


## Chapter 4

### Nanjing, as Observed by Diplomats

..... Major General Sasaki was the top China expert in the Army, had friendly relationships with most of the main leaders of the Chinese Nationalist Party, including Chiang Kai-shek, and understood the Nationalist Party's Revolution. He loved China..... He knew the most about Nanjing before and after its capture. I believed Major General Sasaki's statement expressed the correct view on Nanjing then. I have never seen nor heard a so-called Nanjing massacre. It is said something happened in Nanjing but I think that what Major General Sasaki described in his book was the fact. (Statement by Mr. Iwai Eiichi, Assistant Consul)



Near Chong Shang Road in Nanjing. A Japanese soldier found a carriage, to which he attached the Japanese flag, and ran it with a Chinese riding along.  
(December 23, 1937)

### 36) Interview with Mr. Iwai Eiichi (岩井英一), Assistant Consul

Mr. Iwai Eiichi, a China expert in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, graduated from the Dong A Dong Wen Shu Yuen or East Asian Literary School. It was said that he had a strong network of acquaintances in the military world. His name appeared in the context of several incidents that occurred in China, including the Chengdu Incident and the Xingyi Construction Movement.

I heard that he was in Shanghai in the beginning of 1938 and asked him for interview about the Nanjing incident. Unexpectedly, he sent me a long letter, in which he asked me to call him before the interview. I called him at once and he said he was going to take a trip to Nagoya so we set the interview for the following week. It was 1984.

Mr. Iwai was born in 1899. When we met he was 85 years old yet in very fine health. He practiced judo in the old days and his firm body proved it. His memory was splendid, he remembered China-Japan diplomacy before the War in detail and he talked about those times for an hour. He wrote the book *Memory of Shanghai*, but he spoke to me about things that were not in the book.

“The Ministry of Foreign Affairs should try to get to know the Army and encourage the sharing of information with them,” that was Mr. Iwai's idea. So, he proposed this to Mr. Kawai Tatsuo (河相達夫), the Director of the Information Bureau, to hold a dinner meeting with Army once a month. Attendees were, from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Kawai, Mr. Tanaka Shigetoku (田中重徳), the Chief of the First Department of the Information Bureau, and Mr. Iwai, and from the Army, Mr. Kagesa Sadaaki (影佐禎昭), the Chief of the China Section, and the selection of other members was up to Mr. Kagesa. The first meeting was scheduled for August 13 at a Japanese restaurant in Akasaka. That day, in Tokyo, the decision to dispatch two Divisions to Shanghai was finalized, while in Shanghai, the Chinese Army and Japanese Landing Force initiated battle. Both the Army and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs were in a great stir. They waited for Mr. Kagesa at the restaurant and he eventually appeared. Mr. Kagesa brought with him from the Army, Major Kawamoto Yoshitaro (川本芳太郎) of the Military Affairs Department of the Military Affairs Bureau, who came with Mr. Kagesa, but the other invitee, Lieutenant Colonel Watari Sakon (渡左近), Chief of the China Department of the General Staff Headquarters, could not make it.

During dinner, opposed to the idea of an all-out attack, which Mr. Iwai insisted on, Mr. Kagesa said, “We decided to dispatch two Divisions to Shanghai, and one Division to Qingdao.” Mr. Iwai protested, “All available Divisions should be dispatched to Shanghai, attack Nanjing, and then we can conclude a peace treaty.”

Mr. Iwai believed that if Japan attacked Nanjing, China would surrender. Mr. Kagesa eventually agreed with him. After that, Mr. Iwai visited Beijing and Tianjin in August and September, then Shanghai and Nanjing in December.

– Did you think, at the time, that if Japan captured Nanjing China would have surrendered?

In the previous year, I went to Chongqing from Nanjing to my new appointment, consul-general in Chengdu. Before reaching Chongqing, I had to change to smaller boats a couple of times. The Chang Jiang was a serpentine river and during the week-long trip I felt as though I was in the same place as I was from the previous day. Chengdu was situated in a far, far-off place. China declared already they would keep fighting even if they had to run into the depths of their huge country, so I knew that if we started a war against China, it would get serious. As I met Mr. Kagesa, I knew that the war would not end anytime soon. Nevertheless, to capture the enemy's capital was a main wartime objective.

