall is commonly seen in the background of Photos 82, 85,
and 90, one may assume that the photos were taken at the same location. This means that the cameraman walked around the area with a camera in his hands and took the photos from three different angles. Such a feat would have been impossible if he had tried to photograph the scenes unbeknownst to the perpetrators of the alleged crimes.

Photos 82, 89, and 90 share another common feature, that is, the face of the circled individual found in each of them. Strangely, this person posed as a victim in Photo 82 whereas he was a victimizer in Photo 89. The Sankei Newspaper already touched on this point in its September 27, 1998, issue, and suggested the possibility that the scenes were staged. In addition, the man about to swing down a sword in Photo 81 seems to be identical to the man wearing glasses in Photo 82, while the man with his neck tied with a rope in Photo 85 appears to be the same as the one seen in the background (second from the right) in Photo 90. Furthermore, all persons were thinly dressed, and the wall structures seen in these photos look more like those more typical of tropical areas than of Nanking.

As for Photos 91, 92, and 94, they are highly likely to be pornographic images as discussed in Chapter 2, judging from the postures of the photographed individuals. One may also detect some staged elements in the movements of the persons shown in Photos 83, 86, 87, and 93—the existence of a camera or cameras close to them may have made their behavior a little unnatural. One more unnatural scene is the leg puttee of the man captured in Photo 86—he is not wearing it properly.

Based on these findings, one may reach the following conclusions with respect to the nature of the Marion Fitch photo collection. First, even the “owner” of the collection, who was also responsible for “providing” these to a media source, was unable to ascertain the exact origin of these images. She failed to clarify who took these photographs, the locations depicted and on what date they were taken. One could even speculate that the only role that the “owner/provider” played was merely to testify that Japanese military personnel had taken these images. The story concerning their origin, as recounted by Marin Fitch, certainly serves as an effective tool to make the viewers believe that these photographs are authentic and reliable.

Second, the scenes shown in almost all of the Fitch photos are not those of winter, when the alleged Nanking massacre unfolded. Third, it would have been impossible for those images which, according to Fitch’s account, were kept tightly in her possession, to be printed in the books published by the GMD’s propaganda bureau. That these images appeared in such sources is testimonial to the existence of fabrication or staging of the account of the “owner/provider” or of the photographs themselves.
Images reprinted from a variety of sources

(1) A severed head for public viewing

Photo 95 shows a gruesome scene of a severed head displayed for public viewing. One senses a cruel personality of those who perpetrated the act.

This photograph appeared for the first time in the January 10, 1938, issue of *Life* magazine with the following caption:

Chinese head, whose owner was incorrigibly anti-Japanese, was wedged in a barbed-wire barricade outside Nanking just before the city fell Dec. 14 [sic].

It remained in good condition in the freezing weather, facing toward Nanking, . . .

Although this explanation may give the readers the impression that the Japanese were responsible for this inhumane act, no one has been able to determine who was beheaded and who placed his head on a palisade. Most likely because of its obscure origin, the image was never reprinted thereafter for a long time.

Photo 95

![Photo 95](image)

Photo 95: This image made its media debut in the January 10, 1938, issue of *Life* magazine.
Forty-five years later, however, *Nankin daigyakusatsu: Maboroshika kōsaku hihan* carried this image again with a caption that incorrectly copied information in the original *Life* magazine caption—it refers to December 14, 1937, as the date “prior” to the fall of Nanking. This triggered subsequent Nanking-related publications to include this photograph. These sources are QINHUA, NDG, SND, “Nanking 1937,” RON-YY, and RON-I. As for RON-I, its caption contains a passage that was not in the *Life*’s original caption, that is, “with a cigarette butt inserted between his lips as a joke.” On top of this, NDG hinted that “Mr. B”—the former owner of the “16 Photos” who testified to the Japanese origin of these photographs—had seen this image. Although the Japanese origin of the photographs does not automatically implicate the Japanese for the atrocious acts shown in these images, such a story is likely to cause readers to strongly make this connection in their minds.

Photo A

Photo 96

Photo 96: A photograph featured in the August 4, 1984, issue of the *Asahi Newspaper* as “undeniable proof” of the “Rape of Nanking.”

Photo A: The *Asahi Newspaper* article with photographs, including Photo 96.
Photo B: RON-I’s caption says that these severed heads belonged to the victims of the Nanking massacre.

Photo C: RON-YY

Photo D: Bessatsu rekishi tokuhon: mikōkai shashin ni miru Nitchū-sensō, p. 155. Attached to the original photograph is a handwritten caption, “Heads of horse-riding bandits who were shot to death at Tieling.” This caption was missing in the photo printed in the Asahi Newspaper.

There have been other instances in which this type of photograph has been deceptively used. Photo 96 was printed with an article in the August 4, 1984, issue of the Asahi Newspaper. Under the headline of “Nanking massacre diary and photographs unearthed,” three monochrome photographs and a page of a former soldier’s diary, which were reportedly discovered at a farmer’s house in a village in Miyazaki Prefecture, appeared with the following passage:

[Although] the Nanking massacre has been equated with the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki as well as with the systematic killing of the Jews at Auschwitz, very little evidence has been discovered on the
Japanese side. But [the unearthed materials] seem to corroborate the undeniable truth of the incident. Two of the three photographs appear to show dead bodies. One cannot, however, verify whether or not they were taken in Nanking.

The focus of analysis here will be on Photo 96, that is, the third image printed at the bottom of the photo group in the Asahi Newspaper article. Some Nanking-related publications contain photographs similar to Photos B, C, and D. As ‘Rape of Nanking’ no kenkyū by Higashinakano noted, eight of the severed heads seen in Photos B and C are common, with their positions only altered slightly. Obviously, someone moved them with the purpose of photographing them. Although one can see something like a city wall behind the heads, the wall proved not to be that of Nanking. One could speculate that these are the heads of political prisoners or bandits taken during the era of civil war between the GMD and the CCP.

Photo D—exactly the same image as Photo 96—was included in Bessatsu rekishi tokuhon: mikōkai shashin ni miru Nitchū-sensō [Extra Issue of ‘History Reading’: The Sino-Japanese War Seen in Never-Seen Footages] published in 1989. The only difference is that Photo 96 did not have the hand-written photo caption attached to Photo D, which reads, “Heads of mounted bandits who were shot to death at Tieling.” The caption did not identify who was responsible for the execution. Nevertheless, only because this photograph was among the possessions of a former Japanese soldier, the Asahi Newspaper determined it to be proof of “undeniable truth of” the Nanking massacre.

An important side note to this episode is that the Chinese still maintained the custom of displaying severed heads of the executed in the 1930s whereas the Japanese ceased to observe the same practice after the Meiji Revolution of 1868. Yoshine Hiro’o, author of the previously quoted Yōsukō monogatari, said in his work:

[Upon seeing the severed head being displayed publicly] I hurried back to my ship in a cold sweat. China was in the midst of turmoil in the late Taishō to the early Shōwa era as numerous warlords battled against each other. Adding fuel to this chaos was newly emerging CCP force that infiltrated into urban areas and clashed with local troops. As a result, one could witness this sort of scene everywhere then.

Some materials substantiate Yoshine’s story. Photo E shows severed heads of bandits executed in the Nongan prefecture in the Jilin Province on March 31, 1923. It is one of the numerous photographs which a former Japanese soldier purchased at the time of the Manchurian Incident in Fengtian—today’s Shenyang. Also, the Osaka Mainichi Newspaper reported in its February 12, 1938 issue that three severed heads had been found on the street of the French settlement in Shanghai. The article added that the people in the city were frightened to see them.
Photo E: A photograph that was on sale in Fengtian (present day Shenyang). According to its caption, these heads belonged to the bandits executed in Nongan prefecture on March 31, 1923.

Photo F: An article from the *Osaka Mainichi Newspaper*, 12 February 1938, which reported that three severed heads had been found on the streets in Shanghai.
(2) Alleged murder of children

Among the exhibits at the Memorial Hall in Nanking are numerous photographs including those subjected to analysis by the research team. Saotome Katsumoto reprinted one of these photographs, Photo 97, on a page within his publication entitled *Haha to ko de miru Nankin kara no tegami* [Letters from Nanking for Mother and Children to Read] as shown in Photo G. The image depicts many dead bodies.

The explanation given by the Memorial Hall says “The Japanese army slaughtered many innocent Chinese children in Nanking.” He Yingqin also provided a similar caption of the same photo that was included in the gravure preface of his *Rijun Qinhua Banian Kangzhanshi* [History of Eight-Year Resistance War Against the Invading Japanese].

Photo G

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Photo G and 97: Photo G is in *Haha to ko de miru Nankin kara no tegami*, p. 75. Photo 97 is an enlarged version of Photo G.

Photo H: One of the photographs in the infographic section of *Chōsenjin kyōsei renkō no kiroku* [Record of Forced Conscription of Koreans]. Its handwritten caption reads, “Korean infants, who were murdered by local bandits.” They may have been the victims of an anti-Japanese riot instigated by Korean independence activists at Jiandao in 1930.
The same image, however, appeared with a hand-written caption at the top in *Chōsenjin kyōsei renkō no kiroku* [Records of Forced Relocation of Koreans]. Shown in Photo H, this caption says “Korean infants who were murdered by local bandits.” Thus, the explanation at the Memorial Hall replaced “local bandits” and “Korean infants” with “the Japanese army” and “Chinese children,” respectively.

(3) Alleged massacre of civilians

Despite the oft-made allegation of the Japanese massacre of 300,000 people in Nanking, for a long time, no commentator presented a photograph that hints at a large-scale killing of this magnitude. Then, Photo 98 appeared in RON-YY, which shows a scene that looks like the aftermath of indiscriminate massacring of civilians. This photograph was also on display at the Osaka International Peace Center. However, the scene depicted is not that of Nanking. Commentators like Hatanaka Hideo and Takahashi Shirō already discussed the truth behind this photograph. The following is an excerpt from Takahashi’s work entitled *Rekishi kyōiku wa kore de yoi no ka* [Is History Education Presently in Good Shape?]:

![Photo 98](image-url)

It is Carl Mydans, an American in Chongqing, who took this photograph for *Life*. The caption to this photograph reads, “After a mass panic, bodies were dumped outside the city’s largest shelter.” This photograph was printed next to that of another image of a larger size, which is captioned, “In the dark, cramped confines of a sandstone shelter—here illuminated by flashbulb—Chungking [Chongqing] residents huddle together while Japanese bomb the city.” Thereafter, a more detailed explanation follows: “. . . Following a heavy raid, a crowd was starting to leave Chungking’s largest shelter, a mile-and-a-half-long tunnel under the heart of the city, when the signal for another raid was suddenly given. Guards slammed the gates shut, and in the ensuing panic 4,000 people were suffocated or trampled to death.”

Thus, even *Life* magazine, which maintained a very anti-Japanese stance then, clearly stated that this carnage was the result of an unfortunate accident . . . not the direct result of the Japanese bombing.

RON-YY attached to this image the caption “June 28, 1941. Civilian victims of Japanese bombing at Chongqing [Chungking], China’s wartime capital.” The only correct pieces of information in this passage are “civilian victims” and “Chongqing”.

(4) Chinese murdered as bayonet practice guinea pigs

A Japanese periodical *Modan Nihon* [Modern Japan] carried an article commenting on photographs like Photo 99 in its February 1939 issue. The following is an excerpt from that article penned by Hen Seiretsu.

[The Daily Mirror magazine] stunned the American public with the use of a photograph of an unknown origin. The magazine moved the minds of Americans who speak of humanity as if it were second nature with a sensational caption—that the Japanese soldiers use dead bodies as guinea pigs for their bayonet practice in defiance of the norm of the civilized peoples who pay respect to the soulless bodies of humans. The Japanese Consulate-General filed an immediate protest with the magazine publisher. A subsequent investigation revealed that this was a photograph which an American news service company’s correspondent stationed in north China sent to the United States. When the Japanese troops occupied the city of Beijing, they found several copies of the same photograph at a photo store owned by a Chinese national. Afterward, that newspaper company reportedly expressed its apology to the Consulate-General and recalled that correspondent from China.

Photo I: A part of Photo 99 enlarged. The soldier’s uniform has a turned-up collar. The uniform is without the long vertical shoulder loop typically seen in the Japanese army.

Photo 99 is one of the photographs which the Associated Press distributed in the fall of 1937 as photographic proof of alleged Japanese massacre of Chinese nationals. It appears to be the same image as printed in the September 30, 1937, issue of the Daily Mirror.

Also, Hara Keiji wrote an article entitled “Kokusai senden no gakuyaura” [Behind-the-scene realities of international propaganda] to discuss the same topic in the November 1939 issue of Keizai chishiki [Knowledge on Economics]. Hara said in the article:

Depending on the newspapers, the caption [of the photograph] varied such as “A Japanese soldier in bayonet practice using a Chinese tied to a pole,” or “A Japanese soldier’s bayonet practice with the use of Chinese dead body as a guinea pig.” . . . This photograph was the product of the Chinese who
inspired anti-Japanese sentiment among the population, and was on sale in that country as a postcard.

The publication *Shina-tairiku no shinsō* [The Truth of the Chinese Continent] also mentioned the existence of similar photographs, one of which showed a woman being stabbed by someone. More recently, Nakada Takashi summarized the circumstances surrounding the origin of such images in his article “Nitchū-sensō-ki ni okeru Chūgoku kokumintō no taigai senden katsudō” [GMD international propaganda activities during the Sino-Japanese War] published in *Seiji keizai shigaku* [History of Politics and Economy], no. 431.

That this photograph was a fabrication was known at the time. As a result, for a long time, it did not reappear in media sources. But recently, the following sources reprinted this photograph: Yang Kelin, Cao Hong, *Zhongguo Kangri Tuzhi* [Pictorial History of China’s Resistance War], RON-YY, and REKISHI. In particular, REKISHI included Photo 99 in a section entitled the “mop-up operations in and outside the city walls” with the following caption: “The Japanese army used live Chinese persons as guinea pigs for bayonet practice to turn rookie soldiers into ‘murdering maniacs.’”

