An Inquiry into the Truth of the Sino–Japanese Incident (or, the Second Sino–Japanese War)

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This paper's purpose is to conduct an inquiry into the truth of the Sino–Japanese Incident (or "Second Sino–Japanese War"). The Chinese assert that, "the Sino–Japanese War — or the Sino–Japanese Incident — was a war of Japanese aggression. Many Chinese lives and considerable assets were lost due to the invasion by the Japanese Army. The Japanese people need to acknowledge this and apologize from the heart." In consideration of this, we would like to reply to that assertion with a candid question: "Is this really true?"

What is serious about this problem is that there are many Japanese who believe the Chinese assertion, and there are a great many of the intelligentsia who are in agreement with it. When those who had had actual experience in war were the central figures in Japanese politics and business, there was none of this type of thing. They would shut down any argument with the following four points:

1) Exactly who was it who wanted the Sino–Japanese War? Was it really the Japanese?
2) Given the minor shooting affair at the Marco Polo Bridge, who was it who escalated the troubles in the north of China?
3) Who was the person who decided to turn it into a full-scale war between China and Japan, and chose Shanghai to be the battlefield?
4) Who was it that employed scorched earth tactics even though knowing that expanding the war into the Chinese interior would cause suffering to China's citizens?

The feature of today's talk is that we will make clear such questions or problems by means of the official histories of the war kept by both of the parties actually involved in the war. These will be the explanations introduced within the official histories, already published in an illustrated edition, so the answers are not new. The simple fact is, however, that this public, published history has only been read by a few specialists.

The governments of both China and Japan were responsible for the editing and publishing of these war records. The significance of this address being based on the official histories of the war is this:

There are many Japanese (it is a given for the Chinese) who believe that the Sino–Chinese Incident (*Shina-Jihen*) and the Greater East Asian War were conflicts of Japanese aggression; it is from a lack of study and from not even knowing that official histories of the war exist, that this situation is so. The lack of study about the history of the war by the government officials and the bureaucracy is particularly troubling. Because of this lack, there is no way to calculate how many losses Japan has suffered as a nation.

To give one example, there is the so-called reparations paid to China for chemical weapons abandoned in Manchuria, which totalled 200 billion yen. Since weapons of the Japanese Army — including chemical weapons — were handed over to the Soviet Army at the time of disarmament, that should have been an end to it without paying anything. The fact that at the conclusion of the Chinese civil war between the Nationalist and Communist forces, the Communist Chinese Army ordered the population in the area of Halha Peak to take the material and dispose of it, burying it underground, corroborates

this. Those who abandoned the arms were not the Japanese Army; they were the Chinese forces.

We must explain a bit more about the official histories. After a war's conclusion, the governments of the nations involved always compile a history of the war. Compilation of war records is vital research, and some parts are just not available to the public. The results of this endeavor become the official history of the war. All of Japan's military actions starting with the First Sino–Japanese and Russo–Japanese wars are included in these records.

Japan's highest-level research center for military history, the Military History Department of the Defense Agency's National Institute for Defense Studies (at that time, the "Military History Room"), compiled all the information from Greater East Asian War (including the Sino–Japanese Incident [*Shina Jihen*]) into it, and it was then printed by the *Asagumo* Newspaper Company. All told, there are 102 volumes. Therein, all of the military operations on the Chinese mainland — everything from the Manchurian Incident to the start of the Greater East Asian War — are recounted in the three volumes making up the *Shina Jihen Rikugun Sakusen* (Continental Military Operations of the Sino–Japanese Incident).

In China, the official history of the war was compiled by the Military History Division of the People's Liberation Army's Institute of Military Science (the equivalent of the Military History Department of the Defense Agency's National Institute for Defense Studies in Japan). It was published in three volumes under the title *Zhongguo Kang Ri Zhanzheng Shi* (The History of War of Resistance Against Japanese Agression) by Jiefang Jun Chuban (Liberation Army Publishing).

Today, relying on these six volumes of the two countries' official histories of the war, we would like to clarify several questionable points about the Sino–Japanese Incident which, even though called "Incident," became in essence a great war between China and Japan.