I guessed that the discussion at the meeting on the 13<sup>th</sup> was conveyed to General Matsui, the Commander of the Shanghai Expeditionary Army, by Mr. Kagesa, the Chief of the China Department, because I heard that, when General Matsui was leaving for China, at the platform at Tokyo Station, he said to the Prime Minister Konoe, who had come to see General Matsui off, that he would advance as far as Nanjing. This meant that Mr. Kagesa gave General Matsui this advice, which was the thought that I shared with Mr. Kagesa. This struck me as I read the Note written by the Prime Minister Konoe. I didn't write this story in my book because it might sound self-serving, but this was very likely what had happened.

– At the end of December 1937, you went to Shanghai and Nanjing.

Mr. Kawai went to inspect the occupied areas and I accompanied him. We left Tokyo on December 31.

– Did someone else accompany you?

No, it was only the two of us.

– After that, did you go to Nanjing?

I went to Nanjing with Mr. Kawai. We stayed in Nanjing for a couple of days. It was three weeks after the capture, so we were unable to find a decent hotel or inn--maybe we stayed somewhere in Nanjing, or found an inn in Xiaguan and stayed there.

– Did you visit the consulate-general?

Well, no. I didn't know in what situation the consulate-general was. We had no particular plan for the consulate-general, but just to inspect the place that we had occupied.

– What was the situation in Nanjing?

The city was a battlefield; it looked like as battlefields do.

– Did you see any scene of a massacre or hear about a massacre?

I didn't see anything. I didn't hear anything. Also, in Tokyo, I never heard of such a thing. Mr. Kawai had a strong personal sense of justice and was very keen to those kinds of rumors. I suspected that the purpose of his Nanjing visit was to investigate the rumor himself.

– Probably after you returned to Shanghai, Chief Kawai talked with reporters Hallett Abend of *The New York Times*, and David Fraser of *The Times* of London. Did you know that?

No, I didn't know that. Mr. Kawai could speak English so he spoke with foreign

reporters. I couldn't understand English, as my specialty was Chinese, so we worked separately, in those cases.

– You were working at the Information Bureau of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. After returned to Tokyo, did you hear something in the Ministry about a massacre?

I stayed in China for about two weeks and returned to Japan on January 13. I have no recollection of such talk in Tokyo as well. It might be possible that I heard something but I had no interest in it so I don't remember.

In 1965, “Biography of a Military Man,” was published, which was a diary written by Major General Sasaki Toichi (佐々木到一), who performed brilliantly as the Brigadier Commander of the Nanjing Attack Forces. Major General Sasaki was the top expert on China in the Army, had friendly relationships with most of the main leaders of the Chinese Nationalist Party, including Chiang Kai-shek, and understood the Nationalist Party’s Revolution. He loved China. Nevertheless, Major General Sasaki joined in on the Nanjing Attack, and after its capture, he served as the Commander of the Nanjing Garrison. He knew the most about Nanjing before and after its capture. I believed Major General Sasaki’s statement expressed the correct view on Nanjing then.

I have never seen nor heard a so-called Nanjing massacre. It is said something happened in Nanjing but I think that what Major General Sasaki described in his book was the fact.

– Mr. Ishii Itaro (石射猪太郎), the Chief of the East Asia Bureau, wrote in his memoir after the War that stories of atrocities in Nanjing quickly spread around the world, causing a sensation, and all accusations focused on the Japanese Army. And he described the relationship between Japan and China, as “China-Japan”, or the “China-Japan” War, China coming first. What was his intention?

Mr. Ishii graduated from the Dong A Dong Wen Shu Yuen, or the East Asian Literary School, like I did. He was senior to me. When Mr. Ishii became consul-general, the news was greatly welcomed and Mr. Ouchi, the head of the Dong A Dong Wen Shu Yuen, held a party for him.

Mr. Ishii thought of himself as an expert on China. However, his ideas were not

acceptable to the Army, and I have also a difference of opinion from him. The Axis Powers gradually gained support from members of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, yet Mr. Ishii was different from them in that respect, too. The expression “Japan-China” was changed to “China-Japan” after the War because China won.

– You went Shanghai again in February, as the Vice-Consul of the Shanghai Consulate-General. In Shanghai then, did you hear something about a massacre?

I left Tokyo on February 25, 1938 and arrived in Shanghai on the 28<sup>th</sup>. I will say again that I heard nothing about a massacre.

### **37) Interview with Mr. Kasuya Yoshio (粕谷孝夫), Assistant Consul**

Mr. Kasuya Yoshio was born in 1909, joined the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1934, and in July 1937 his duty station changed from the London Embassy to the Consulate-General in Shanghai. The Marco Polo Bridge Incident had already occurred, and in Shanghai confrontation between Japan and China was expected as well.