One should analyze this allegation by referring to another contemporary source. The following is an excerpt from a 1941 publication entitled *Hōdō sen sen* [Front of Media Warfare] by Mabuchi Itsuo:

One prominent example is that the government of Chiang Kai-shek aroused anti-Japanese and pro-Chinese sentiment by disseminating a propaganda photo that shows a Japanese soldier allegedly using a Chinese POW as a guinea pig for bayonet practice. But *Lowdown* magazine exposed the truth of this photograph. The magazine said in an article in its January 1939 issue that this photograph had a long history of propaganda usage—first against a warlord, against the Communists, and then against the Japanese during the Manchurian Incident. It went on to say, “In its most recent reappearance it was used for the customary purpose of enlisting American sympathies—and arousing anti-Japanese sentiment in this country.” This type of revelation proves to be counter-effective for the original purpose of propaganda. During World War II, people believed an unfounded rumor that the Germans extracted fat from the bodies of those killed in action to produce soap. If someone had faked a photograph that depicted dead bodies being transported to a factory, it would have lent more credence to the story.
An article of the January 1939 issue of *Lowdown* magazine that commented on the nature of propaganda warfare. Because *Lowdown* magazine of the United States did not print the photograph it was referring to, it is impossible to verify whether or not Photo 99 was that very picture. Nevertheless, the following passage of the article is worth quoting here:

It was first placed on sale, as a post card, in Shanghai in 1919. At that time, it was presented as propaganda against one of the war lords ravaging an interior province. A year or so later it was brought out again depicting Communist Chinese officers torturing a Chinese prisoner of one of the northern provinces. It did not rest for long, as it was hauled out again as propaganda against the Japanese when they went into Manchuria. When the Manchurian crisis had ceased to be news, it was put away only to be unearthed again to illustrate the atrocities committed by the Chinese Soviets when Chiang Kai-shek was attempting to wipe out the Chinese Red Army in 1934.

Photo J
Another notable fact is that a soldier depicted in Photo 99 is wearing a turnover collared uniform. Since no Japanese military men wore this type of uniform at the time, the soldier could have been Japanese.

Photo K

Photo K: RON-YY, p. 142. Its caption says, “A Japanese officer practices swordwork on a bound and blindfolded victim propped up on two sticks.”

Although RON-YY captioned a similar photograph, Photo K, as “A Japanese officer practices swordwork on a bound and blindfolded victim propped up on two sticks,” the man is seen holding a sword with one hand and in the form of fencing, which would be an unlikely posture for the use of a Japanese sword.

(5) Alleged killing contest and sword maintenance scene

Photo 100 made its debut in Zhongguo Kangri Huazhi [Illustrated History of China’s Resistance War] published in 1947. The publishing of this book appeared to have been timed with the opening of the military court in Nanking to try Mukai Toshiaki and Noda Tsuyoshi—two Japanese officers who had participated in the Nanking campaign as second lieutenants and were indicted by the military court for the so-called “100-man killing contest.” The court convicted them and sentenced them to death by adopting as evidence only newspaper articles that reported on the alleged killing competition. They were subsequently shot to death on January 28, 1948. Its caption says, “Three contestants in a killing contest betted on their score, and triumphantly wiped bloodstains off their
sword blades.’’ Thereafter, this image was reprinted in the following sources with its caption: the Japanese edition of *Battle for Asia*, *Chūgoku no tabi*, *Chūgoku no Nihon-gun*, QINHUA, SND, “Nanking 1937,” and RON-YY.

Photo 100: “Three contestants in a killing contest bet on their score, and triumphantly wipe bloodstains off their sword blades.” ZKH, p. 129. In this image, the scabbards for their swords are nowhere to be found. In addition, they seem to be performing sword maintenance in a dangerous manner—with bare foot.

One may, however, wonder if the men captured in the photograph were soldiers who had a genuine “killing score” contest. If they truly had been Japanese military men and if this allegation had been true, then the military court in Nanking should have tried them. Although newspaper articles do not usually constitute a piece of viable court evidence, the Nanking court defied this established legal custom in the trial of the two second lieutenants Mukai and Noda. This photograph could, however, have been a useful tool with which to identify the culprits. Nevertheless, there is no record to indicate that the Chinese judicial authorities attempted to locate these three men after the war.

(6) Images that captured the “moment of” and “after” of beheading

Several images that depict “before” and “after” alleged beheadings by the Japanese
military have appeared in several Nanking-related publications. To the knowledge of the research team, however, Photo 101—included in RON-YY and SND—is the only snapshot that captured the “moment” of such an execution. Yet, one may detect the following questionable points in the scene, especially in comparison to a mock performance (Photo L) and authentic scenes of sword use for actual beheading (Photo M).

Ron-I, p. 114. The shoulder loop on the Japanese army uniforms was a vertically long one, instead of a horizontally long one as seen in this image. In addition, the uniform worn by the individual in this image does not have a standing collar—the type used by the Japanese army at the time of the Nanking campaign.

1. As shown in both Photos L and M, one steps with his right foot forward at the moment of swing the sword down, whether he is right-handed or left-handed. The man in Photo 101 is, however, seen stepping forward his left foot.
2. It is questionable that the photographer could approach so dangerously close to the scene of the execution with someone about to swing down a sword.
3. The man being beheaded was tied at his elbows, not with hands behind him, with the rope stretched behind him. This type of binding would have made the beheading difficult because it would have allowed the bound man to move his upper body freely.
4. The headless body is seen standing upright—a phenomenon that was likely to happen in executions with the use of broad sword, as shown in Photo M.
5. Photo 101 shows a grassy background—an unlikely scene for winter when Nanking fell.

These considerations sufficiently question the validity of Photo 101 as evidence of a Japanese atrocity in Nanking.

Photo 102 is printed in SND and RON-YY. The man depicted in this photograph does not look like a Japanese military man since his outfit—overall look of the uniform, his helmet, shape of his boots, the neckerchief he is wearing—do not appear to be that of the Japanese army. Other questionable details are: (1) the uniform is not the standing collar of the Japanese army uniform was at the time of the Nanking campaign, (2) he is not carrying a scabbard for the sword, and (3) the canteen which is supposed to be attached to the waist belt is seen above the belt. In addition, Photo N—an enlargement of part of Photo 102—makes one wonder how he could hold a human head with only his thumb and pointer finger. Also, the straight line circled in Photo N looks unnatural. One could speculate that this was a post card on sale in China at the time.
Photo 102: One of the photographs grouped under the title of *can wurendao de sharen shouduan* [Cruel and inhumane ways of murder]. RON-YY, p. 126.
Photo N: A part of Photo 102 enlarged. It seems that this soldier is holding a severed human head with his thumb and index finger. One may wonder if it was possible to hold it up in such a manner.

(7) To impress viewers with “Japanese savagery”

Until very recently, Japanese primary school textbooks were printed with Photo O, which depicts a wall painting that “Guangxi Xueshengjun” [Guangxi student militia] produced for anti-Japanese propaganda purposes. (The Chinese writing on the wall says “Japanese brutality!”) Photo P, which appeared in *Chinas Erneuerung* by Lilie Abegg, shows another such painting. As for actual photographic examples of the alleged Japanese slaying or mutilation of Chinese women, the research team identified three in publications and internet sites relating to the Nanking massacre. Among these three, the team has already subjected Photo 22 to its scrutiny in Chapter 2. As for Photos 103 and 104, which show truly abominable scenes, they were among the photographs found in *Zhongguo Kangri Huazhi*. The truth is, however, detailed data concerning these pictures—who took them, where and on what date—are not at all available. There is no clue that traces their origin to Nanking.
写真P：『私の進軍中国戦線』（124頁）に掲載された写真
農村でプロパガンダ。移動劇団のリーダーがこれから上演されるようコマを絵にして農民に説明している。絵に描かれられているのは、日本兵がまさに銃剣で農民を刺そうとしている瞬間である

写真O

Photo O: Watashi no jūgun: Chūgoku sensen [My Battle Record: China Front], p. 124. Photo P: “This is a scene from a propaganda theater performance at a farm village. The leader of a traveling troupe is showing a painting to explain a play segment which the spectators are about to see. The painting depicts a Japanese soldier about to stab Chinese farmers to death.” Chinas Erneuerung, p. 145.
Another question is whether or not the Japanese made it a custom to commit this type of brutal act. The fact is that China, rather than Japan, has witnessed up until recently the perpetration of such cruelties as slitting the belly of the dead or inserting foreign objects into the female genital. The following are excerpts from Wild Swans: Three Daughters of China by Jung Chang:

They [bandits] were particularly sadistic to women. One day the corpse of one of my father’s nieces was dumped just outside the city gate; she had been raped and knifed, and her vagina was a bloody mess. Another young woman was caught by the Broadsword Brigade during a skirmish . . . . one of the bandits cut a hunk out of her flesh with a knife. She died horribly mutilated. (p. 160)
In one case a [Communist] Party member raped the female members of a landowner’s family and then mutilated them by cutting off their breasts.

One bandit gang had captured a young Communist. . . . The bandit chief ordered him to be cut in half. The chief was later caught, and beaten to death by the Communist land reform team leader, who had been a friend of the man who had been killed. The team leader then cut out the chief’s heart and ate it to demonstrate his revenge. (p. 167)

Readers should note that these quoted passages recount the events that transpired in 1949-50.

Another source that narrates similar acts of cruelties in China is Hungry Ghosts: Mao’s Secret Famine by Jasper Becker. The following episode included in this book happened during the time of the “Great Leap Forward,” which reportedly starved 30 million people to death in China:

Guo Shouli, head of the militia of Nayuan Brigade in Liji commune, Gushi county, beat 110 militiamen, 11 of whom were left permanently disabled and 6 of whom died . . . . A common form of punishment was for cadres to drag people along by their hair . . . . The peasants tried to escape this form of cruelty by shaving off all their hair but then the cadres began to cut off the ears of their victims. In the Daluying production brigade in Fan Hu commune, Xixian county, cadres hacked off the ears of seventeen people. A 20-year-old girl, Huang Xiu Lian, who was president of the commune’s Women’s Association, cut off the ears of four people, one of whom later died. Elsewhere women were humiliated by having sticks inserted into their genitals. . . . The Party Secretary of Qisi commune in Gushi county, Jiang Xue Zhong, is said to have invented a method of boiling human flesh to turn it into fertilizer . . . . Subsequent investigations revealed that he had boiled at least twenty corpses . . . . When the collective canteen ran out of grain, some began slaughtering the remaining livestock. . . . Lu Xianwen denounced this as “sabotage of production” . . . . Some had their noses pierced and were pulled through the nostrils. They were then forced to pull a plough in the field like an ox . . . . That winter, cannibalism became widespread. Generally, the villagers ate the flesh of corpses, especially those of children. . . . In Gushi county, in 1960, the authorities listed 200 cases of corpses being eaten and charged those arrested with the crime of ‘destroying corpses.’ (pp. 115-19)

If someone uses the descriptions in this quote, which recounts events in China during the 1960s, as captions for Photos O, P, 22, 103, and 104, viewers may well accept the scenes depicted in these photographs as those that actually happened at that time.

Publications of the “great massacre school” tend to contain passages that illustrate the savage nature of the Japanese soldiers. For example, one can find the following passages in RON-I:
The Japanese not only disemboweled, decapitated, and dismembered victims but performed more excruciating variety of torture. Throughout the city they nailed prisoners to wooden boards and ran over them with tanks, crucified them to trees and electrical posts, carved long strips of flesh from them, and used them for bayonet practice. At least one hundred men reportedly had their eyes gouged out and their noses and ears hacked off before being set on fire. (p. 87)

After gang rape, Japanese soldiers sometimes slashed open the bodies of pregnant women and ripped out the fetuses for amusement. (p. 91)

. . . they “stuck a wire through his nose and tied the other end of the wire to a tree just like one would tie up a bull.” (p. 94)

. . . one Japanese soldier who raped a young woman thrust a beer bottle into her and shot her. Another victim was found with a golf club rammed into her. . . . the Japanese raped a barber’s wife and then stuck a firecracker in her vagina. (pp. 94-95)

Similarities between the descriptions of alleged Japanese atrocities in RON-I on the one hand and Chinese brutality recounted in *Wild Swans* and *Hungry Ghosts* on the other hand are striking. One could speculate that the three photographs and RON-I’s (?) accounts were the result of the Chinese projecting their own past conduct onto the Japanese army.

There is yet another example of blaming the Japanese of committing atrocious acts which the Chinese have traditionally perpetrated. Photo 105, which shows a man placed in a cangue, made its debut as a Nanking-atrocity photograph in QINHUA, and has since been included in other publications. On one hand, the Japanese people did not impose this kind of punishment on criminals in modern times. On the other hand, the Chinese still observed this punishment even in the 20th century, and the scene shown in Photo 105 was not rare. Photos Q and R were taken in Shanghai in 1907 and in Beijing in 1924, respectively. Owase Tatsuhiko sketches the origin of the cangue and the punishment that accompanied its use in his *Zusetsu Chūgoku kokukeishi* [Pictorial History of Chinese Cruel Punishments]:

The cangue is a tool for punishing criminals by immobilizing their neck, hands, and feet. Originally modeled on an agricultural tool, it was already in use at the time of the Shang and Zhou dynasties, but was not officially adopted until after the time of the northern Wei dynasty. The size, shape, and weight of the cangue varied, and the seriousness of criminal offense determined which type should be used. Although it was usually made of wood, an iron version was also produced during the Sung dynasty period.
In view of such a Chinese tradition, Photo 105 may well be another Chinese projection of Japanese brutality, in the light of their own past.


Photo Q: “Female prisoners placed in a triple cangu (Shanghai, 1907).” Zusetsu Chūgoku kokukei-shi, p. 79.
“Someone offering incense to a prisoner on public display (Beijing, 1924).” Zusetsu Chūgoku kokukei-shi, p. 79.