First we must touch on the *terminology* of the conflict. Recently, the Sino–Japanese Incident (*Shina Jihen*) have come to be called the "Sino–Japanese War" (*Nitchû Sensô*). "Sino–Japanese War," however, originally referred to the First Sino–Japanese War (*Nisshin Sensô*). Outside Japan it is properly called the Sino-Japanese Incident (*Nisshi Jihen*); but in Japanese textbooks, it is taught only as the Sino–Japanese War. In China it is called the "War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression" (*Kang Ri Zhanzheng*) rather than "Sino–Japanese War."

On top of all this, neither side issued a formal declaration of war; so even if there were "incidents," it wasn't officially a "war." The international laws of warfare were not being applied. In the world of academe, it is vital to clearly distinguish and use the proper terminology. This is why, in this address, we are distinct in usage among terms like Sina and China, as well as "attack," "invasion," "aggression," "luring," etc.

The proper terminology in China may be "War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression"; in Japan is it "The Chinese Incident"; and internationally it would be properly called "Sino–Japanese Incident."

I. The Background of the Sino–Japanese Incident

A. The Manchurian Incident and Sino–Japanese Relations

There are those who say that the Sino–Japanese conflict was fifteen years of warfare. The claim is that the Sino–Japanese Incident began with the Manchurian Incident. This is the assertion of the Chinese Communist Party — but there are also those in Japan who claim that the Manchurian Incident was a Japanese plot calculated to start the invasion of China. But this is a complete mistake in total disregard of the

historical truth.

It is a fact, of course, that the Manchurian Incident occurred on Sept. 18, 1931, that on March 1 of the next year the state of Manchukuo was established, and that the relationship between Japan and China went into decline. In October of that year, the report of the Lytton Commission was issued to the League of Nations. On February 21, 1933, at the General Assembly of the League of Nations, when a resolution was passed against Japan, the Japanese delegation led by Matsuoka Yosuke walked out. On March 27, a formal notice of withdrawl from the League was issued by the Emperor.

One may reckon that Sino–Japanese relations were at their lowest ebb; however, the actual relationship between China and Japan was the complete opposite. In only two short months — on May 31 — Tanggu Truce was signed and the relationship quickly grew even better.

In China's official history of the war, it says "In humiliation, the Nationalist government sought peace." They had no choice but to accept that the Nationalists were pursuing peace with Japan. Even though they were criticised for the "humiliation," China's Nationalist government desired the restoration of peaceful relations between China and Japan, and this authoritative truth cannot be expunged. Even though the Chinese may try to twist the truth somehow to justify their historical view when confronted with inconvenient historical facts, the truth always comes out and the lie is exposed.

In 1933, Chiang Kai-shek's highest priority was the annihilation of the Communist Party, which he appraised as "like a gnat on a lion." In August of that year, he confirmed this by proclaiming the policy "internal security, expel outsiders." (That is to say, "destroy the Communist Party and establish domestic security, and having done that, expel the foreigners.")

In January, 1934, Chiang Kai-shek met with Ariyoshi Akira, minister of legation (former ambassador to Brazil), and Suzuki Yoshimichi, military attaché (lieutenant general), at his official residence. He said then that he wanted to build better relations and move forward with the spirit of compromise between the two nations. Japan, too, wanted to have good relations with China; in May, 1935, both countries' diplomatic legations were elevated to ambassadorial status. Japan's chief-of-legation Ariyoshi was made Japan's ambassador to China, and China's resident chief-of-legation in Japan, Jiang Zuobin, was made ambassador to Japan.

Economic intercourse moved even faster. On July 1, 1933, shortly after the signing of the Tanggu Truce, the direct train line plying between Beiping (present-day Beijing) and Mukden (present-day Shenyang) was reopened. In November, 1934, a postal accord was reached, and in January, 1935, normal postal operations between Manchuria and China proper was re-established. On February 5, telegraph service began; and on June 1, telephone lines were connected. In September of that same year, customs offices were set up at places on the borders between Manchuria and China such as Shanhaiguan. Regular international commerce had begun.

It was said that Japan had withdrawn from the League of Nations and set out on her own isolationist path, but relations with outsiders did not actually worsen. Relations between Japan and China — both political and economic — were progressing, and the reality was that the improvement was phenomenal. It must be noted that the Sino–Japanese relations worsened after 1935 when the Chinese Communist Party fell on hard times.