Five months after he was assigned to the Shanghai Consulate-General, Nanjing fell. Several members of the Shanghai Consulate-General entered Nanjing as soon as Nanjing was captured, and in the following year, Mr. Kasuya was appointed Nanjing Consul-General. He was 28 years old.

In January 1938, in Nanjing, several issues arose concerning US interests . In the middle of January, the American consulate complained that Japanese soldiers trespassed on US property. Also, on January 26, an assault occurred on Consul John Allison. The story was that a Chinese woman who claimed that she was raped by Japanese soldier tried to find the offender. Together with Consul Allison, Professor Riggs of Ginling College and Japanese military policeman they tried to enter the Japanese soldiers' barracks. A Japanese soldier started to argue with Consul Allison and the soldier struck Consul Allison. Remember that in the Tokyo Trial (IMTFE), during this very period, the Tribunal accused Japanese soldiers of committing atrocities. Assistant Consul Kasuya went to Nanjing during this period to handle matters pertaining to the interests of foreign

countries, including those of the US.

After the War, Mr. Kasuya served as Ambassador to Peru and Thailand. After retiring in 1971, he joined Matsushita Electric Industrial. I interviewed him in autumn 1985, at his office at Matsushita Electric Industrial, which was located in the World Trade Center Building. Mr. Kasuya was 75 years old, with fine silver-gray hair. He was friendly and smiled during our discussion.

– When Nanjing fell, were you in Shanghai?

Yes. We had the embassy and consul-general in Shanghai but both of them were situated in the same building and their duties were not clearly separated.

Staff included Mr. Okamoto Suemasa (岡本季正), Mr. Tajiri Akiyoshi (田尻愛義), Mr. Sone Eki (曾称益), Mr. Okumura Katsuzo (奥村勝蔵), and Mr. Wajima Eiji (倭島英二).

I was very busy with matters related to the Shanghai area.

– It is said that when the Japanese army entered Nanjing, a massacre occurred. You were at the Shanghai Consulate-General then. Did you hear about the incident?

I never heard anything directly. It is often called a massacre, but I don't understand this. I had been in Shanghai and so busy with matters related to Shanghai.

– At the time, *The New York Times* and Chinese newspapers wrote about Nanjing.

Did they? I didn't read *The New York Times* or Chinese newspapers.

– Americans and Germans who were in Nanjing at the time established the International Committee for Nanjing Safety Zone to demand and protest against the Japanese Consulate. Those demands and protests were sent to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs via Shanghai. Did you hear about these things when you were at the Shanghai Consulate-General?

I didn't hear about these things either.

– According to a memoir written by Mr. Uemura Shinichi (上村伸一), who was the Chief of the First Department of the East Asia Section at the Ministry, protests, reports and photos from Nanjing piled up in a room.

He wrote this? This is the first time I have heard of this.

– The following year, 1938, you went to Nanjing.

In January. I don't remember the exact date. I was in Nanjing until October of the same year.

– Who else were at the Nanjing Consulate-General?

Mr. Fukui Atsushi (福井淳), was, to my memory, the acting consul-general. He was later replaced by Mr. Hanawa Yoshitaka (花輪義敬). Also, Mr. Tanaka Shoichi (田中正一) and Mr. Fukuda Tokuyasu (福田篤泰) were there. Mr. Tanaka spoke fluent Chinese. In addition, a couple of young staffers were there. The Consulate compound had a consulate area and a residence and I lived in the residential area.

– Was Mr. Hidaka Shinrokuro (日高信六郎) there?

When the Consulate was closed in August, I saw him there but after that he returned to the Embassy in Shanghai. Mr. Hidaka was the Chief of the Personnel Department when I joined the Ministry.

– What was the situation in Nanjing?

Uneventful and nothing special. The shops were open and Japanese merchants were there. There was no such thing as a massacre.

– What was your duty in Nanjing?



My duty was to contact and negotiate with foreign countries. There were many foreign consul-generals, and my duty was to negotiate with them. With foreigners there, that means their interests were there as well, so troubles occurred as a matter of course. The American Consul was Mr. Allison, who was later appointed Ambassador to Japan. He spoke Japanese fluently.

– In Nanjing, the International Committee for Nanjing Safety Zone was organized by the third-party nationals like Mr. Rabe and Mr. Bates. Did you see them?

I knew nothing of them.

– The incident, that Consul Allison was struck, happened at the end of January.