(8) Poor children

The caption of Photo 106, which appears in Chapter 2 of RON-YY, reads “Trying desperately to revive their dead children.” Movies like “Battle of China” and “Zhongguo zhi Shuhou” [Roar of China] also feature this photo clip to illustrate the conduct of the Japanese troops after the fall of Nanking.

The original version of this photograph, however, appeared in the January 10, 1938, issue of Life with a different viewpoint and caption. In the original, one can see a uniformed man standing to the left of an old man holding a child. Judging from the shape of the cap worn by that uniformed man, he was most likely not a Japanese soldier, but a Chinese man. Life captioned the photograph, which recorded an event on December 6, 1937 as “A civilian in Nanking, in a state of extreme grief, carried his dying son, wounded by a Japanese bomb splinter.” The presence of such a small child close to the frontline, as indicated by the sandbags, was quite unnatural, however. Thus, Life’s caption itself may not be accurate. But the important fact here is that someone took this photograph on December 6. Accordingly, this cannot constitute photographic evidence of the Japanese
army’s conduct after its entry into the city on December 13. Since the editors judged that the presence of a Chinese soldier and other civilians in the photo may not impress the viewer with a tension-packed atmosphere, only the portion marked with the dotted line in Photo S was printed in RON-YY.

Photo 106


Photo 107 appears to show a man about to place the dead body of a child into a coffin. The viewers may be struck by what appears to be an imprudent way of handling the little soulless body. RON-YY’s caption explains this scene as “A child killed by merciless Japanese soldiers was picked up by a self-organized burial team after the Nanking massacre.”

Actually, this photograph made its first appearance in the February 21, 1938, issue of Life. Close examination of that original—Photo T—reveals that the jacket worn by the
man is printed with symbols reading “Chanshi.” This means that the men of the burial team did not belong to the Red Swastika Society, which buried almost all of the dead in and around Nanking under the supervision of the Japanese army’s special service, and whose logo was the swastika mark (卍). In addition, although most of the burial activities progressed during the winter time, the outfits of the people shown in the image do not look like those for winter. Thus, the scene depicted in Photo 107 has nothing to do with Nanking following its fall.

Photo 107

Photo T: *Life*, 21 February 1938, p. 54.
Photo 107: “A child killed by merciless Japanese soldiers was picked up by a self-organized burial team after the Nanking massacre.” RON-YY, p. 70. The insignia on the man’s jacket reads “Chanshi.”

According to RON-YY’s caption, the children shown in Photo 108 were “[C]hildren blinded by warfare begging on the streets of Zhen Jiang, the strategic front door to Nanking.” Ichoku-nin no Shōwa-shi, vol. 2, also contains this image with a caption reading, “They might be war-affected orphans.” The readers of these two sources may well pity these innocent children and vent their anger at the Japanese army. Again, a completely different explanation accompanied the original photo, which was printed in Mainichi-ban Shina-jihen gahō, dated December 21, 1938. Its caption says, “Kadozuke of Chinese children (at Foshan in southern China).”

Kadozuke—Menfu in Chinese—means musical performance at the house front-gate for the purpose of making money, or those who conduct such performance. Children who intended to become skilled kadozuke player started undergoing rigorous practice of singing or musical instrument playing at a young age. A similar tradition also existed in Japan. This segment, photographed by a Japanese correspondent, thus shows
such children playing in the presence of Japanese soldiers in a southern Chinese town. One may notice the smiling faces of those Japanese soldiers who were watching these little art performers.

(9) A Japanese tank allegedly incinerating a private residence

Photo 109 appears in RON-I as a New China News Agency photo with the following caption: “Arson destroyed one-third of Nanking during the massacre. Here Japanese troops set fire to a house in the suburbs.” One should, however, reject this explanation for the following two reasons. First, the tank shown in the photograph is a “Type-97 light armored vehicle,” which was even not produced at the time of the Nanking campaign. “Type-97” means that the Japanese army general staff authorized the adoption of this type of armored vehicle in the Japanese imperial year 2597, that is, A.D. 1937. Some of the first 247 of this type, produced in 1939, were assigned to the 48th Scout Regiment headquartered in Ōita Prefecture for the first time in November 1940.

Photo 109

Photo 109: RON-I’s caption of this photograph, credited with New China News Agency, reads, “Arson destroyed one-third of Nanking during the massacre. Here Japanese troops set fire to a house in the suburbs.” The fact is, however, that the Type-97 light armored vehicle depicted in this photograph was not even produced at the time of the Nanking campaign in 1937-38.
Photo U: Type-94 light armored vehicle—the type which was indeed in use in the Nanking campaign. The size of its rear wheel is different from the one in the vehicle depicted in Photo 109.

Therefore, the scene in which this type of tank was in operation was definitely not that of Nanking in 1937-38. Second, “light armored vehicles,” which were designed to transport arms and ammunition to the frontline, were mounted with a gun but not a flame-thrower. It is thus impossible for this vehicle to conduct incendiary operations. (The authors would like to thank Iwata Yoshiyasu, a former officer of a Japanese army tank unit, for information that was useful to complete this section.) The readers should compare this type with the “Type-94 light armored vehicle,” which was in use at the time of the Nanking operation, shown in Photos U and V.
Photo V: “The Japanese tank unit moving toward the Zhonghua Gate.” *Nankin kōryakusen shashinchō.*

(10) Images of alleged Japanese arson

Photo W is one of the images printed in *Nankin kōryaku-sen shashin-chō* [Nanking Campaign Album] published in January 1938. According to its caption, it depicts “fire at the South Gate street, Nanking.” The same image was also printed in the December 18, 1937, issue of the *North China Daily News*, which explained the scene only as a Chinese barricade at Zhongshan street. Thus, the focus of contemporary observers seems to have been either on the fire of unknown origin or the Chinese barricade.

With the passage of time, however, retouching of this image progressed as shown, in order, in Photos 110, 111, and 112. While a portion of the barricade was deleted, the emphasis was shifted to the fire for the purpose of blaming it on the Japanese. In particular, the REKISHI version looks almost like a different photo as it left out vehicles as well as some soldiers shown in the original, and was attached with a caption that reads, “Buildings in Nanking on fire following the entry of the Japanese army.”

Although the caption of Photo 110 printed in QINHUA identifies the location as South Gate Street, RON-YY version says, “Smoke from a huge fire set by the Japanese
Army rose near Zhonghua Gate.” Judging from the outlook of the town shown in these photographs, it is to the west of the Zhonghua Gate. Since the fire was observable even from Zhongshan Street at the eastern end of the Safety Zone, it must have been huge enough to catch the attention of the people who stayed in the Safety Zone. Actually, John H.D. Rabe noted in his diary entry of December 12, 8 p.m., “The sky to the south is all in flames.” It was the night immediately prior to the fall of Nanking, and Nanking garrison commander Tang fled from the city about the same time. His escape was followed by the wholesale evacuation of the entire Chinese garrison. In the course of their retreat, the Chinese troops implemented the “scorched-earth” strategy of jianbi qingye to leave nothing behind after their evacuation. Although one cannot rule out the possibility of fire caused by Japanese combat actions, so far, no evidence has attributed the fire set around this time to the Japanese army.

Photo W

Photo W: “Fire at the South Gate street, Nanking.” Nankin kōryakusen shashinchō.

Photo W from the North China Daily News certainly shows smoke. But it was highly likely to be the smoke from the fire caused by the retreating Chinese troops on the night of December 12. It cannot be determined when this image was taken. It does not look like a scene of military engagement. The soldiers who appear to be marching in good order look like Japanese soldiers. Thus, one may assume that someone captured this image on or after December 13.
Photo 110: “A scene of arson by the Japanese army outside the South Gate.” QINHUA, p. 47
A part overlapped by another photograph
A portion deleted from the original

Photo 111: “Smoke from a huge fire set by the Japanese Army rose near Zhonghua Gate.”
RON-YY, p. 195.
A portion deleted from the original

Photo 112: “Forty-two percent of the buildings were lost to arson . . . .” REKISHI, p. 24.
A portion deleted from the original

*Ketteiban Shōwa-shi* [History of Showa: Ddefinitive Version], vol. 8, and the February 1938 issue of *Rekishi shashin* [Historical Photographs] carried the identical photo. The latter’s caption reads, “On South Gate Street inside the Nanking wall was a sandbag barricade constructed by the Chinese army.  Far behind is a flame as a result of military engagements.” Again, the main focus at this point was on the Chinese barricade.

In summary, one may conclude that there is no evidence to corroborate the content of the captions of Photos 110-112 that blame the fire shown in the photographs on the Japanese. Rather, it is much more probable that the smoke originated from the fire caused by the retreating Chinese army. This is a good example of one photographic image being retouched by someone to serve an ulterior motive.
Ron-Yy and Ron-I both carry Photo 113, and respective captions read, “More refugees fled into the Safety Zone as the horror of Japanese atrocity grew” and “During the massacre thousands of Chinese refugees fled into the Nanking Safety Zone.” As for Photo 114, it appeared in Kōnichi kaihō no Chūgoku [China in Resistance Against Japan and in Liberation]. Close examination of these two reveals, however, that the people are wearing summer clothes, and that the soldiers’ pants were short and appeared to be those of British servicemen. The caps worn by the military men were different from those of the Japanese as well. Furthermore, the truth is that there were no foreigners standing on guard duty with a handgun in Nanking. Thus, these are not the scenes of Nanking under Japanese occupation.

Photo 114

Photo 113

Photo 113: Ron-Yy’s caption says, “During the massacre thousands of Chinese refugees fled into the Nanking Safety Zone.” Judging from the summer clothes worn by the crowd and the vehicles on the street, it is most likely a scene of Shanghai.

Photo 114: Kōnichi kaihō no Chūgoku explains this as a scene “in Nanking 1937.” This photograph was, however, featured on the September 13, 1937, issue of Newsweek magazine. In addition, the presence of many people in white-colored summer clothes as well as British servicemen in shorts clearly indicates that the picture was taken during the summer.
Photo 115 was included in SND with the caption “The Japanese army in occupation of Nanking. (Provided by the Mainichi Newspaper.)” But the soldiers in short pants, one visible with a non-Japanese pistol, and wearing British army-style head cover, look like British soldiers. It is most likely a scene from Shanghai.

Photo 115: “The Japanese army in occupation of Nanking.” SND, p. 43. The (shorts wearing) soldier with a handgun on the left looks like a British serviceman. Most likely, this is a scene of Shanghai, not Nanking.
Chapter 4: Misleading use of the Photographs of Known Origins

Images Photographed by the Westerners (1): Magee photos

(a) Why Magee did not present his visual evidence to the IMTFE

John G. Magee, a missionary of the U.S. Episcopal Church, has been a subject of discussion several times in the preceding chapters. Magee was in Nanking from 1912 to 1940, and recorded some scenes of the Japanese occupation of the city with his 16-milimeter video camera. This motion picture is a precious document that captured the realities of Nanking at the time. Most of the photographs known as “Magee photos” are the still images of this motion picture taken by him.

Magee testified to the systematic killing of the Japanese army at the IMTFE as a witness and mentioned his moving images as evidence. He said that the Japanese had committed rape at many locations, and that they had murdered numerous women and children. He also said that the Japanese stabbed to death women who resisted rape attempts, and added that he had captured moving as well as still images of these scenes.

Had Magee’s visual materials included the scenes of these criminal acts, they would have constituted definitive evidence to authenticate the Japanese atrocities. Nevertheless, despite his reference to his own visual records, he did not present them to the IMTFE as court evidence. One may wonder why he did not.

In the following analysis, one should keep in his/her mind that unlike the video-cameras of today the Magee film contains only visual images and is without any accompanying sound, which would give the viewers valuable clue to ascertain the time and location of the filming.

The so-called “Magee film,” which is preserved at the National Archives and Records Administration of the United States, is comprised of 39 segments. The first one and half a minutes of the film depicts scenes prior to the Japanese occupation, that is, (1) a residential street with Western-style houses, (2) Xiakuan, (3) a group of people—either military men or civilians—running in an open field, (4) three vehicles entering from the outside of the city walls through the Zhongshan Gate, and (5) a large building in flame and turning out smoke. Then, the scenes after the Japanese entry into the city follow: (6) a scene that was recorded through a window, (7) a missionary speaking to Chinese nationals, (8) a man standing in front of a house, (9) through (24) scenes of a hospital, showing some 16 patients in all, (25) women walking in a group, (26) through (38) scenes of a hospital, which depict some 13 patients in all, and (39) an old woman who stood close to some dead bodies that were wrapped with cloths or straw mats.

As this breakdown reveals, most of the “Magee film” is composed of the shots of hospitals and wounded people there. Neither these nor other parts of the film depict gruesome scenes as suggested by Magee’s testimony at the IMTFE. In other words, it cannot stand as conclusive evidence to authenticate the alleged Japanese massacre in Nanking. One may thus speculate that this lack of probative value was a major reason
why Magee did not present it to the court as evidence. Even if his film did not capture critical moments of atrocities, he should have presented it to the court as corroborative evidence if he had indeed witnessed Japanese atrocities.

Many Westerners in Nanking were aware of this “Magee film.” Miner S. Bates, who also testified at the IMTFE, was one of them. So were George A. Fitch, who used the “Magee film” during his lecture tour in the United States, and those who watched the film in Fitch’s lectures. Thus, those viewers could have served as witnesses to lend credence to the “Magee film” if Magee had attempted to have his film deposited as evidence to the IMTFE. Nevertheless, he did not do so. This fact seemingly testifies to the lack of confidence on the part of Magee and Bates in the probative value of the film. One may even speculate that Magee failed to have his film introduced to the court because he was afraid that the actual demonstration of the film might discredit his verbal testimony at the court.

(b) Subtitles to produce a propaganda effect

Quite a few people have treated the “Magee film” as definitive evidence of the alleged Rape of Nanking from the time of the IMTFE through to the present. Although there are several hypotheses with respect to who really masterminded such a highlighted use of the film, the research team will not make any probe into this subject since it is beyond the purview of this book’s topic.