B. The Chinese Civil War (Chiang Kai-shek's Suppression of the Communist Army) and the August 1 Announcement

Chiang Kai-shek, who had no concerns about any Japanese conflict behind him,

increasingly began laying plans for the complete suppression of the Chinese Communists. Chiang's Nationalist Army, which launched a major attack, continued with battle upon battle and success upon success through November of 1934, when they captured the Communist Party's base in Ruijin (in Jiangxi Province). The defeated 300,000-man Communist force fled from the province of Guangxi through the provinces of Guizhou, Sichuan, and Shanxi. The Chinese Communist Party called this retreat the "Great Western Shift" or the "Long March," but it was a total retreat and at the same time it was very difficult going. By the time they reached Yan'an in Shaanxi province in February of 1936, their force had dwindled to a mere 20,000.

At this point, a series of terrorist activities in opposition to Chiang Kai-shek's declaration for the improvement in Sino–Japanese relations took place in rapid succession. There were a total of fifty incidents in the four-month period from January to May of 1935. As examples, on May 2, Hu Enpu, the president of the *Guoquanbao* Newspaper, was assassinated in the Japanese settlement in Tianjin; and on May 3, Bai Yuhuan, the president of the *Zhenbao* Newspaper, was also assassinated there. Forces had arisen who were opposed to peace and the improvement of Sino–Japanese relations. The Japanese people, however, felt that these were signs of Chiang Kai-shek's insincerity, and mistrust grew.

At this time, the Soviet Communist Party's international arm, the Comintern, ordered representatives from all the world's Communist Parties to assemble in Moscow. In July, 1935, the Seventh Comintern Congress took place in Moscow. At this Congress, the world's Communist Parties pointed to Germany and Japan as present enemies, and they adopted a resolution to devote themselves to defeating them.

On August 1, the Chinese party representatives, Wang Ming and Kang Sheng, proclaimed, "We will form a united anti–Japanese front and wage war against Japan." This "August 1 Announcement" was made public in Paris on October 1.

The gist of this was that the civil war between the Communists and the Nationalists would come to an end and that a single, unified anti-Japanese front would be formed. They would set up a national defense government uniting all of China, but excluding Chiang Kai-shek. They would organize an anti-Japanese coalition army and an anti-Japanese coalition general headquarters to prosecute a war against Japan. This was as good as a declaration of war on Japan. At this stage, in 1935, the ones who wanted a war between Japan and China were not the Japanese, nor Chiang Kai-shek — it was the Chinese Communist Party. A detailed account of the August 1 Announcement appears on pages 54 and 55 of the first volume of *Zhongguo Kang Ri Zhanzheng Shi* (the official Chinese history of the war). It is first-rate evidence for those who are looking into where the responsibility lies for the war between China and Japan.

The one who desired and planned for war — in every respect, schemed for it — and in the end achieved his goal of eight years of war between China and Japan (from the Sino–Japanese Incident in July, 1937, to August, 1945) was Mao Zedong of the Chinese Communist Party. This is clear from the words of Mao Zedong himself.

For example, on June 10, 1960, when a delegation of Japan's Socialist Party members visited China and committee chairman Sasaki Kôzô apologized for the war between China and Japan during an audience with Mao Zedong, Mao replied, "There is nothing to apologize for. [The Sino–Japanese War] has brought great benefits to China. Thanks to the Japanese Army, we were able to take control of the government." This is testimony of very weighty importance, for who but Mao Zedong would have such thorough knowledge of the cause of the war? (From *Shakaishugi Riron to Jitsu* [Socialist Theory and Practice], 1964, September issue.)

These historical documents prove that the ones who wanted a war between China and Japan were the Chinese Communist Party. In addition, the ones who are

most afraid of the truth of this being made clear are also the Chinese Communist Party. The reason is simple: they will lose their position of "being in the right." It is for that reason that they so brazenly foist off onto the Japanese their *own* responsibility for the war.

C. The Xi'an Incident (December 12, 1936)

We have made clear the Chinese Communist Party's responsibility for the war, but why did Chiang Kai-shek cooperate and even participate? What *was* it that made Chiang Kai-shek do an about-face in his strategy, to set out to fight against Japan, and to bring about the destruction of the Chinese Nationalist Party which had brought back peaceful relations with Japan? What did it was the Xi'an Incident.