Yes. Mr. Allison went to the Japanese soldiers' barracks to either confirm his suspicion or to investigate, and tried to cross a sentry line despite the guard's warning and he was hit--that's what I heard.

– Was it a significant matter?

It was said that the Consul made a claim against Japan and the main office of the Ministry handled it well--thus the matter was soon resolved.

– What kind of person was Consul Allison? Pro-Japanese? Or Anti-Japanese?

He was knowledgeable about Japanese. It seemed that he didn't take the incident badly in particular.

– As an Assistant Consul, you must have performed many negotiations with the Army.

Major Hongo Tadao (本郷忠夫), who was in charge of Army information, handled the responsibility of negotiations. When I got a claim against the Army from a foreign consulate, I negotiated with Major Hongo. He was a son of General Hongo Fusataro (本郷房太郎.). Later, Major Hongo died in New Guinea; he was a good man.

Later, Colonel Hirota Yutaka (広田豊) arrived as the Chief of the Negotiations Department. Mr. Hirota had an office in Shanghai, he was a calm person. Mr. Hirota could speak English, he lived in the US at one time and he was a so-called globally minded person. He knew the US well. I assumed that he belonged to the “common sense” group. Later, he transferred to the aviation sector and became a divisional commander.

And, though it was only once, I met Colonel Muto Akira (武藤章). He had an ear for listening. His attitude, of hearing people voice themselves, might be related with his high position, but anyway, he was not an arrogant person.

– From the end of January to the beginning of February 1938, Major General Homma Masaharu visited Shanghai, Nanjing, and Hangzhou, from Tokyo. At that time Colonel Hirota accompanied him.

At the time, Mr. Honma was the Chief of the Second Department in General Staff Headquarters. I heard Mr. Honma had arrived. It was said that he came to inspect specific areas in China. I didn't know Mr. Hirota arrived with him.

– Have you ever heard about the Nanjing incident?

No.

– According to Mr. Johnson, the American Ambassador to China, the Japanese embassy tried to send a telegram and the Army prevented this. Did this really happened at the Nanjing General-Consulate?

No such things happened. I think the Ministry of Foreign Affairs had their own telegraph equipment.

## Supplement

I (Ara) couldn't meet half of the survivors, mostly because of declining health. Nevertheless, they sent me letters and postcards concerning the situation in Nanjing at the time. I exchanged letters with some of them for a number of years. Statements from those who I could not meet in person are as follows.

### **38) Major Yoshikawa Takeshi (吉川猛), Staff Officer of the Central China Area Army**

The Central China Area Army had six staff officers and Mr. Yoshikawa Takeshi, the youngest of them, was the only one still alive. When I asked him for an interview, he was undergoing repeated hospitalizations, so he was not able to talk to me personally. But he was able to answer my questions with detailed letters. At times, due to his illness, his letters stopped but over three years we exchanged eight letters, in which he wrote the following replies:

One dog barked a lie and millions of dogs spread it as truth – once a thing is thought of as true, it is tough to argue and correct it. The first impression deeply pierces into humans' emotion.

In December 1937, as we moved the Headquarters of the Central China Area Army to Suzhou, Staff Officer Ninomiya, the Chief of Logistics, and I, a Staff Officer of the General Affairs Section, were called in by General Matsui. General Matsui gave us a severe scolding, that our treatment of the bodies were wrong, that only the bodies of Japanese soldiers were being handled properly but the bodies of Chinese soldiers were being neglected--this was not acceptable. That was the kind of person Excellency Matsui was.

### **39) Lieutenant Colonel Terada Masao (寺田雅雄), Staff Officer of the 10th Army**

Lieutenant Colonel Terada Masao served as a leading staff officer of the Strategy Department in the 10th Army and later became well-known as the Chief of Strategy Department in the Kwantung Army during the Nomonhan Incident, that is, the Soviet-Japanese border conflicts.

When I asked him for an interview he was over 90 years old and I was unable to meet him. But he answered my questions in his letters below:

Due to the fact that the Operation in the Shanghai Area seemed deadlocked, Imperial Headquarters planned to land the 10th Army at Hangzhou Bay. The 10th Army was very cautious not to take the same path as the Shanghai Area Army took, so they simply focused on strategy.

The 10th Army adopted the strategy to advance in a rush as soon as they landed at Hangzhou Bay. Therefore, they understood that it would be impossible to get supplies from the rear. That's why we had to manage to get food wherever we can. The strategy adopted by the 10th Army was so tough and brave that the enemy in the Shanghai Area quickly withdrew.