The first to use the “Magee film” on the media was Harold J. Timperly. Prior to the publication of his *What War Means*, he exchanged correspondences with Bates and Stanley K. Hornbeck, then chief of the U.S. State Department’s Far Eastern division. In the letter to the two dated February 16, 1938, Timperly said that he had deleted some unnecessary segments of the film and inserted subtitles to it so that the viewers could understand the scenes recorded there. Timperly added that the insertion of the subtitles had animated the film, and that its effect would become clear if one actually saw it. He also said that he had been contemplating some brilliant ideas for a few days after he had seen Magee’s film, which George A. Fitch had brought to him.

In summary, what is known today as the “Magee film” is a modified version of Magee’s original voiceless motion picture with the addition of subtitles. As examples of how the insertion of subtitles may affect the viewer’s impression, four of the oft-used still images of the “Magee film” will be shown in the following. Since RON-YY attaches captions to these images as well, the research team will comment on them as well.

Photo 116: One of the “Magee photos”: a scene photographed through a window.
Magee’s film (MF; what follows is a subtitle given by Timperly to the original Magee film): Thousands of civilians were taken in this way, bound with ropes, carried to the river banks, to the edges of ponds and to vacant space where they were gone to death by machine-guns, bayonets, rifles, and even hand-grenades. Chinese women kneel before Japanese soldiers as they beg for lives of their menfolk, seized on suspicion of being ex-soldiers.

RON-YY (p. 77): Chinese women knelt before Japanese soldiers and begged that their menfolk not be seized. They watched as their men were taken away on suspicion of being ex-soldiers and marched to their deaths.

Photo 116 may depict a scene where the Japanese army was separating former military men from civilians. One cannot verify the presence of “thousands of civilians” “bound with ropes.” That they were killed “by machine guns, bayonets, rifles, and even hand-grenades” was a mere speculation.

Magee told the IMTFE that he had seen the Japanese taking away 60 to 70 men by overriding the plea by an old man to release them, and added that he had photographed this scene. One may wonder why he did not present that photograph to the court as evidence.
MF: After having been beaten by Japanese soldiers with an iron bar, this 13-year old boy was bayoneted in the head.

RON-YY (p. 138): This 14-year-old boy had been forced to labor for the Japanese troops for three weeks. When he asked for food after two days without eating, he was stabbed with a bayonet on his body and face and beaten on the head with an iron rod.

Photo B: A 13-year-old boy featured in one of the “Magee photos.”

John H.D. Rabe quoted Jin Songpan, who had eight field hospitals outside the Safety Zone under his command, as saying: “. . . most of them [the wounded housed at these hospitals] . . . have wounded themselves in order to get out of danger.” According to Jin, only the lightly wounded were in these hospitals. When Jin asked Rabe “to place those with self-inflicted wounds inside” the Safety Zone, Rabe said it would be “contrary to our [their] agreement,” but referred him to “Dr. Trimmer, the chairman of our [their] medical division at Kulou [Gulou] hospital.” Thus, many of those wounded men may have been transferred from field hospitals to the Gulou hospital prior to the fall of the city. One should also take into consideration a special privilege offered by the hospital—those who claimed to have been victimized by Japanese soldiers were entitled to free medical treatment.

It is worth noting here that the “Daily Reports of Serious Injuries to Civilians” does not include any case that corresponds to the instance of this boy shown on Photo 117.
* Magee photo (3)

MF: Group of women refugees moving from one camp to another in search of greater safety.

RON-YY (p. 228): Group of 300 women living in the international Safety Zone escorted by an American to be registered with Japanese authorities. Although the Safety Zone protected thousands of people from being killed, it concentrated large numbers of women together, which facilitated sexual assaults on them by the Japanese Army.

Photo 118

Photo 118: One of the “Magee photos,” which, according to its caption, depicts women moving “from one camp to another in search of greater safety.” An enlarged image, however, shows that these women were smiling.

These passages suggest that these women were attempting to escape from danger by moving to another refugee camp. Yet, the enlarged image—Photo 118—shows smiling faces of these women. The scene which Magee captured was therefore not the one characterized by a tense atmosphere.
* Magee photo (4)

MF: This entire family was massacred by the Japanese when they entered the city. Two of the women were raped and then put to death—one of them was in a particularly horrible fashion.

RON-YY (p. 186): Xia Shu-qin’s home after the catastrophe. Her family and a Muslim family, totaling 13 persons including babies and grandparents, lived there when Japanese troops stormed in. Only she and her younger sister survived. According to John Rabe’s account of the incident, the soldiers raped Xia Shu-qin’s mother and two older sisters before killing them. This scene was filmed by Rev. John G. Magee, a member of the International committee for Nanking Safety Zone.

Photo 119: One of the “Magee photos”
This photograph has been cited as evidence to corroborate the story of 11 slain people in the family of Xia Shuqin and in the family of their landlord. The story was supposedly recounted to Magee by Xia Shuqin—then an eight-year-old girl who had survived an alleged Japanese atrocity—and by her uncle, as well as by an old woman in her neighbor, who first found the aftermath of the atrocity. According to the January 25, 1938, entry in the record of Ernest H. Forster, the earliest date when Magee could take the image of these dead bodies was January 25, 1938—one and a half months after December 13, 1937, when the incident is said to have occurred. On this day, the old woman guided Magee to the site of the alleged carnage.

Some 50 years later, a testimony of Wang Zhiru, who is said to have been Xia’s neighbor at the time, was quoted in a Rape of Nanking survivor account collection published in 1995. According to the account of Wang, who was 72 years of age when she gave her testimony for the publication, she fled to a refugee camp and returned to her house more than 20 days later to find the dead bodies. Wang said that she conducted funeral service for them promptly. On the same book, Xia Shuqin, 55, identified Wang as her aunt.

If these accounts described the truth, then 24-year-old Wang was the first to find the people who had been massacred, and was the one who guided Magee to the scene. The woman shown on the photograph, however, does not appear to be 24 years of age. In addition, although Wang said that she had arranged the funeral service for them quickly, it was one and a half months later that she supposedly brought Magee to the spot for him to record these dead bodies on his film. If the photograph had truly depicted an aftermath of a Japanese atrocity, Magee should have submitted it to the IMTFE. Again, he did not do so.

(c) Another “Magee Film” emerged

Magee did not submit any portion of the “Magee Film” as evidence of the massacre. Nevertheless, that Magee took these pictures in Nanking has been more accentuated, and this fact has added more credibility to this film as historical document. Such was possibly a background for the emergence of another version of the “Magee Film” in the United States in 1991.

The film, which the Alliance in Memory of Victims of the Nanjing Massacre produced under the title of “Magee’s Testament,” features accounts provided by David Magee—John G. Magee’s son—and contains the image of the dead bodies in a pond—a photograph which a preceding chapter has examined—as well as the scenes of Japan and Shanghai prior to the outbreak of the hostility. The film, however, does not contain any segments that clearly show the massacre or other atrocious conducts perpetrated by the Japanese. In addition, it includes some scenes that were apparently not those of Nanking. For example, “Magee’s Testament” explains Photos 120 and 121, which appear in sequence, as scenes of the Nanking Safety Zone. Photo 121, however, shows a uniformed Westerner, who could never be in the Safety Zone in Nanking. Also, one can see a railway line in the back. Thus, this image is highly likely to have captured the scene of Shanghai.
RON-YY’s editors copied this error because its caption to Photo 120 reads “During the first few days of Japanese occupation, about 200,000 refugees, including many disarmed Chinese soldiers, fled into the Safety Zone.”

Photo 122

Photo 120

Photo 121

Photo 120: RON-YY’s caption identifies this location as the “safety zone.” “Magee’s Testament” also includes this clip.

Photo 121: A clip in “Magee’s Testament.”

Photo 122: RON-YY, p. 204.

There are other similar instances of images taken in Shanghai being misused as those that depict the scenes of Nanking. RON-YY, for example, includes three photographs as shown in Photo 122 with a caption “Ruins and damaged building left by the Japanese Army arson.” A 1938 Japanese publication entitled Chūshi no tenbō [Prospect of central China], however, contains photographs that capture the same locations, which were all in Shanghai—the uppermost one was a building in Dachangzhen in northern Shanghai, the one immediately underneath was a building of the Shanghai municipal government, and the image on the lower right shows pillboxes reinforced with sandbags in Zhabei.
(d) Ulterior motive behind the inclusion of “Rev. John G. Magee” in captions

The Magee film has seemingly become a sanctified piece of visual evidence without undergoing careful scrutiny, and has acquired such a magical power as to disallow any form of question regarding its authenticity or validity as historical evidence. A case in point is the large number of photographs—71 in all—credited as “Rev. John G. Magee” on RON-YY. Of these 71, 30 are from the “Magee Film,” ten from “Magee’s Testament,” and 31 from other sources. That 31 photographs originated from sources other than the two films connected with Magee means Magee took yet other images. But whether or not Magee indeed photographed all these images credited with his name on RON-YY is an open question.

For example, Photos 123 and 124 are apparently of a different nature from those still images taken from the “Magee Film” as already summarized earlier in this chapter. The only common feature is that these are also still images taken from motion picture. Predictably, neither the “Magee Film” as preserved at the U.S. National Archives and Records Administration nor “Magee’s Testament” includes these shots. Thus, these are obviously not from either one of these moving images. Possibly, Magee took these still images separately from his motion pictures, and RON-YY obtained them through a certain channel. If so, the photo credit should have been “Courtesy of John G. Magee.” But the photo credit on RON-YY reads only “Rev. John G. Magee.”

Original sources of 71 photographs credited with “Rev. John G. Magee” in RON-YY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>分類項目</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>「マギー＝フィルム」に確認できるもの</td>
<td>30</td>
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<tr>
<td>「マギーの証言」に確認できるもの</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>「パトル＝オブ・チャイナ」によるもの</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>「日支暴行実録」にあるもの</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>「ライフ」／「パトル＝オブ・チャイナ」</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>上記以外のもの／不明</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
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<td>計</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
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*分類にさいしてはこの表の優先順位で振り分けた。例えば、「パトル＝オブ・チャイナ」に出てくる写真も、上位の「マギー＝フィルム」に出ていれば「マギー＝フィルム」に算入した*
One may even speculate that the editors of RON-YY inserted this credit to make these photographs appear more credible as evidence.

Photo 123


Images Photographed by the Westerners (2): Photographs of Archibald Steele

Archibald Steele was a correspondent of the Chicago Daily News. Upon his departure from Nanking on December 15, 1937, he wired his “Nanking Massacre Story,” which became front-page news on the same day issue of the Chicago Daily News. The content of the article, however, resembles the first chapter of Timperly’s What War Means most likely because his news source was Miner S. Bates, who actually penned that very chapter of Timperly’s book. Recent research has also revealed that there was a wide
discrepancy between the realities in Nanking on the one hand and what Steele described in his article on the other. (See Nankin “gyakustsu” kenkyū no saizensen, 2003 issue, p. 275.)

The research team identified 13 photographs of Steele. Of these 13, two were not the scenes of Nanking as Steele himself said. Of the remaining 11 which he took in Nanking, six depict locations in front of the Zhonghua Gate. Somehow, none of these photographs appeared in his articles on the paper. RON-YY, however, used these photo

![Photo D and Photo 125](Images)

Photos 125 and D: RON-YY, p. 44. Both of them—Photo 125 as printed in RON-YY, p. 44, and Photo D, included in Nankin-jiken shiryō-shū (I)—depict the Zhonghua Gate although the latter source incorrectly identifies this as the Zhongshan Gate. The identical Chinese ideograph is seen painted on the wall in both images.
pieces in its own ways. For example, Photo 125 is on RON-YY under the following caption:

A scene at Yijiang Gate. A few days before, fleeing civilians and defeated Chinese soldiers had converged on the city’s gates, like this one in the north wall, hoping to cross the Yangtze to safety. As their numbers grew, the Japanese began shelling and the gates became death traps. Entangled in the debris of artillery fire, abandoned weapons, bedding, and broken vehicles, masses of struggling soldiers and civilian refugees, pack animals and pushcarts were trapped in the narrow passage, already blocked by piles of dead bodies.

The truth is, however, this gate is not the Yijiang Gate in the northern walls of the city. Although it is not clear on Photo 125, one can recognize a Chinese symbol of 仁 on Photo D, which is included in Nanking jiken shiryō-shū (I): Amerika-kankei shiryō-hen [Nanking incident source material collection: sources available in the United States] and shows the same gate—even though this source incorrectly identifies this gate as the Zhongshan Gate.

As discussed in chapter 1—and as Steele also mentioned in his article—dead bodies filled the area around the Yijiang Gate. Most likely because this fact occupied their minds, the editors of RON-YY rushed to conclude that the gate on the photograph was the Yijiang Gate.

The Zhonghua Gate was a scene of an intense military engagement. If the bodies left on the spot had been those that belonged to the soldiers or civilians unlawfully massacred by the Japanese army, the Japanese military personnel shown on the photograph would have kept the area off limit and would not have allowed anyone to photograph the area. The truth is, however, Steele took as many as six shots of the gate area. Furthermore, as will be discussed later, another individual took photographs of the same location.

Judging from the latitude allowed to these media crew, those dead bodies depicted on the image were the military men killed in action. Probably, this was the major reason why none of his photographs accompanied his articles. Since he recognized these bodies as military casualties, not the victims of massacre, he did not use that photo in the “Nanking Massacre Story” article.

NDG captioned Photo 126 as “Three Japanese soldiers taking away a Chinese soldier whose hands were tied in the back. At the Zhonghua Gate area.” Likewise, RON-YY’s caption reads “A Chinese soldier who laid down his arms and hid in the city is rounded up by Japanese army men and marched to his death.” Although Steele himself only speculated that the Japanese had shot that Chinese man to death, these captions highly likely give readers an impression that his death in the hands of the Japanese was a foregone conclusion.
Photo 126: RON-YY, which features this photograph on p. 57, does not credit this to Steele. NDG, however, carries the same image and credits it to Steele on p. 109.