In the spring of 1936, Chiang Kai-shek knew that the Communist army was holed up in Yan'an and gasping for breath. Thinking that a good opportunity to annihilate them was at hand, he began to make plans for an all-out attack to finish off the Communist Army. Key elements for the punitive force would be the Northeastern Army under Chang Xueliang and the Northwestern Army under Yang Hucheng, but these units were ambivalent about the suppression of the Communist Party, and in fact, thought that they should fight with the Communists against the Japanese. Unlike Chiang Kai-shek, they didn't understand the true nature of the Communists.

Chaing, growing impatient, went to Xi'an on November 12 to encourage Chang Xueliang and Yang Hucheng. When he arrived on the night of the twelfth, Chang and others seized him and forced upon him an eight-point, anti–Japanese demand, with contents identical to the Communist Party's goals — to stop the civil war, amnesty for all political offenses, etc. Chiang Kai-shek rejected their demands. The Nationalist Army, overseeing Nanjing during Chiang's absence, began making preparations for a punitive attack on Chang Xueliang and his compatriots.

Chang, flustered, opened discussions with the Communist Party in Yan'an to settle the problem. Zhou Enlai, accepting the Soviet Union's position, went to Xi'an. Zhou patiently worked to persuade Chiang Kai-shek to agree, and Madame Chiang Kai-shek (Soong May-Ling) also came to Xi'an to persuade him. As a result, Chiang finally agreed to accept the demands of Zhou Enlai and the others, and he was released.

The problem is, did he or did he not promise to stop the civil war, unite the Nationalists with the Communists, and wage war against Japan?

Chiang Kai-shek denied the existence of these secret agreements, but at the end of February, 1937, peace talks between the Nationalist Party and the Communist Party took place in Xi'an where the civil war between the two was ended and an anti–Japanese direction was decided upon. Why had Chiang Kai-shek, who had called for the destruction of the Communist Army and gone to Xi'an to urge his army to victory, gone along with the peace talks, stopped the civil war and agreed to go to war against Japan two months after the Xi'an Incident? We can only see that the acceptance of this joint Communist–Nationalist peace conference was the result of a secret agreement with Chiang Kai-shek.

Chiang Kai-shek, who decided to war with Japan only to bring about the revival of the Communist Party, did not readily enact the agreement for cessation of hostilities. The Chinese Communist Party tried everything to get Chiang Kai-Shek to go to war with Japan, but they were not having much success. At this point, provocations against the Japanese forces stationed in Beiping (present-day Beijing) began, culminating in the occurrence of the Marco Polo Bridge Incident.

II. The Marco Polo Bridge Incident (July 7, 1937)

On July 7, 1937, seven kilometers from the south-west quarter of Beiping, near

the Marco Polo bridge which straddles the Yongding River, a shooting incident took place between the Chinese Army and the Japanese Army, which was conducting night-time drills. The Japanese held back from shooting until 5:40 in the morning of July 8.

The Japanese Army there stationed was the 8th Company (under company commander Lt. Shimizu Setsurô) of the 3rd Battalion, 1st Regiment; the unit of the Chinese Army that fired was the Wanping district garrison (Jin Zhenzhong's battalion of 1,400 men), under the 37th Division (Gen. Feng Zhian, commanding) of the 29th Army (Gen. Song Zheyuan, commanding).

So — why did shooting break out? It was the local Chinese Army's resolute determination for war, brought about by political education from a Chinese Communist Party functionary. Jin Zhenzhong's battalion made strategic preparations with full intent, anxious to do battle with the Japanese Army. This is found on page seven of the second volume of *Zhongguo Kang Ri Zhanzheng Shi*, and in Major Jin Zhenzhong's journal in his own handwriting.

The Chinese Communist Party spared no time with their correspondence. On June 8, when the true situation of the shooting incident was still unclear, a telegram (the June 8 Circular Telegram) was transmitted throughout the country ordering an immediate opening of hostilities, and on the 9th ordering subordinate units to conduct an all-out war with Japan. On that day, Zhou Enlai visited Chiang Kai-shek at Lushan to consult with him, insisting that he keep his promise to actively fight a war of resistance against Japan. (*Zhongguo Kang Ri Zhanzheng Shi*, pp. 8–10.)