Regarding disciplinary problem, it was said that we were wrong to rely on local areas for food. But I don't think discipline of the 10th Army was especially bad.

I never heard of the “Nanjing incident” in those days.

Mr. Terada lived in Obama City, Fukui. When I went to Fukui, I tried meeting with him, but he was bedridden, so I was unable to meet him.

#### **40) Captain Sento Shunzo (仙頭俊三), Staff Officer of the 10th Army**

The 10th Army had the Kunizaki Detachment (mainly 9<sup>th</sup> Brigade, 5<sup>th</sup> Division). The Kunizaki Detachment was instructed to cut off the enemy's retreat by crossing the Yangtze at around Wuhu and advancing to Pukou. Mr. Sento, a Strategy Staff Officer in the 10th Army, joined the Detachment.

Due to his health conditions, I was unable to see Mr. Sento Shunzo in person but he

replied to my letters as well as showed me his memos from the time. His recollection of those days was as follows:

On December 12, 1937 as we advanced to Pukou, which was on the opposite side of the Yangtze from Xiaguan, I saw that our artillery was shooting a number of 15 centimeter high explosive shells over Pukou. The bodies of the enemy, which were floating along both sides of Yangtze, was in the order of several hundreds by my estimate. Bodies were hardly found in midstream. I saw that the quay wall of Xiaguan had turned red, and bodies seemed to have had their hands and feet tied.

I knew nothing about a massacre then. Regarding discipline, as far as the Kunizaki Detachment was concerned, there were no disciplinary problems.

#### **41) Lieutenant Colonel Goto Mitsuzo (後藤光藏), Military Attaché**

Lieutenant Colonel Goto Mitsuzo went to the 10th Army's front line as a Military Attaché and entered Nanjing. He was known as the last Konoe Division Commander.

Due to his health, I could not meet him but he described in his letter the situation when he entered Nanjing.

Nanjing was an empty town--no one there. I stayed at an empty home, nothing happened.

He died in December 1986.

#### **42) Captain Okamura Tekizo (岡村適三), Shanghai Military Police**

While Mr. Okamura Tekizo was in Shanghai, the Shanghai incident occurred. He then went to Nanjing as soon as Nanjing was captured.

He had a health problem, senile ischemia, and I was unable to meet with him, but he did answer my questions in his letter, as shown below:

I didn't hear about Nanjing incident at the time. Regarding disciplinary problem of the troops, I heard nothing in particular from Lieutenant Colonel Yokota Masataka (横田昌隆), Chief of Military Police of the Shanghai Expeditionary Army, Major Uesuna Katsushichi (上砂勝七), Chief of Military Police of the 10th Army, and Lieutenant Fujino Ranjo (藤野鸞丈), Sub-Chief.

I heard the Japanese Army acted arrogantly.

Because he was a military policeman he must have been familiar about disciplinary matters relating to the Japanese Army. I wanted to hear in detail of this from him in person and after several letters were exchanged, he agreed.

On the day of meeting, when I called him from Fukuoka Airport to announce my arrival, one of his family members told me, "He said something in the morning and completely forgot about it in the afternoon, so an interview is impossible." I shrugged and went back home.

#### **43) Mr. Horikawa Takeo (堀川武夫), Reporter for the *Domei Tsushin***

Mr. Horikawa Takeo joined the 16<sup>th</sup> Division and after the War he taught at Hiroshima University.

I was unable to meet him due to his illness, but I listened to him say the following:

As for your question, I didn't see nor hear anything in particular.

#### **44) Mr. Fujimoto Kame (藤本亀), Reporter for the *Asahi Shimbun***

Mr. Fujimoto Kame entered Nanjing through Guanghua Gate on December 13. After the War, he served as the director of the *Sanyo Shimbun* and as the president of Sanyo Hoso Broadcasting. Due to his health, I was unable to meet him, but he wrote me:

I want to inform you that during the time I joined the Army I didn't see nor hear of anything in particular.

#### **45) Mr. Asami Kazuo, Reporter for the *Tokyo Nichinichi Shimbun***

Mr. Asami Kazuo entered Nanjing on December 13. I asked him for an interview, but he declined my request, saying that he had no clear memory of that time. At the same time he stated:

I wish that this fact, of the massacre of the century, will never be denied and denial will not be an occasion to praise--an accompaniment to--militarism.

#### **46) Mr. Nishino Gen (西野源,), Reporter for the *Osaka Mainichi Shimbun***

Mr. Nishino Gen joined the Army from the Nagoya general office of the *Osaka Mainichi Shimbun*, and entered Nanjing through Guanghua Gate with the 9<sup>th</sup> Division.