Photo 127 is another Steele photograph printed in *Nankin jiken shiryō-shū* (I). This source quoted him as saying that this was an image taken during the Japanese army’s mopping-up operation in Nanking, and that arson was a probable cause of the smoke in the back. As for Photo 128, SND credited the Memorial Hall as its courtesy provider and mentioned Steele as its photographer. Judging from common objects shown on these two images—the smoke in the back and a sign board reading Wuhejiangyuan—they depict the same location on the same date. What is notable on Photo 128 is that it shows two of the four Japanese soldiers looking at the camera. The implication here is that these Japanese military men tolerated what Steele did—to take photographs of them. Had these Japanese soldiers been committing an unlawful act which they did not want him to photograph, they would have restrained him, or even would have confiscated his film. That they did not take away Steele’s film suggests that these Japanese soldiers were conducting a lawful military operation—a mopping-up operation that the troops in occupation of a town need to conduct. They tolerated Steele’s photographing activity because they had no qualm about allowing him to record their legitimate military activities with his camera.
But SND, seemingly by pouncing on the word “arson” in Steele’s explanation, charged that the Japanese army started systematic burning of housings in Nanking after its entry into the city in order to force out straggling soldiers from the buildings. According to SND, some ex-Japanese soldiers recounted that the Japanese military men set afire buildings everywhere. Thus, SND took the word “arson” out of the context of Steele’s original explanation to emphasize the licentious nature of the alleged Japanese arson.

It is, however, obvious that the smoke is seen in the distance, and those houses nearby which the Japanese soldiers allegedly set afire at random were not burning at all. In reality, according to Nanking special service report, no. 3, compiled in March 1938, the fire-extinguishing unit formed by the Japanese army’s tokumu kikan [special service] was called out 101 times between January and March of 1938 to perform its duty. The truth was that the Japanese army was rather busy putting out the fire caused by the Chinese soldiers in hiding by mobilizing this newly formed unit. The origin of the smoke seen on these photographs was highly likely to be the scorched-earth strategy of the Chinese troops.
Images Photographed by the Westerners (3): Photographs of Ernest H. Forster

Rev. Ernest H. Forster was a missionary of the U.S. Episcopal Church. Dozens of photographs of his, including Photos 129 and 130, have been in use as evidence of the alleged Rape of Nanking.

Photo 129 depicts what looks like a peaceful scene. A patient, whether sick or wounded, is seen transported on a stretcher to a white building. According to Forster’s explanation on the original photograph preserved at Yale University, the building was a temporary medical center established within the compounds of a cement factory at Qixia Mountain, and he took this image in March 1938. Since the conditions in Nanking had become mostly stabilized by March, it is no wonder that this scene looks peaceful.

In *Nankin nanmin-ku no hyakunichi* [100 days in the Nanking refugee zone] by Kasahara Tokushi, however, the same image appears in a section that describes the condition in Nanking immediately after its fall on December 13, 1937, under a caption reading “Victims carried into a hospital.” Furthermore, Kasahara entered to the next of the caption the following quote from a *New York Times* article written by F. Tillman:

As for RON-YY, it attached the following caption to Photo 129: “An emergency station set up by International Red Cross Nanking Council at the foot of Qixia Mountain, where wounded Chinese civilians were carried in and treated. This photo was taken by Rev. Ernest H. Forster in March 1938. Three months after Nanking’s fall, the killing had not stopped.” Although this caption provides the location and the date correctly, the passage, “the killing had not stopped,” seems to be a mere speculation.

The *Documents on the Nanking Safety Zone* actually contains a memorandum that touched on the conditions at this location. The memorandum contains a report submitted by a Danish national named B. A. Sindberg to the ICNSZ on February 3, 1938, with the following foreword: “This letter was received from the temple of Tsitsashan [Qixia Mountain], situated about 5 miles from my residence and is written by one of the high priests, and signed by 20 reputable local residents.” The report then lists cases of robbery, rape, and murder allegedly committed by the Japanese troops. A former Japanese soldier, however, countervailed this testimony. That soldier, who was among the Japanese military men stationed at that cement factory, said that no criminal incidents occurred there since the Japanese soldiers did not have any contact with the local population. Furthermore, even this memorandum stated that “About January 20 a new detachment of troops arrived . . . . Since his [the lieutenant in charge of the troops] arrival things have been a good deal better.” Therefore, the situation at Qixia Mountain became quiet after January 20, 1938. This statement in Sindberg’s report effectively denies the content of RON-YY’s caption that says “Three months after Nanking’s fall, the killing had not stopped.”
Photo 129: “This photo was taken by Rev. Ernest H. Forster in March 1938. Three months after Nanking’s fall, the killing had not stopped.” RON-YY, p. 235.

Durdin: “Some of the victims were aged men, women and children. . . . Any person who ran because of fear or excitement was likely to be killed on the spot.” In addition, he did not provide any data of the photograph—where and when it was taken. Although the actual location of the photo image—Qixia Mountain—was far away from the Nanking city proper and was even outside of the city’s administrative jurisdiction, those who read these explanations on Kasahara’s book are likely to conclude that someone took that photograph in the Nanking Safety Zone on December 13. They may well accept it as the real scene of a hospital in the city and even see those people on the stretchers as victims of Japanese atrocities.

In summary, Kasahara on the one hand used Photo 129 in his publication without specifying its location or date of photographing, seemingly to impress the readers that there were victims of atrocities as early as December 13—the date of the Japanese occupation of the city. The editors of RON-YY, on the other hand, printed the same photograph on their book to advance their theory that the killing by the Japanese continued even three months after the fall of the city.
As for Photo 130, RON-YY said, “On March 17, 1938, at the Nanking Pacific Hotel, a Japanese soldier captured a child and searched him for valuables.” The original of this photograph preserved at Yale University’s Divinity School, is however, with a caption that identified the uniformed man on the photograph simply as a Japanese soldier quartered at the Pacific Hotel in Nanking, March 17, 1938. Although RON-YY correctly noted the time and location, it added a statement of arbitrary speculation—“a Japanese soldier captured a child and searched him for valuables.” In addition, a closer look at the original reveals that there is another Japanese soldier on the right edge of the image. Also, that soldier seems to be about to give something to the child rather than rob him.

Photo 130

写真130

Photo 130: “. . . a Japanese soldier captured a child and searched him for valuables.”
The readers are advised to imagine the moment when Forster photographed this scene. What would Forster have done if he had seen a Japanese soldier robbing the child? Instead of taking a snapshot, he would have protested strongly against that act. The reality was, however, he did take Photo 130, most likely because the Japanese soldier did not commit any abominable act.

A more careful look at the photo reveals that the sentry depicted there is seen smiling a little, possibly being aware of Forster’s camera. It seems that the child only happened to be sitting in the back. One can see no expression of fear on the child’s face. Furthermore, that a child could be in such a location where Japanese soldiers were on guard duty is testimonial to the degree of safety in Nanking at the time.

**Images Photographed by the Japanese (1): Photographs of Satō Shinju**

Satō Shinju accompanied the Japanese troops to Nanking as a war correspondent of the *Tokyo Nichinichi Newspaper* (today’s *Mainichi Newspaper*) and took some 100 photographs.

Photo 131 is his snapshot of two second lieutenants—Mukai Toshiaki and Noda Tsuyoshi—at the eastern gate of Changzhou, to the east of Nanking, in late November 1937. As seen on Photo A, Photo 131 is printed with a *Tokyo Nichinichi Newspaper*’s article on its December 13 issue. This was the fourth of an article series that started on November 10 and featured these two second lieutenants who, according to the story, competed with each other to kill 100 opponents first with their sword. The *Tokyo Nichinichi Newspaper* carried this article series for a morale boosting purpose at wartime.

Nevertheless, the military court in Nanking tried and convicted these two Japanese officers after the war by adopting these articles as evidence. Since Asami Kazuo, a correspondent who penned these articles, failed to admit to the fictional nature of the article story, the Nanking court had the two officers shot to death in a public execution on January 28, 1948.

Later investigations have proved that the story of the *Tokyo Nichinichi Newspaper* articles was indeed a fiction. In addition, the details of this episode are beyond the scope of this book’s topic. Therefore, the focus here will be on the role that this photograph played in the media reporting of this episode.

The newspaper article shown on Photo A contains the following passage: “Two second lieutenants of Mukai Toshiaki and Noda Tsuyoshi extended their score of killing to 106 and 105, respectively, during the battle to capture the Zijin Mountain. At the noon of December 10, they faced each other again holding their swords marked with some nicks.”

Imagine that this article were without Photo 131. Then, the readers might well detect an element of fiction in the story, or at least question its authenticity. Only a small number of readers would be likely to accept this story as a genuine one. The accompanying photograph, however, may increase the degree of the story’s truthfulness drastically because the readers are likely to assume that someone who captured that image of these two men, “holding their swords marked with some nicks,” truly faced them “at the noon of December 10.”
Photo 131: Second Lieutenants Noda Tsuyoshi (right) and Mukai Toshiaki (left). Photographed at the eastern gate of Changzhou, to the east of Nanking, in late November 1937. (Courtesy of Noda Masa).

Photo A: “Two officers competing with each other to first kill 100: Noda Tsuyoshi (right) and Mukai Toshiaki (left). Photographed by correspondent Satō [Shinju] at Changzhou.”

Tokyo Nichinichi Newspaper, 13 December 1937.

The Tokyo Nichinichi Newspaper certainly entered a fine print that made clear who took that image at what location—correspondent Satō Shinju at Changzhou, about 100km east of Nanking. But there was no description of date. Such an insufficient explanation almost surely misled the readers. Thus, the Tokyo Nichinichi Newspaper should be held accountable for having used Photo 131, which was actually taken in late November, as if it had been a snapshot at the noon of December 10.

The Asahi Newspaper started a journal article series entitled “Chūgoku no tabi” [trip in China] by Honda Katsuichi in August 1971—about one year prior to the normalization of Sino-Japanese diplomatic relationship in September the following year. A November 5, 1971, article in this series featured the story of this alleged killing contest
with a headline “Two Second lieutenants in Competition.” The article quoted Jiang Genfu of Nanking as saying that this story was also well known in Japan because of media coverage. Honda thus introduced this episode as a story recounted by a Chinese national. This fact means that the content of the Tokyo Nichinichi Newspaper article series was familiar also to the population in China. Although Honda did not include in his journal article Photo A, which was printed on the Tokyo Nichinichi Newspaper article, he did use it in his Chūgoku no tabi and Chūgoku no nihon-gun, which were published in March and July of the following year, respectively.

Photo B


A major problem in Honda’s use of the Tokyo Nichinichi Newspaper article series was the lack of his text critique. Authors Suzuki Akira and Yamamoto Shichihei discussed the fictional elements in the articles academically in their respective publications like Nankin daigyakusatsu no maboroshi [Illusion of the Rape of Nanking] and Watashi no naka no nihon-gun [Japanese army within myself]. Another source worth quoting here is a will letter written by Noda Tsuyoshi, one of these second lieutenants. His sister Noda Masa discovered this letter in the spring of 2001 at the bottom of a box belonging to her,
and she found the following passage in the letter: “My military duty would never have allowed me to commit an act like the alleged 100-man killing contest.”

A countless number of publications have merely quoted the *Tokyo Nichinichi Newspaper* article series and its photograph as evidence of the alleged killing competition in disregard of countervailing evidence like Noda’s letter. One can see the end result of this irresponsible use of the articles and the photograph at the Memorial Hall in Nanking, where Photo 131 as enlarged to the real-life size is on display.

Careful study of this episode must begin with the critique of the *Tokyo Nichinichi Newspaper* article series by setting aside its accompanying photograph—Photo 131.

One final note about this article is that the *Mainichi Newspaper*, as renamed from the *Tokyo Nichinichi Newspaper* after World War II, stated in its 1989 publication *Shōwa-shi zenkiroku* [Complete record of the Showa era]: *Chronicle 1926-1989* that the “100-man killing contest turned out to be a fiction.”

Photo 132 is another example of how a different caption sends a totally different message to the viewers. Referring to this image, QINHUA, specifying the date as December 15, 1937, said, “The Japanese troops carried away properties robbed from the population in Nanking with the use of a variety of wagons including baby buggies.” Satō, who took this image, however, furnished a totally different account as regards its context. In “Nankin jiken” nihonjin 48-nin no shōgen [Nanking Incident: Accounts by 48 Japanese eye-witnesses] by Ara Ken’ichi, he was quoted as saying,

> Caption may change drastically the impression which its viewers may obtain from a photograph. One of the photographs I took on the 15th [of December 1937] inside the Nanking city walls shows Japanese soldiers carrying baggage in their back. It also depicts one of them using a baby buggy. The baggage of the soldiers was heavy... I know about it very well. The soldiers I saw there were walking with drooping shoulders, seemingly because they had lost tension after their triumphant entry into the city. I understood very well how they felt, and I captured this scene to show such an after-battle demeanor of the soldiers to prospective viewers. Nevertheless, quite a few sources later captioned this image as “Japanese soldiers carrying requisitioned items.”

Certainly, a baby baggy could not be a property of a soldier. Someone who felt extremely tired after a battle probably stole it somewhere to facilitate his walk with heavy baggage, weighing some 30 kilograms, on his back. Nevertheless, the fact remains that Satō, who himself had difficulty in walking after he had hyper-extended his knee at the town of Wuxi, took this image out of his sympathy to the soldiers dragging their feet with a heavy load on their back. In summary, this photograph cannot serve as a proof to authenticate the robbery of private properties allegedly committed by the Japanese soldiers in Nanking.
Photo 132: “Exhausted Japanese soldiers dragging their feet with their baggage. A soldier
in front is drawing a baby baggy while some soldiers in the background are seen loading
their baggage on a mule cart (15 December 1937).” *Ichikoku-nin no Shōwa-shi*, vol. 10, p. 84. QINHUA, however, attaches the following caption to the same photograph on p. 45:
“The Japanese army carted away properties they had looted from the population on a
variety of vehicles including baby baggies on December 15, 1937. Quoted from Hora
Tomio, *Nankin datgyakusatsu*.”
Fudō Kenji was a war correspondent of Dōmei News Agency of Japan at the time. Some sources have used two of his photographs in a way to mislead the viewers.