Japan was totally opposed to this. Early on the morning of the 8th, the Japanese government, apprised by a report from their army there of the Chinese Army's attack, held a meeting all morning long at the Foreign Affairs Ministry among the three concerned ministries (the Army, Navy, and Foreign Affairs). Principal at the meeting were Ishii Itarô, chief of the East Asian Office (in whose chambers the meeting took place), Ushiroku Atsushi of the department of army affairs, and Toyoda Soemu, representing naval affairs . They confirmed the need for a quick settlement to the incident, and to contain it.

Holding meeting that afternoon, the cabinet, too, decided to keep the incident from expanding and to take measures to resolve the situation where it started. Thereafter, the General Staff Headquarters transmitted General Order #400 to the Japanese Army stationed in China, commanding "No enlargement of the incident, no exercise of military force."

The Japanese Army in China followed the orders of the General Staff Headquarters, going forward with talks with the commanders at the 29th's headquarters to quickly end the hostilities. The result of this was the signing on the night of June 11 of an accord to end the conflict between the Japanese forces and the 29th Army. In addition, a representative of the 29th Army apologized for the incident, and they promised to punish the offenders and to take steps to ensure that there would not be a repeat occurrence.

The Chinese Communist Party, desirous of all-out war between China and Japan, agonized over how to get entangled in an armed quarrel. It was at this point that they carried out a series of terrorist attacks to damage the peaceful entente. The Japanese Army, however, would not rise to the bait. The Chinese Communist Party, knowing that the Japanese forces would not respond to small-scale terrorist action, finally they started directly attacking the Japanese with the regular Chinese Army.

On June 25, Chinese regulars of the 229th Regiment, 38th Division, attacked some members of the Japanese Signal Corps who were repairing telegraph lines in Langfang (the Langfang Incident). The next day, as the Hirobe Battalion was passing through the Guang'an Gate in Beiping, they were fired on by gate guards (the

Guang'anmen Incident).

It was unmistakable that armed attacks by the Chinese Regulars on the Japanese Army had begun. The prudent General Staff Headquarters finally authorized armed action, but limited to the Beiping/Tianjin area, on June 27 (General Staff Headquarters Extraordinary Order #64). This marked the beginning of the Northern Sino–Japanese Incident.

At 8 o'clock AM on June 28, the troops stationed in China that began the attack made a clean sweep of the 29th Army, which was more than ten times its size. At 8 o'clock the next evening, they secured the Beiping/Tianjin area; but the day before, in the eastern Beiping suburb of Tongzhou, "Chinese Peace Preservation Corps" officers massacred 223 people in the Japanese settlement in what came to be known as the Tongzhou Incident.

The simple shooting incident at the Marco Polo Bridge caused an escalation into the North Sino–Japanese Incident. These Troubles were armed attacks on the Japanese forces by regular Chinese Army soldiers.

III. The Widening of the Sino–Japanese Incident into Central China

The expansion of fighting in northern China into central China, and eventually throughout all of China, was the choice of Chiang Kai-shek.

That is to say, it was the Chinese Communist Party who wanted a full-scale war between China and Japan, but the person who resolved to do it and made Shanghai a battlefield was Chiang Kai-shek. At a national defense conference on August 6, before the Shanghai Incident occurred, Chiang had already decided on the direction of the anti–Japanese resistence — a war of attrition.

At that time, the Japanese concession in Shanghai, defended by 5,000 Japanese marines, was being surrounded by 50,000 government troops. In the encirclement, the government troops achieved a well-structured defensive position using trenches built under the direction of a group of German military advisors. With Nanjing, the base of operations of the Chinese gevernment's Central Army, securely behind him, Chiang Kai-shek had complete self-confidence about fighting so close to the international city of Shanghai. He was sure he could win a victory over the Japanese Army while under the eyes of the international community. At the same time Chiang was making preparations in case Japan would start to strike back in full force. He had decided on a policy of using all of China to fight a scorched-earth war — in other words, a war of attrition.

On August 9, the Ôyama Incident took place. Lt. Ôyama Isao of the Japanese marines in Shanghai and his driver were shot and killed by the members of the Chinese Peace Preservation Corps. The Chinese army, using this as an excuse, began preparing for operations.