As to your questions, unfortunately I heard nothing. It is common that a number of groundless rumors fly on the battlefield.

#### **47) Mr. Otani Kosho 大谷光照, Chief Abbot of Nishi-Honganji Temple**

Chief Abbot Kosho Otani visited Shanghai in November 1937 as consolation visit for the Imperial Army in Shanghai, then went to Nanjing to attend the entrance ceremony on December 17. On the 18<sup>th</sup>, the next day, a memorial service, which was held at an airfield within the Castle, was performed by the Chief Abbot.

He described the situation of Nanjing as follows;

I arrived in Nanjing on the evening of the 14<sup>th</sup>, it was the next day after the final capture of the city, and I lodged in Nanjing and stayed for 4 days. I entered the Castle several times and I saw no massacre and heard no rumor of one at all. At that time, the battle was entirely over, the town was calm, no citizens were found there – it was not a circumstance under which a massacre occurred. The Japanese Army lodged inside and outside of the Castle, getting their rest in peace.

#### **48) Mr. Ishikawa Tatsuzo, War Correspondent**

Mr. Ishikawa Tatsuzo was awarded the first Akutagawa prize for his novel, “Sobo (蒼氓),” in 1935 and in 1937 he was dispatched by the magazine *Chuo Koron* to Nanjing, immediately after its capture. He left Tokyo on December 21, 1937 and visited Shanghai, Suzhou, and Nanjing, and returned to Tokyo at the end of January 1938.

During his visit, he mainly met soldiers of the 16<sup>th</sup> Division and, based on his experience during that time, he wrote the novel, “Soldiers Being Alive,” and published it in the magazine *Chuo Koron*, which was released on February 18. However, on the day of release, *Chuo Koron* was banned from sale under the Newspapers Regulation Law and Mr. Ishikawa was prosecuted,. In September, he was sentenced to four months in prison, suspended for three years.

After the War, his novel, “Soldiers Being Alive,” was said to have described the Nanjing incident.

In October 1984, I asked him for an interview but I was unable to meet with him. Later, I found the reason--three months after he declined, in January 1985, he died of pneumonia. At the time I asked him for interview, his gastric ulcer was improving, yet his condition was not good enough to withstand an interview. However, he responded to my letter at that time:

When I entered Nanjing, it was two weeks after the entrance ceremony. I didn't see any trace of a massacre.

It is impossible to clear out hundreds and thousands bodies within a couple of weeks. I have never believed that Nanjing massacre story and I don't believe now.



People the author contacted and received no reply due to death or illness, are:

**Colonel Matsuda Chiaki (松田千秋), Staff Officer of the Shanghai Expeditionary Army**

**Major Yonihana Utakichi (米花宇太吉), Chief of the Press Team, Shanghai Expeditionary Army**

**Mr. Isshiki Tatsuo (一色達夫), Chief of the Photo Team, Shanghai Expeditionary Army**

**Mr. Kojima Tomou (小島友宇), Nanjing Special Service Agency**

**Major Yamazaki Masao (山崎正男), Staff Officer, 10th Army**

**Captain Shimizu Takeo (清水武夫), Staff Officer, 10th Army**

**Lieutenant Colonel Miyamoto Seiichi (宮本清一), Staff Officer, Central District Army**

**Mr. Fukuda Atsuyasu (福田篤泰), Assistant Consul, Nanjing Consulate**

**Mr. Goto Mitsutaro (後藤光太郎), Staff in the Information Bureau, Ministry of Foreign Affairs**

**Mr. Ikeno Seikyu (池野清躬), Interior Ministry official, Ministry of the Interior**

**Mr. Maeda Yuji (前田雄二), Reporter for the *Domei Tsushin***

**Mr. Fudo Kenji (不動健治), Chief of the Photography Department for the *Domei Tsushin***

**Mr. Kato Sho (加藤松), Reporter for the *Domei Tsushin***

**Mr. Haraikawa Chikashige (祓川親茂), Photographer for the *Domei Tsushin***

**Mr. Takasaki Osamu (高崎修), Photographer for the *Domei Tshushin***

**Mr. Kikuchi Hisataro (菊池久太郎), Radio Operator**

**Mr. Tabata Masashi (田畑雅), Photographer for the *Asahi Shimbun***

**Mr. Endo Tshuyoshi (遠藤毅), Chief of Field Senior Post, Transportation and Communications Director General's Office**