Photo 133 appeared on *Nihon Shashin-shi: 1840-1945* [History of Japanese photography: 1840-1945] under a caption “Sino-Japanese War. Central China. The Nanking Massacre committed by the Japanese army. By Fudō Kenji. December 1937.” RON-YY’s caption of the same image reads, “Zhongshan Road and Zhongyang Road became killing fields.” The location depicted on this image was, however, not the Zhongshan Road or the Zhongyang Road. Satō Shinju—whom the previous section mentioned—and Matsuo Kunizo—a cameraman of the *Osaka Mainichi Newspaper*, whose

Photo 133: *Nihon Shashin-shi: 1840-1945*, p. 318. This image depicts the outside of the Nanking city walls around the Zhonghua West Gate area (in the background) to the Zhonghua Gate. A caption reading “Zhongshan Road and Zhongyang Road became killing fields” accompanies the same photograph reprinted in RON-YY, p. 57, with the portion of the city walls blurred.
Photographs will be introduced in the next section—photographed the same scene where many hanging electric cables were visible. So did Steele of the Chicago Daily News. Judging from these photographs, Photo 133 most likely depicts the scene outside the city walls around the western Zhonghua Gate or the Zhonghua Gate.

A crucial question is whether or not the dead bodies shown on the photograph were those of the people massacred by the Japanese troops. The analysis of one of Archibald Steele’s photographs in a preceding section determined that the corpses outside the Zhonghua Gate were those of combat casualties. A Japanese soldier’s story included in 1937 Nankin kōryakusen no shinjitsu corroborates this conclusion. This soldier of the 6th Division said,

The Ishida Platoon advanced bit by bit in the intervals of the enemy’s fire to the immediate vicinity of the Zhonghua Gate. My platoon coordinated its move with Ishida’s to advance to the line of a creek. This operation more or less wiped out the enemy positioned around the creek. Later, we counted about 250 dead bodies in the area.

This recollection, which he made two years after the Nanking battle, indicates that the area outside the Zhonghua Gate was littered with a number of soldiers killed in action. Satō Shinju, who photographed the same scene, also said,

Although Fudō Kenji of Dōmei News Agency photographed the same scene, he explained this as an aftermath of the massacre. His photograph that appeared in a publication shortly after the war (Nihon shashin-shi: 1840-1945) was with a caption to that effect. Matsuo Kunizō of the Osaka Mainichi Newspaper and I captioned the photographs of the same scene as the Chinese combat casualties. . . . I know Mr. Fudō very well, and I have never heard any story of the massacre in Nanking from him. . . . I was told that he had given that photo to someone who was wishing to obtain photographic evidence of the atrocities.

A close look at Fudō’s photograph—Photo 134 as printed on Zusetsu Shōwa no rekishi [Illustrated history of the Showa era]—indeed reveals that there was a dead man wearing a helmet. That they were the bodies of Chinese soldiers who fell in the battle is beyond any doubt. Nevertheless, the caption attached to Photo 134 as printed on Zusetsu Shōwa no rekishi says, “The Nanking massacre and a POW camp: a one-month period following the occupation of Nanking reportedly saw the destruction by arson of one third of the city’s buildings, over 20,000 cases of rape, and slaughter of some 200,000 POWs and civilians.”

One further analysis of those dead bodies outside the Zhonghua Gate will follow later in this chapter.
Photo 134: Zusetu Shōwa no rekishi, p. 59. In the foreground, a dead body of a soldier wearing a helmet.

Photo 135, which is comprised of three images, appeared on the fifth volume of Gahō kindai hyakunen-shi [Pictorial history of a modern century], which was published in 1952. Its caption says,

It is Mr. Fudō, chief editor of this series, who took these photographs when he was accompanying the Nakajima Division [the 16th Division under the command of Lieutenant-General Nakajima Kesago] as a correspondent. These images are available to the public for the first time on this volume. Upon their entry into Nanking, the Japanese troops—principally the Nakajima Division—perpetrated the most horrible atrocity in modern history in the course of their mopping-up operation in the city.

In addition, the following caption is attached to these three photographs: “A group of captives who could not be identified either as ex-military men or as civilians, and the bodies of those who were massacred.”
The same photographs were reprinted on the Japanese translation of Edgar Snow’s *Battle for Asia* published in 1956 as shown on Photo C. Its caption says, “These three photographs depict a group of captives who could not be identified either as ex-military men or as civilians, and the bodies of those who were executed.” RON-YY includes only one photograph at the bottom with a caption that identifies the dead bodies as “Victims of a killing on the outskirts of Nanking.”

A closer look at these three photographs, however, reveals some facts that may contradict the content of these captions. Although the photograph at the top shows a Japanese soldier holding a gun fixed with a bayonet, those POWs were not tied in their hands. Some of them are seen even smiling. The POWs depicted on the middle photograph were not tied in their hands, either. Furthermore, the Japanese soldiers who seem to be watching them are not carrying any arms. The third photo at the bottom, the size of which is quite larger than the other two, shows dead bodies at an unknown location. Viewers who look at these three in sequence may well conjecture a dismal story of the ex-Chinese soldiers at a Japanese POW camp, that is, those POWs photographed on the first and second images were in the end executed as shown on the third.
Photos D and E: Still images from Inagaki Kiyoshi’s 9.5-milimeter movie.
Photo F: A POW camp photographed by Hayashi Tsuneo with Inagaki Kiyoshi’s camera

A piece of countervailing evidence was, however, unearthed in 2002. Among the record files of Inagaki Kiyoshi, who went to Nanking as a veterinary medic second lieutenant, was a 9.5-milimeter motion film—a film that had not been run for 66 years after Inagaki captured some scenes in Nanking on it. Higashinakano Shūdō detailed its content in his article “Kore demo ‘mina-goroshi’ to iu ka!: Nankin kōryakusen horyo shūyōjo no eizō hakken” [Can you still allege that wholesale killing occurred!: Discovery of moving images of POW camp after the Nanking campaign] on the February 2003 issue of the Setron magazine. The film contains scenes of a POW camp in Nanking as shown on
Photos D and E—still images of the motion film. Among Inagaki’s records is also a camera photograph—Photo F—which shows the same location. Judging from the outlook of the sign board reading “POW camp” in Japanese as well as mountains in the back on each of Fudō’s photograph as well as on Inagaki’s (Photo G), they obviously captured an identical location. Inagaki’s record pinpointed this location as Xiaqilinmen.

Photo D depicts a building that may have accommodated the POWs. On Photo E, a considerable number of men were seen moving up and down. One can even see a Japanese soldier lying on the ground on Photo F. It is extremely difficult to associate these scenes with the alleged indiscriminate and wholesale massacre of POWs. As these photos show, the Chinese POWs far outnumbered the Japanese soldiers supervising them. In reality, some POWs escaped from the camp after dusk by capitalizing on the loose security due to the lack of Japanese men watching over them. Given such a situation, if the alleged massacre of POWs had occurred day by day, the POWs would have rioted against the Japanese. But the impression one may obtain from these photographs is that a
much larger number POWs obeyed a smaller number of Japanese soldiers. The demeanor of the POWs suggests that there was no such large-scale killing of POWs.

The fact is that not only military correspondents but also ordinary Japanese soldiers freely photographed this POW camp. In addition, Chinese civilians passed in front of this location without any trouble. Taking all these considerations into account, one should determine this to be an ordinary POW camp. These photographs therefore constitute a piece of viable evidence to illustrate how the Japanese army treated Chinese POWs.

If the readers see these three photographs in Photo 135 together, they may well see a scene of “the most horrible atrocity in modern history.” Such is a magical effect which photographs may have on the viewers depending on how they are used.

Photo H

Photo H: “A POW camp inside the Suzhou city walls.” Mainichi-ban shina-jihen gahō, no. 13, 21 December 1937, p. 4. Photographed by Satō Shinju. Although no detailed explanation of this image is available, the viewer may speculate as to how the Japanese treated Chinese POWs at their camps. For example, some POWs are seen holding plates or cups. This image may serve as a corrective to the stereotypic notion that the Japanese army made a point of executing surrendering opponents rather than taking them as POWs.
Images Photographed by the Japanese (3): Photographs of Matsuo Kunizō

Matsuo Kunizō was a war correspondent cameraman of the *Osaka Mainichi Newspaper*. One photograph with a hand-written signature reading “Photographed by Matsuo” appeared on *Fukyoka shashin: sirizu 20-seiki no kiroku* [Photographs not permitted: Records of the 20th century series].

The phrase “photographs not permitted” may give the readers an impression that the Japanese military authorities prohibited their publication to cover up the malicious conducts of its own armed forces. But the real reason why the authorities disallowed their publication was their concern that the viewers might misconstrue the scenes depicted there if they were not provided with sufficient explanations. This underlying principle is universal internationally.

Photo I was stamped with a mark of the *Osaka Mainichi Newspaper* with a date—December 16—and another mark, “not permitted.” A hand-written letters on it read, “Aftermath of severe battle in front of the South Gate. Photographed by Matsuo.” Since the photograph shows only dead bodies, those who see this without any explanation may imagine something more atrocious.

The “South Gate” was identical with the Zhonghua Gate, where, as previously noted, a severe military engagement caused a number of combat casualties both on the Chinese and Japanese sides. Although the victorious force usually recovers its own dead, the losing side generally retreats by leaving behind their own casualties. Thus, as Matsuo handwrote on the photograph, this depicts an “aftermath of severe battle.”

Nevertheless, RON-YY captioned this image as “A massacre site photographed by a Japanese journalist outside of the South Gate.” RON-YY’s editors seemingly pounced on the stamp mark of “not permitted,” and arbitrarily used it as an atrocity photo.

Photo 136: The same photograph featured in the RON-YY, p. 64, is captioned, “A massacre site photographed by a Japanese journalist outside of the South Gate.”
Photo J is also Matsuo’s as his handwriting clearly reads, “Photographed by Matsuo.” The handwritten caption on the right says, “A Chinese regular soldier caught stealing canned food of the Japanese army. In the south of Yuepuzhen.” Most likely, Matsu captured this image by pure coincidence as he happened to be at the scene of this arrest. Cans are certainly observable as indicated with an arrow. Again, the viewers may well consider this as a scene that depicts Japanese soldiers abusing a Chinese man.

Photo J

Photo 137

Photo J: *Fukyoka shashin: shiriizu 20-seiki no kiroku*, p. 77. The handwritten explanation identifies the man surrounded by the Japanese military personnel as a Chinese soldier who “had stolen canned food from the Japanese army.”

Photo 137: A caption attached to the same image in *Nihon no shinryaku: Chūgoku Chōsen*, p. 49, says, “A Chinese soldier who failed to retreat in time and was caught. Near Yuepuzhen. This photograph was also prohibited from publication out of concern about international repercussion.”
As for *Nihon no shinryaku: Chūgoku Chōsen* [Japan’s invasion: China and Korea] by Kuraha Kiyotaka and Kajimura Hideki, it carries the Photo J with a considerable degree of alteration. While Matsuo’s handwriting was almost deleted, only the stamp mark of “not permitted” remains as seen on Photo 137. Furthermore, its caption reads, “A Chinese soldier who failed to retreat in time and was caught. Near Yuepuzhen. This photograph was also prohibited from publication out of concern about international repercussion.” (Emphasis by authors) RON-YY also attaches to this image the following caption, “The killing of a Chinese civilian in progress at the town of Yuepu near Shanghai. (This photo was taken by a Japanese journalist. The seal on the right side of the photo was put on by the Japanese News Censorship Bureau. It reads: “Not permitted.”)

On top of their disregard of the original photographer’s explanation, the editors of these publications concocted its caption arbitrarily for their own convenience: “arrest” of a Chinese “regular soldier” was turned into “killing” of a Chinese “civilian” while the reason for his capture was changed from “stealing canned food” into the failure “to retreat in time.”

An important side note is that it was almost an established international custom to disallow the publication of photographs depicting POWs on the media. The same was true of Japan at the time. Although this photograph was not permitted for publication, that Matsuo was able to photograph this scene indirectly proves that it was not a scene of illegitimate act committed by the Japanese soldiers.
Images Photographed by the Japanese (4): Photographs of Murase Moriyasu

On its August 16, 1983 issue, the *Mainichi Newspaper* printed Photos 138 and 139 under the headline, “The Nanking massacre was the fact: Photographs taken by a Japanese army veteran.” Discussion of the background information pertinent to these photographs should precede their detailed analysis.

The name of that Japanese army veteran is Murase Moriyasu. Since their appearance on the *Mainichi Newspaper*, they have been reprinted in a substantial number of publications, including some teaching materials for children in Japan, as undeniable evidence of the alleged Japanese atrocities. They have also become book cover images: Photo 138 for RON-I and QINHUA, and Photo 139 for the Chinese collection of atrocity survivor testimonies.

Murase started serving in the 17th motor transport company of the supply regiment headquartered in Meguro, Tokyo, as a private second class in July 1937. He visited such locations as Pusan, Tianjin, Beijing, Dalian, Shanghai, Nanking, Xuzhou, Hankou, the

![Photo 139 and Photo 138]

Photo 139: *Watashi no jūgun Chūgoku sensen*, p. 46. Judging from its width, this river is not the Yangzi. It is more likely a small river that flows into the Jiajing, a tributary of the Yangzi.
Shanxi Province, and Nomonhan during his tour of duty before his homecoming in January 1940. He had a part of “some 3,000 photographs” which he had taken during that time period published in 1987 under the title of *Watashi no jūgun Chūgoku sensen: Murase Moriyasu shashinshū—Ichi heishi ga utsushita senjō no kiroku* [My battle record at the China front: Photo collection of Murase Moriyasu—record of battlefields as photographed by a soldier]. The following is an excerpt from the book’s postscript that sums up how it was published.