At 11:30 AM on the 13th, an attack began on Japanese forces near the offices of Shangwuan Publishing, and in the evening Japanese troops near the Bazi Bridge came under fire. The next day, a detachment of Chinese Army troops began an all-out attack on the Hongkou landing forces' base and the defensive line of the Japanese concession. The air force also bombed the *Izumo* (the flagship of the Japanese Third Fleet, which was on a stopover), and the headquarters of the Japanese marines.

On August 15, Chiang Kai-shek ordered a general mobilization, established his Supreme Headquarters, and appointed himself supreme commander of the army and navy.

The Japanese navy, of course, counter-attacked, bombing the Chinese military airbases in Hangzhou, Nanchang, Guangde, and Nanjing. To relieve Shanghai, the army was ordered to form a Shanghai Expeditionary Force under the command of Gen. Matsui Iwane. At a cabinet meeting on August 17, the Japanese government resolved to

renounce plans to contain the conflict and move to a to war footing.

Essentially this was how the Sino–Japanese Incident — which it would be fair to call an all out war between China and Japan — came about. On August 23, the vanguard of the Shanghai Expeditionary Force, the 3rd Division, landed in force and joined in battle with 14 to 15 whole divisions of the Chinese Army. The battle with the Chinese government forces, which had been waiting with all preparations in order, was fierce in the extreme. The Japanese Army's losses increased suddenly, and in an instant they were caught in a stalemate.

On September 23, Chiang Kai-shek signed the Second National Collaboration Agreement between the Nationalist Party and the Communist Party.

To clear up the war situation in Shanghai, the Japanese Army landed the 10th Army at Hongzhou Harbor on November 5. On November 7, the Central China Area Army was newly organized, also with Gen. Matsui Iwane in command, and a Supreme Head Quarters established on the 17th. At the 10th Army's landing at Hongzhou Harbor, the Chinese Army in Shanghai, fearing being cut off without an escape route, began a general withdrawal.

On December 13, the Japanese Army captured the Chinese capital of Nanjing; but with the retreat from Wuhan to Zhongqing of Chiang Kai-shek, who was receiving whole-hearted aid from the United States, the scope of the war grew wider. Thus all of China became a battlefield. As Chiang had originally planned, they employed a strategy of luring the Japanese into China's interior while his forces conducted a scorched-earth policy and left the Japanese Army with no foodstuffs or lodgings.

In his memoirs, titled *Shô Kaiseki* (Chiang Kai-shek [published by Japanese Foreign Policy Committee]), Chiang's close associate Dong Xianguang wrote the facts down:

> "He chose the line of the Yangzi River as a battlefield favorable to us. In case the Yangzi River line fell, the plan was to construct a line of resistance deep in the interior. The shifting situation of the war after is proof that Chiang Kai-shek's thinking on this was correct. However, this plan meant the Chinese people had to endure pain and suffering for many years before this plan finally brought about victory."

Expanding the war into the Chinese interior and visiting hardships on the local population was never the desire of the Japanese Army. The responsibility lies with Chiang Kai-shek, who pursued a scorched-earth strategy that left the injured civilian population to their own devices.

IV. The Lessons of the Sino–Japanese Incident

1. If one investigates the Japanese leadership of the Sino–Japanese Incident, one finds that there are many lessons there that are applicable today. The first lesson would be the cause of victory in the First Sino–Japanese War and the Russo–Japanese War and the cause of defeat in the Greater East Asian War. The reason for the victories of the Japanese Army in First Sino–Japanese War and Russo–Japanese War is that ten years before the wars began they had been anticipated; they were the result of meticulous preparation.

A remarkable example would be the military preparations made by the navy. The threat to the Japanese Navy during the First Sino–Japanese war were the two over-7,000-ton giants the Chinese navy boasted of, equipped with four 30-cm guns — the *Dingyuan* and the *Zhenyuan.* With only one warship of over 4,000 tons (the cruiser *Yoshino*), the Japanese navy had not the means to fight them. Three coast-defense ships were constructed with the quick fitting of a single 32-cm gun to 3,000-ton hulls, but in

only ten short years later in the First Sino–Japanese War, the "Six-six Fleet" was in possession of six 15,000-ton battleships and six 9,000-ton armored cruisers. The fleet, built with painful effort and self-sacrifice, along with the standing army's 13-division structure, were the primary factors in Japan's victory in the Russo–Japanese War.