In the summer of 1983, Mr. Satō of *zenshōren* [a federation of Japanese small businesses] secretariat asked me to contribute an article—as well as photographs if any—to the federation’s monthly magazine. One of these photographs printed on the magazine caught the attention of Mr. Tominaga of the Japan-China Friendship Association, who subsequently displayed it at a war photograph exhibit at a church in Tokyo. Then, Nameshida Takashi of the *Mainichi Newspaper* saw it and had it reprinted on the paper. The result was the media uproar.

Some 170 photographs on Murase’s book are mostly snapshots of Japanese soldiers, localities where they were stationed, and aftermaths of battles. Some of them, however, attracted media attention as photographic evidence of the alleged Nanking massacre.

A question worth asking here is whether or not Murase witnessed the alleged massacre himself. Murase entered the following passage at the beginning of the section that listed the photographs of Nanking: “As we passed through each village on our way to the frontline, we began to see the bodies of those who had been massacred.” One may, however, question the truthfulness of his statement that he witnessed the remains of “those who had been massacred.”

Certainly, more dead bodies one was likely to see, the closer he approached to the frontline. One of the 6th Division veterans said in his recollection, “The piled up bodies of the enemy, barbed wires that had been severed, and numerous weapons and uniforms abandoned—all of these testify eloquently to the severity of the fighting until yesterday.” Thus, contemporary observers all considered these bodies as combat casualties in the aftermath of military engagements in the frontline.

Although Murase claimed to have witnessed the “bodies of massacred people,” that he considered them as the civilians whom the Japanese troops had massacred was an arbitrary conjecture. The perpetrators may well have been the Chinese. Furthermore, Chinese civilians were likely to evacuate their residences when their locality was about to become a battlefield.

A sad reality of war is that combat deaths result from it. By disregarding this fact, Murase concluded that those dead bodies that he had witnessed belonged to the victims of the Japanese atrocities. Murase went on to say, “For unknown reasons, our supply column was not permitted to the inside of the city walls for two weeks. There was a rumor originating from unconfirmed sources that a large-scale killing was in progress inside the city walls.”
Photo 140—one of Murase’s—shows the Zhongshan Gate seen from the outside. So does Photo K, which a correspondent of the *Tokyo Nichinichi Newspaper* took on December 16, 1937. As for Photo L, it was a photo of the same gate filmed from the inside on December 17—the date of the victory parade. A close look at the passages of the gate on these photographs reveals that the debris seen at these gate passages on Photo K had been removed considerably on Photo 140. On Photo L—the last taken of the three—one can see one of the passages (indicated as “a”) completely open, and two others

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Photo K: The Zhongshan Gate seen from the outside of the city walls. Photographed on December 16, 1937. *Tokyo Nichinichi Newspaper*.

Photo L: The Zhongshan Gate seen from the inside of the city walls. Photographed on December 17, 1937. *Tokyo Nichinichi Newspaper*.

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Photo 140: *Watashi no jūgun Chūgoku sensen*, p. 43.
half open. Since Murase most likely took his photograph on December 16 or 17, he could have entered the city through the passage “a.”

If his unit had to stay outside the city walls under an order, it was most likely because of a practical reason. Since two other passages of the gate were still blocked by debris, its removal required the use of vehicles. Thus, Murase’s unit was outside the city walls probably because it was assigned to transport that debris out from the city gate passages. Another possible reason was that the Japanese army command allowed only those units assigned with specific missions to enter the city and prohibited the entry of others. This restriction, partly for the security of the civilians, also required each unit to be quartered only at a designated location.

Although Murase noted a rumor of the massacre perpetrated by the Japanese troops, he did not record when and from whom he heard it. Nor did he verify that rumor. In reality, he certainly saw dead bodies but did not witness the actual scene of the killing. Commenting on Photos 138 and 139, which he himself took, Murase said,

When the restriction on my unit’s movement was finally lifted, I went to the Xiakuan wharf to receive some cargos. There, I saw the river shore filled with corpses. Buried partially in the mud of the shore, they covered about ten meters from the shore. I wondered if that was the very spot where the massacre as rumored had taken place. There were practically no uniformed men, and most of them were plain-clothed civilians that seemingly included some women and children.

His wordings like “I wondered . . .” and “seemingly included some women and children” suggest that he presented only his speculations. The readers, however, may well judge these scenes depicted on the photographs as an aftermath of the massacre.

Whether or not those bodies shown on the photos belonged to the victims of the alleged massacre is, however, an open question. One may even question whether or not there was really a massacre in the Xiakuan area.

Contingents of the Japanese army and navy made their final approach to Xiakuan on December 13. According to an account which Hashimoto Mochiyuki of the Japanese navy contributed to the Kaikō [ex-Japanese army officers’ association] magazine, “Some Chinese soldiers held on to their rifles or machine-guns, but none of them were wearing uniforms” in the Xiakuan area. The Japanese troops encountered those plain-clothed Chinese soldiers who were about to begin their attempt to swim across the Yangzi River. Referring to these Chinese soldiers, Sekiguchi Kōzō of the Japanese navy said in his recollection published on the same magazine, “None of them displayed a white flag or raised their hands to surrender to us.” As long as the opponent indicated no sign of surrendering, the Japanese forces had to continue their military actions. In response, the Chinese military men either counterattacked by firing their weapons, or tried to escape on board some floating objects like rafts or by swimming.

Kajiya Takeo, who was a sergeant of the Nanking second anchorage unit, described the aftermath of this battle in his field diary. In his diary entry of December 22,
In 1937, Kajiya wrote, “We had some soldiers clean the roads in the Xiakuan area, and had them dump the dead bodies into the Yangzi River.” He also noted in his diary that on December 26, he used some 40 coolies to remove the dead amid a stench arising from them. Thus, many Chinese soldiers met their unfortunate death by drowning close to Xiakuan. It is thus more reasonable to conclude that Photos 138 and 139 depict a mass of the dead bodies belonging to such Chinese soldiers.

Map 1:

Map 1: Location of the battle of Shanghezhen fought by the Kagoshima-based 45th Infantry Regiment’s 11th company under the 6th Division
Xiakuan Jiangdong Gate  Shanghezhen
Map 2: “Assault on Nanking.” A map on p. 79 of Doronko no hei by Hamazaki Tomizō, who participated in the battle of Shanghezhen as a soldier of the 45th Regiment.

Another possibility, judging from the existence of trash seen floating around these corpses, is that these were the bodies of combat casualties drifting ashore from upstream. Actually, there was indeed a military engagement on the Yangzi river bank in the west of the Zhonghua Gate early in the morning of December 13. At Shanghezhen, about 200 men of the 45th Regiment’s 11th Company under the Japanese 6th Division clashed against some 20,000 Chinese soldiers who had been retreating all night from Nanking. Lance corporal Fukumoto Tsuzumi of that company noted in his field diary that some 40,000 enemy troops surrounded his unit. According to his record, the resulting battle killed 14 men of his unit, including Captain Ōzono Naozō, who was commanding the company, and wounded 35. After that, Second lieutenant Akaboshi Takashi took over the command of the company. The following is an excerpt from Akaboshi’s publication entitled Kōnan no haru tōku: Nikka jihen senki—Jōkachin no gekisen [Spring yet to come in southern China: Battle record of the Sino-Japanese War—A battle at Shanghezhen].
The intensity of the enemy’s attack finally began to slacken with the lapse of time. The Chinese troops that had been marching toward us until shortly before started moving toward the Yangzi shore. Then, I saw them stripping themselves and jumping into the river. Some others built rafts out of lumbers which they had found nearby to escape on the river. It was at that moment that a mountain artillery piece was positioned on the road. It opened fire on these Chinese soldiers. I could clearly see a raft and soldiers blown up with each blast. All the eighteen shells we possessed at the time made successful hits on the targets. With the termination of the artillery fire, the battle was over. . . . There was a rumor that my company—the 11th—had been annihilated.

Tani Hisao, who commanded the 6th Division, Ushijima Mitsuru, a brigade commander under Tani, and Takeshita Yoshiharu leading the regiment of the 11th company, inspected this battlefield on the following day. As for Akaboshi, he accompanied Obara Shigetaka, the commander of the 3rd Battalion of the same regiment, to clean the aftermath of the battle. Akaboshi said, “We counted 2,377 dead bodies of the opponent in and around the road. By adding those who were killed in the Yangzi, we estimated the loss we had inflicted on the opponent at about 10,000.”
Photo N: A photograph among the record files of Akaboshi Takashi. The person indicated with an arrow mark is Mr. Akaboshi.


A map included in Akaboshi’s book indicates the existence of lumber repository—where some Chinese soldiers most likely constructed rafts.

Such is an account included in Akaboshi’s book which was published in 1968—well before Honda Katsuichi’s Chūgoku no tabi or Murase’s photo collection came out. Higashinakano’s “The Rape of Nanking” no kenkyū quoted almost the same story given by Takahashi Yoshihiko, who as a first lieutenant of the Independent 2nd Mountain Artillery Regiment directed the artillery attack as described in Akaboshi’s account. Likewise, Hamazaki Tomizō, who had fought under Akaboshi as a non-commissioned officer in Shanghezhen, said in his privately published book entitled Doronko no hei [Soldiers covered with mud], “Those enemy combatants who had attacked us either jumped into the river or tried to extricate themselves on board small ships or rafts. They left behind several thousands of dead bodies.”

Thus, those Chinese soldiers who attempted their escape boarding the rafts were blown to death by the artillery fire, and their bodies were probably washed ashore downstream. What Murase photographed with his camera was possibly a scene of the Chinese military men killed in such a manner. Although one cannot determine whether
these were the bodies of the Chinese soldiers killed in Shanghezhen or in Xiakuan, there is no evidence to prove that the Japanese army had massacred them unlawfully. It was more probable that they were casualties of a legitimate combat action.

Photo 141

An article featuring Second Lieutenant Akaboshi Takashi in the January 14, 1938, issue of the Kagoshima Nichinichi Newspaper.

Photo 141: Watashi no jūgun Chūgoku sensen, p. 49.

Those who live in peace time today may well be critical of the merciless nature of the Japanese army’s military action if they see its aftermaths as shown on these photographs. But it happened on the battlefield which a cruel rule governed—if the Japanese had not fought fiercely, they would have suffered more losses.

To conclude the discussion of the Murase photographs showing dead bodies close to the river shore, another photograph—Photo 141, which has appeared alongside with Photo 138 in most published sources—should be subjected to scrutiny as well.

If one is convinced that Photo 138 is a snapshot of massacred victims, one is likely to interpret the scene shown on Photo 141 as the Japanese attempt to cover up the trace of their atrocity by removing the bodies off shore.

The reality was that the Japanese army had no way but to carry the corpses away from the shore since these human remains on the Yangzi river bank were difficult to be transported to the land. Not only because of the heart-wrenching appearance of these soulless bodies but also because of sanitary reason, the Japanese troops on board boats
removed them away from the shore to the midstream. According to the recollections of Sergeants Fujita Kiyoshi and Arai Toshiharu as quoted in *Nankin senshi* [History of the Nanking battle], they witnessed two “privately owned boats” chartered by soldiers of an engineering unit dragging the dead bodies away from the Yangzi shore on December 17. They noted that it was estimated to take 15 days to complete all the work. There is yet another photograph—Photo 142—that captured such a work in progress. RON-YY’s caption says Ide Junji—a war correspondent attached to the 8th aviation battalion—photographed this image.

Photo 142

Photo 142: RON-YY’s caption of this photograph identifies its photographer as “Japanese military journalist Junji Ide.”

Photo 143
Photo 143: Although this photograph is identified as the one taken by Murase Moriyasu in *Shōgen Nankan daigyakusatsu*, it is not included in Murase’s own publication *Watashi no jūgun Chūgoku sensen*.

Although a number of individuals, including those mentioned in the preceding paragraphs, either participated in this work or witnessed it, none of them called these human remains as those of the massacre victims.

There is yet another photo that is associated with Murase and is worth analyzing here. Photo 143 has appeared in multiple publications, including RON-YY and *Shōgen Nankan daigyakusatsu*—the Japanese translation of the Chinese witness account collection. Although the viewers may consider Photo 143 as a possession of Murase—especially if it is printed alongside Photos 138 and 139 as it is on *Shōgen Nankan daigyakusatsu*—Murase’s publication does not include it.

If one assumes that Murase indeed took Photo 143, one may detect inconsistency in the photo caption in *Shōgen Nankan daigyakusatsu*. It says, “One soldier led a suspicious-looking man to his unit. Then, I heard a gun shot and hastened to the scene to
find an old man lying on the ground. That man turned out to be only a peddler.” If this explanation told the truth, Murase could have photographed only that old man who was already lying dead and could not have captured the upper portion of Photo 143—a scene immediately before the alleged shooting by the Japanese soldier.

Murase may have “provided” these photographs to these publications. That fact alone, however, cannot serve as a clue to determine whether Murase himself photographed them or he merely possessed them—a matter of crucial difference. In the postscript to his book, Murase said, “My memory began to fade with the passage of nearly half a century. To compensate for some uncertain points, I referred to some published sources such as Ichioku-nin no Shōwa-shi by the Mainichi Newspaper.” This remark may well suggest that Murase hinted at the occurrence of massacre by relying on uncertain memory without solid authentication.

The readers themselves should judge the probative value of these photographs that originate from clearly identifiable sources. The readers should, however, keep in mind a reality on the battlefield—one is likely to witness numerous dead bodies in the aftermath of military engagement. Those human remains inevitably attract the attention of the people carrying a camera.

If the Japanese army had started massacring the civilians in Nanking indiscriminately upon their entry into the city—as alleged today by many—a large number of photographs that depict the carnage of such a slaughter should be available today. For example, although Rev. Magee indeed captured an image of an old man standing beside some dead humans, he could have recorded more such scenes in his motion picture or camera films. But his records do not include such images.