Immediately after the Russo–Japanese War victory, however, anti–Japanese sentiment grew fiercely among the American people — especially those living on the west coast.

In 1905, San Francisco Department of Education issued instructions for the segregation of Japanese school children. The next year, the United States Congress passed an immigration law banning immigrants from Hawaii to the United States. The Japanese government reached a "Gentleman's Agreement" with the United States to practice self-regulation on emigration. In 1908, however, an anti–Japanese movement rose up in Seattle, and over the next decade sentiments grew more vehement. In California, the state legislature passed an anti–Japanese alien land law, and in 1919, the "Anti–Japanese Committee" was founded. In 1924, the U.S. Congress passed an anti–Japanese immigration law with an overwhelming majority vote.

With the background of this kind of anti–Japanese sentiment in the United States, the American government's opposition to Japan's policies grew all the more forceful. When the Democratic administration of the President Roosevelt was inaugurated, America's anti–Japanese, pro–Chinese Asian policies became all the more conspicuous. The support of Chiang Kai-shek was a striking manifestation of this.

The Japanese government and people had strong pro–American sentiments and ignored the American people's anti–Japanese attitudes and the American government's anti–Japanese laws; they didn't think it would come to war. No preparations were put in place for any policies to stave off war on the off-chance it came. This was a primary cause of the Greater East Asian War.

Now, Japan seems to be about to repeat the same mistaken policies regarding China. Japan is too blind to the anti–Japanese sentiment of the Chinese people and the anti-Japanese policies of the Chinese government. It is true that the Chinese people's sentiment is such that they are not hesitant to make war, and it must be understood that given the build-up in military preparedness of the Chinese government, China's goal — after Taiwan — is Japan. With this realization, it is necessary to be prepared.

B. Finally, we must add a postscript about research materials. This thesis is based on both Chinese and Japanese official historical documents from the war, but contemporary documents of the United States — an independent, third party — backs up the main assertions herein.

First, there is the MacMurray Memorandum from John Van Antwerp MacMurray, the U.S. minister-of-legation in China for the four-year period of 1925–29. He displayed an understanding of the position of the Japanese in China. American ambassador in Japan Joseph C. Grew, who saw the memo, said, "This may be useful in changing the thinking of many of our fellow countrymen, who think Japan is always arrogant and bullies weaklings, and that China was a tyrannized innocent." They were unable to change the Department of State's fanatical prejudice, however. (*How the Peace Was Lost*, MacMurray and Waldron, published by the Hoover Institute.)

Second, there is the book *There Is No Half-way Neutrality* by Ralph Townsend, who had thorough knowledge of the situation in China, and had experience as a vice-consul in Shanghai and Fujian.

Some said a war with Japan was the best means of unifying China. Others said China could regain Manchuria. Meanwhile Chinese reds fanned the

agitation for war as a means of penetrating Chiang's government, knowing that if war came he would be obliged to ally with them.

All this evidence of a definite Chinese campaign for war is on record in the day to day accounts of Chinese papers through early 1937. Had the causes of war gone before an impartial board of inquiry, China's case would not have looked very good.

Publications of the Chinese reds through early 1937 put clearly on record their resolve to force war. — The same Chinese who said early in 1937 that they would attack Japan, get U. S. and Soviet aid, and regain Manchuria, now state that they were set upon without provocation. (p. 28, 29)

More awkward evidence for China is that after the first minor affair near Peiping on July 7, 1937, the Chinese press and mobs of students demanded that Chiang refuse to recognize a peaceful settlement by local Chinese officials, and mobilize for war.

Over a period of months previous there had been recurrent violence against Japanese. The incident which roused greatest indignation in Japan came after tension was already acute, when Chinese soldiers slew a number of Japanese subjects at Tungchow. Japanese gave out the number slain at around 200. U. S. papers gave this event — quite important in launching the war — very little attention.

The location of war is not evidence one way or other. Our own armies have fought in China on two occasions of clear-cut defense. Our war with Tripoli in 1801, after American ships had been attacked was wholly defensive. (p.30)

Both of these books were written by American foreign officers who had lived in China and who had detailed knowledge of the real situation.