It seems that those photographs with clearly identifiable origins rather prove indirectly that the Japanese army did not commit the alleged atrocities.
Chapter 5: Conclusion: Non Photographs Can Stand as Viable Historical Evidence

Search for definitive clues for photo analysis

Reviewing the Nanking atrocity photographs, a project of the Nanking research association’s photo research team, lasted nearly three years. This undertaking required more time than originally expected because the research process was stalled by the lack of definitive analytical tools to verify the authenticity of the photographs in question. The issue that often concerned the research team was that laborious analytical work would come to naught, regardless of the amount of energy expended for this endeavor, if the analytical methods employed were judged to be arbitrary.

An informative case that one may draw on in connection with the analytical tool issue is a controversy that arose over a photograph printed in the *Los Angeles Times* some years ago. A close look at that photograph revealed that it depicted an individual twice. The *LA Times* initiated an investigation in response to an inquiry from a reader, and the investigation led the photographer to admit that he had combined two different images that were photographed almost simultaneously and at the same location with his personal computer. As a result, the *LA Times* terminated employment of the photographer and posted an apology in its paper.

Another example was an image of the three Japanese nationals who were taken hostage in Iraq. In that photograph, one of the three was showing a desperate gesture of pleading for help, with his neck strangled by a captor. When a commentator examined the photograph, he hinted at a possibility of exaggeration by pointing to what appeared to be a choreographed move on the hostage’s part. After their release, they more or less admitted to this.

If there is any suspicion of fabrication or exaggeration with respect to a photograph, as illustrated by these examples, the surest method to verify the assumption is to contact the individual or individuals closely involved in the actual photographing. Such a procedure is considered to be the only way to determine whether or not a photographic image truly shows a scene of alleged Japanese atrocity. The research team’s concern was that any other method would not prove to be absolute.

The problem is, however, that there is no way to conduct such an investigation since most of the photographs are of unknown origin—even the identity of who took them is not clear in most cases. Accordingly, our approach was to substitute the surest way with other means such as: to identify the source where the photograph first appeared, to compare multiple sources that carried the same photograph, to identify the location where the photograph was taken by looking for other photo pieces that showed the same scene, and to consult with as many sources that recounted the events of the time as possible. The analysis of the research team gradually became near-perfect with the adoption of such a multiple-oriented approach.

Yet, the analysis of the research team was unable to solve one puzzle—a riddle that kept the review work short of perfect in the eyes of the research team members. As indicated many times in the preceding chapters, a number of photographs were judged not to be evidence of alleged Japanese atrocities in Nanking because they depict scenes of
spring or summer time—as illustrated, for example, by the outfits of the individuals captured in the photographs—instead of winter time when Japanese troops entered the city. Such a finding constitutes, however, merely circumstantial evidence and cannot be definitive grounds for disproof. One may contend, for example, that the people were dressed thin because the winter in Nanking in that year was milder than usual.

Thus, two clues helped us to answer this question. First, as demonstrated in Chapter 3, shadows seen in the photographs proved to be useful tools to determine the season in which they were taken. Second, a passage in the GMD propaganda bureau’s document—which was unearthed in a truly timely manner—turned out to be a very useful clue. “Sheying Gongzuo Gaikuang” [Summary of Film Operations] within “Zhongyang Xuanchuanbu Guoji Xuanchuanchu Gongzuo Gaiyao” [Summary of Operations by The International Propaganda Division of the Central Propaganda Bureau] contains the following passage:

Our division [International Propaganda Division] started its full-scale operations when Guoji Xinwen Sheyingshe [International News Film Corporation] under our supervision transferred all its filming equipment, materials, and several thousands of photographed films to the Zongyang Tongxinshe Sheyingbu [Central News Agency’s Filming Bureau] in the spring of 1938. We also furnished financial assistance to the agency so that we could combine our efforts for effective uses of filmed materials.

Thus this passage makes clear that the GMD propaganda bureau’s International Propaganda Division commenced its operation for the production of propaganda photos in the spring of 1938. As another piece of indirect evidence to corroborate this fact, one should refer to a letter which Harold J. Timperly sent to Miner S. Bates prior to the publishing of Timperly’s What War Means. In a letter dated March 14, 1938, Timperly complained about the high cost of photographs and said that the publisher was requesting 200 photographs. One may thus reason that the photographs printed in WMRB, published in July 1938, were pieces which the GMD propaganda bureau either collected or produced in a hasty manner through their “filming operation” so that these images could be ready in time for publication of the book. This reasoning is likely to be an answer to the aforementioned puzzling question—many of the acclaimed atrocity photographs captured the scenes of early spring to summer.

One may, however, ask another question—why did the GMD propaganda bureau not pay attention to the background and people’s clothing in the course of producing the photo pieces that were designed to impress the prospective viewer with the alleged winter-time atrocities in Nanking? The answer is that the GMD propaganda bureau did not have any notion that a large-scale massacre had occurred in Nanking, and that they intended to merely conduct a general wartime propaganda campaign. For more detailed analysis of this topic, one should refer to Nankin “gyakusatsu” kenkyū no saizensen, 2003 version, and Higashinakano’s article, “Nankin “daigyakusatsu” o kutsugaesu ketteiteki shōko o hakkutsu-shita” [Definitive Evidence Unearthed for Refuting The Alleged Rape of Nanking].

The research team also found an explanation as to why some individuals’ demeanor and posture appeared unnatural in some photographs—as well as in the motion
pictures which the preceding chapters did not discuss much in detail. In reference to the making of short movies for overseas propaganda purposes, the previously mentioned GMD document contained the following passage:

Our division [International Propaganda Division] obtained the assistance of many U.S. experts in the editing of the movies. Since it was our first experience in this enterprise, we were short-handed in terms of both manpower and needed materials. We were unable to create background sets or to hire actors. As a result, we had no choice but to film the scenes outdoors, using props available on the spot, as if recording a documentary program. All the people who appeared in these films are our honorable stars—the students of the military academy in the movie “Jianjun” [Founding of Armed Force], the sober-minded populace in “Fearless Chongqing,” and peasants and factory workers in “Tongyou” [Wood Oil]. Likewise, a variety of weapons used in “Jianjun” and a numerous vehicles depicted in “Yunnan-Burma Line” are all our props.

This quote explained the oft-seen unnatural demeanor on the part of the characters shown in both camera photographs and in motion pictures—they were students, peasants, and workers mobilized as amateur actors or actresses on the spot to pose for either still photographs or movies. They were “extras” whom the GMD propaganda bureau used for the creation of its propaganda footages for distribution to the media overseas.

**Media tool for arousing pro-Chinese and anti-Japanese sentiment internationally**

The research team was confident that its analysis became near-perfect in the end. The team made some surprising discoveries in the course of its research. One such discovery was the following quote from the GMD propaganda bureau’s confidential report:

Since *Guangguang Xinwen Sheyin Tongxinshe* [Guangguang News Film Communications Company] had started distributing news articles, the photographs originating from that company accounted for 95 percent of all the photos printed with China-related news articles all over the world. Foreign correspondents in Chongqing always purchased photographs from that company and published them as if they were their own. The company is almost the sole provider of news photographs to foreign correspondents and dignitaries who wish to collect photographic materials.

As previously noted in this chapter, the GMD propaganda bureau consolidated all propaganda filming activities under the central news agency’s filming bureau in the spring of 1938. Thereafter, according to this report, the central news agency’s filming bureau was transformed into the Guangguang News Film Communications Company, which distributed 95 percent of all the news photographs that appeared with China-related articles in newspapers or magazines all over the world in 1939.

The same confidential report also made references to those foreign
correspondents who assisted in the bureau’s work. Among them were Archibald Steele of the Chicago Daily News, who wired the “Nanking Massacre Story,” and F. Tillman Durdin of the New York Times. The report also mentions Life magazine, which has often been an object of discussion in the preceding chapters. Another intriguing finding was that this report was often side-noted with phrases such as “photographs selected for articles to be provided for war propaganda purpose.”

Such was the frantic effort by the GMD propaganda bureau to disseminate its own photographs all over the world under the names of these foreign correspondents. They tried to enlist the support of the United States for their war against Japan and for their survival. As a consequence, as Theodore H. White said in his In Search of History: A Personal Adventure, “It was considered necessary to lie to it [the United States], to deceive it, to do anything to persuade America . . . That was the only strategy of the Chinese government . . .” White, who had just graduated from Harvard University, was an adviser to the GMD propaganda bureau under the Chinese name Bai Xiude.

The result was the production of a variety of wartime propaganda photographs. The pioneering work was the photograph of a crying baby at the Shanghai railroad depot as discussed in Chapter 2. According to Dong Xianguang, deputy chief of the GMD propaganda bureau, its photographer was Wang Xiaoenting, a noted cameraman of the central news agency’s filming section. Wang worked for this section, which was a “joint venture” between Dong Xianguang and Xiao Tongzi, chief of the Central News Agency—the sole and largest news service company in China at the time.

As detailed in the discussion in Chapter 2, the October 4, 1937, issue of Life carried the photograph as one taken by “H.S. Wang.” The image is said to have played a pivotal role in drastically turning American public opinion to pro-Chinese and anti-Japanese. As an indication of this attitude, Life’s January 3, 1938 issue featured the photograph again with a caption of “War in China” as the second ranking news story in “Best News Stories of 1937 . . . picked by the News readers.” Tong hailed this as a “masterpiece.”

The essence of such use of photographs was propaganda warfare, the extent of which even surpassed in intensity as the one conducted by the Nazi propaganda ministry. Fabrication was indispensable for propaganda warfare. Not only then did the GMD propaganda bureau’s operations misled Japan and world public opinion. Its operations still reverberates seven decades later in today’s world as it has vastly influenced in favor of the Chinese side the controversy over the Nanking massacre.

To terminate the cycle of hateful sentiment

Based on the analyses in the preceding chapters, the research team would like to present the following three conclusions.

First, no photographic evidence is available to substantiate the allegation that, for six weeks, Japanese troops perpetrated a large-scale massacre, rape, arson, and robbery in Nanking. The research team’s objective was, of course, not to determine whether or not such a massacre took place. The objective of its analysis was to examine the probative value of the photographs that have been in widespread use as “evidence” of alleged Japanese atrocities. The number of photographs reviewed by the team amounted to some 30,000 pieces, of which none could have been judged to stand as
“evidence” of the alleged massacre in Nanking.

Second, the research team’s analysis revealed that the so-called evidential photographs of the Nanking massacre that are available in the public today originated from two Chinese publications—RBS and WMRB. As elucidated in Chapter 2, these two sources featured wartime propaganda photos which GMD sources either fabricated or re-captioned in order to inspire anti-Japanese sentiment in China and in foreign nations, the United States in particular.

Third, the CCP initiated another propaganda war in the 1970s by drawing on these photographs. In Sanshinianlai hua cong tou, which was translated and published in Japan under the title of Pekin yo saraba [Farewell to Beijing], the author—a grandson of Lu Xun—recounted his own experiences in China that illustrate the nature of CCP propaganda activities with the use of photographs. The following is an excerpt:

In 1976, the CCP published a pictorial book in order to commemorate the achievements of my grandfather. . . . Some photographs in which my grandfather posed with other people were reprinted in that book. Prior to reprinting, the editors checked the identity of each person photographed with my grandfather. If they found any “counter-revolutionary” or someone deemed inappropriate to be photographed with my grandfather, they made a point of erasing that person or replaced his/her head with someone else’s in the photo. . . . Although my father . . . asked the CCP authorities to record my grandfather as he was, they did not heed his request at all. Such retouching of photographs is a matter of common and openly implemented practice on the Chinese continent. I myself witnessed such retouching work in progress many times when I worked for Jiefangjun huabaoshe [Liberation Army Photo Publication Company].

At an anniversary memorial service for Mao Zedong, one of the snapshots of the ceremony captured the image of Jiang Qing and Yao Wenyuan. Then, prior to the publication of the photograph, the Gang of Four fell from the power. As soon as this news became known to us, the company head came to our workplace a little panicked in manner and instructed us to remove the Gang of Four and all others who were connected with them in the photograph with the use of retouching techniques.

In summary, the retouching of photographs for media usage was “a matter of common practice” even under CCP rule, and is still true even today. According to a report by the Strait Times of Singapore on September 3, 2004, and Japan’s Sankei Newspaper on the following day, a photograph that showed Hu Jintao shaking hands with Deng Xiaoping in the presence of Jiang Zemin, an image that was captured during Jiang’s tenure as CCP general secretary, was published anew after Hu’s rise to the power with Jiang being erased from the photo. Thus, as common practice, the Chinese authorities still have photographs retouched and re-captioned.

A notable example relevant to the theme of the research team’s work is the group of photographs included in Honda Katsuichi’s Chūgoku no tabi, which was published in 1972. The photographs were originally GMD’s propaganda photos and included some
re-captioned pieces. This publication set in motion the process that disseminated the story of the “Nanking massacre” not only in Japan but also all over the world, which, at the present, has firmly taken root. The preceding chapters of this book, however, demonstrated that most of the photographs that have been in use—such as those included in numerous publications, those on display at the Memorial Hall in Nanking or at media events in Japan—cannot constitute viable evidence of the alleged atrocities in Nanking.

These are the conclusions of our research. We admit that the ultimate evaluation of these findings rests with those who use these pictures and their conscience to reject lie or deceit.” Refusal to exercise common sense and attempting to obstruct the process that uncovers the deceitful elements of history will be tantamount to impeding the construction of a friendly relationship between Japan and China on a long-lasting basis. The deception of the past, if left uncorrected, will continuously create a cycle of hateful sentiment in the bilateral relationship. Sino-Japanese friendship, in the truest sense, will be a reality only when this deception is terminated. The members of the research team only hope that the findings of this work will be useful in removing that obstacle—those “evidential photographs” of alleged Japanese atrocities in Nanking—that stand in the way of fostering genuine friendship between the two nations.

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